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The international economic order is unfair. The global order continues to maintain values and 
practices that sustain the dominance of certain states, entities, and interests to the detriment of the 
fundamental freedoms and development needs of the vulnerable global population. It subordinates 
essential fundamental values, such as economic, social, and political rights; social justice; and 
sustainable development to a peripheral status, while mainstreaming the obdurate commitment to 
an unfettered liberalisation pursuit that mainly favours a privileged few. The institutions 
overseeing the international trade, finance and investment regimes still preserve the colonial 
legacies of power-imbalance, inequity, exploitation, and policies that safeguard the continual 
economic dependence of poorer countries on some affluent entities. Therefore, relying on legal 
evaluations, empirical findings, historical analyses, and political theories, this thesis argues that 
the inescapability of participating in the global system and its hurtful effects on the global less-
fortunate trigger an obligation to reform the international economic and trade regimes.  
In addressing this crisis, this thesis combines global distributive justice theory, the right to 
development, and the Third World critical approaches to international law in proposing five 
conceptual principles that could remedy these normative shortcomings. Furthermore, it 
normatively critiques the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM 
Agreement), particularly the prohibited export and local content subsidies, through the lenses of 
the conceptual principles that it proposes, as case study. It also relied on the infant industry 
economic theory in establishing the need to grant less-industrialised countries the policy space to 
implement strategies that may enhance their prioritised industrial development goals and other 
welfare objectives. It thereafter offers three proposals to improve the equitableness of the SCM 
Agreement. Specifically, this thesis proposes the creation of a special class of subsidy (named 
“Non-Actionable Developmental Subsidies”) to shield (or limit) the usage of certain development-
justifiable subsidies from potential countervailing actions. Also, it explores how the theory of 
grundnorm can be adopted through a proposed “Development Supremacy Clause” with the view 
of prioritising the proposed human rights and development-centred principles in WTO 
Agreements. Finally, it offers some thoughts to improve the effectiveness and operationalisation 
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1.1. Background and Overview 
This thesis is premised on the central claim that the international economic order (IEO) lacks 
fairness.1 The global order continues to maintain values and practices that sustain the dominance 
of certain states, entities, and interests to the detriment of the development objectives of the larger 
world. Fundamental values that are grounded on the ethical idea of “respect for persons”,2 such as 
human rights, social justice, and sustainable development, are considered as peripheral to the 
purely profit-making or commercial objectives of the prevailing economic order. In alienating 
those fundamental values from mainstream economic concerns, they are simply dismissed as 
“value judgements”,3 or classified as “non-economic objectives”,4 especially among contemporary 
positivist economists. By extension, the international economic legal regimes, which mainly 
comprise of trade, investment, and finance, have been significantly segregated from other 
instruments of international law that could challenge its uncompromising commitment towards the 
values of trade liberalisation and the protection of investments – even at the expense of 
fundamental human rights and critical development concerns. Annett, while commenting on this 
deplorable status quo, declared that “the dominant economic paradigm is facing a crisis of 
legitimacy”.5  
 
1 For similar claims on the unfairness or unjustness of the global economic system from the perspectives of law, 
philosophy and economics, respectively, see the following: John Linarelli, Margot E Salomon and M Sornarajah, The 
Misery of International Law: Confrontations with Injustice in the Global Economy (Oxford University Press 2018); 
Aaron James, Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for a Global Economy (Oxford University Press 2012); Joseph 
E Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (W W Norton & Co 2002). 
2 For an explanation on the concept of respect for persons, see: John D Hodson, ‘The Ethics of Respect for Persons’ 
in John D Hodson (ed), The Ethics of Legal Coercion (Springer Netherlands 1983). 
3 For alternative views that deconstruct the avoidance of ethics, values, or moral philosophy among contemporary 
economists, see, Julie A Nelson, ‘Economists, Value Judgments, and Climate Change: A View from Feminist 
Economics’ (2008) 65 Ecological Economics 441; ‘Economists Cannot Avoid Making Value Judgments’ [2018] The 
Economist <https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/02/24/economists-cannot-avoid-making-
value-judgments> accessed 30 April 2021. 
4 Andrea Maneschi, ‘Noneconomic Objectives in the History of Economic Thought’ (2004) 63 The American Journal 
of Economics and Sociology 911. 
5 Anthony Annett, ‘Restoring Ethics to Economics: Modern Economics Should Return to its Roots’ (2018) 55 Finance 
& Development 54. 
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This legitimacy crisis can be better observed if one considers factors such as the growth of various 
anti-globalisation movements. These include the protests and turmoil at almost every major 
meeting of the international economic institutions (IEIs); the agitations in developing countries 
against the largely impoverishing effects of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
imposed by the IEIs; and the fact that the Doha Development Round, which is the latest round of 
trade negotiations among the WTO membership with the aim of addressing the asymmetries in the 
international trading system, ended in a deadlock. These examples are reactions to the dominant 
perception (especially among developing countries) that the IEO has not only been unable to fulfil 
its promises to address development issues, such as poverty, hunger, quality of life, inequality, 
inequity, and income growth, but the policies emanating from the unfair system have, in fact, 
complicated the achievement of those progressive interests.6 
In attempting to address these fundamental issues, scholars and commentators of diverse realms 
have explored various approaches towards that global concern. For instance, Stiglitz has written 
extensively from a purely economic perspective on the discontents of globalisation and has 
proffered multiple economic solutions to remedy the unfairness of the IEO, which he alleges to be 
responsible for the escalating global inequality.7 Similarly, legal academics like Garcia and 
Linarelli have mostly tackled the issue by combining critical legal analysis and political theories 
in demonstrating why the IEO is unjust and as such requires a genuine normative re-evaluation.8 
From philosophical perspectives, different philosophers have also provided theoretical foundations 
upon which fairness in the IEO should be conceived in order to justify policies that may bring 
about the needed global economic justice. For instance, James, relying on the social contract 
philosophical tradition, described how fairness should be understood in the context of the global 
economy. He argued that the nature of the global economic relations generate significant 
 
6 See generally, Kema Irogbe, The Effects of Globalization in Latin America, Africa, and Asia: A Global South 
Perspective (Lexington Books 2014). 
7 For examples, see, Joseph Stiglitz, People, Power, and Profits: Progressive Capitalism for an Age of Discontent 
(Penguin UK 2019); Joseph Stiglitz, The Great Divide (Penguin UK 2015); Joseph Stiglitz, Making Globalization 
Work (W W Norton & Company 2007); Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton, Fair Trade for All: How Trade Can 
Promote Development (Oxford University Press USA - OSO 2006). 
8 Frank J Garcia, Global Justice and International Economic Law: Three Takes (Cambridge University Press 2013); 
Frank J Garcia, ‘Justice, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the Problem of Inequality’ [2008] Boston College Law 
School Legal Studies Research Paper; Frank J Garcia, ‘Trade and Inequality: Economic Justice and the Developing 
World’ (1999) 21 Michigan Journal of International Law 975; John Linarelli, ‘What Do We Owe Each Other in the 




egalitarian obligations of fairness, independently of humanitarian, human rights, or other justice 
concerns for how benefits and burdens should be distributed across countries of different 
development levels.9 Some other authors have based their arguments for a better IEO on human 
rights by establishing the intersection between international human rights instruments and 
international economic law.10 Some legal scholars have also developed various critical legal 
methodologies, such as the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), to 
deconstruct the conventional legal thoughts and practices associated with international economic 
law.11  
While this thesis is primarily rooted in International Economic Law, it adopts a multidisciplinary 
approach, comprising of legal and political philosophy, economic theories, critical legal approach, 
human rights, and development studies, in establishing the unjustness of the IEO, and further 
justifying that its undesirable effect is indeed a trigger for the obligation of global distributive 
justice and the operationalisation of the fundamental human right to development in its policies.  
This thesis is provoked by a number of considerations. The first is the disquieting data on global 
poverty and hunger, and the role that the IEO can play in resolving this global crisis. For instance, 
according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), there were at least 820 
million malnourished persons documented globally in 2019, with over 85% of them located in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the Pacific and Asia.12 While the cause of poverty can be liked to a 
combination of several internal and external factors, there is a significant linkage between the rules 
imposed by the institutions established to manage international economic relations and this 
deplorable statistic.13  
 
9 James (n 1). 
10 David Kinley, Civilising Globalisation: Human Rights and the Global Economy (Cambridge University Press 
2009); Emma Larking, Sharon Friel and Anne Marie Thow, ‘Protecting the Human Right to Food in the Sphere of 
International Trade and Investment’ (Social Science Research Network 2017) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3083853; 
For a similar analysis in a regional context, see, Christian Riffel, ‘Human Rights Protection in the Asia-Pacific: What 
Will Be the Role of the TPP?’ (2016) 14 Otago Law Review 339. 
11 James Thuo Gathii, ‘Third World Approaches to International Economic Governance’ (Social Science Research 
Network 2008) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1624924; BS Chimni, ‘Critical Theory and International Economic Law: A 
Third World Approach to International Law (TWAIL) Perspective’, Chapters (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013). 
12 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, ‘The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 
(2019)’ <http://www.fao.org/state-of-food-security-nutrition/en/> accessed 30 April 2021. 
13 See generally, UNCTAD, ‘Trade and Development Report 2020: From Global Pandemic to Prosperity for All - 
Avoiding Another Lost Decade’; Thomas Winfried Menko Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Polity 2008); 
Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (n 1). 
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Secondly, there is the critical need to alter the largely subordinate role of less-industrialised 
countries in the global value chain through industrial development policies. The current 
international trading rules have significantly constrained the policy space through which 
developing countries may implement strategies that could help to develop their domestic industries 
to such an extent that they can attain competitiveness in the global market. Some economists, such 
as the proponents of dependency theory, have argued that the rules of the IEO are designed to 
continue to make the developing countries of the Global South dependent on their developed 
counterparts.14 As it currently stands, it is accurate to claim that the main comparative advantages 
of many developing countries in the global value chain are raw materials and cheap labour. This 
status quo, in addition to various unfair trade practices, has substantially hindered the development 
of the infant industries in sectors where most developing jurisdictions have a better potential of 
having a comparative advantage. 
Thirdly, the persistent conflicts that arise between international economic policies and essential 
human rights and development values demand the need for a normative critique of the regimes of 
the global economic order. This thesis argues that principles that are anchored in development, 
human rights, and global distributive justice should be held as the foremost consideration while 
enacting and adjudicating international economic agreements. The current regime, which holds 
trade liberalisation and the investment interests of corporations above fundamental human rights 
and development objectives, such as the right to health, is simply a disservice to humanity. 
Otherwise, how would one explain an international trade regime that has refused to suspend the 
monopoly conferred upon a few pharmaceuticals in relation to the production of the Covid-19 
vaccines, even when it is apparent that the few intellectual property right holders lack the capability 
to produce an amount that could serve the world? A proposal put forward by South Africa and 
India to exempt WTO Members from the enforcement of some patents, trade secrets or 
pharmaceutical monopolies in order to facilitate the mass production of generic versions of the 
vaccines was sternly opposed by the European Union, United States, United Kingdom, and Brazil. 
This is particularly bewildering as there are not sufficient quantities of vaccines to go around in 
 




even those wealthier countries, let alone the poorest ones.15 In reacting to this situation, the 
Director-General of the World Health Organisation expressed that “the world is on the brink of a 
catastrophic moral failure, and the price of this failure will be paid with lives and livelihoods in 
the world’s poorest countries”.16 This proves that not even a global pandemic that has ravaged, and 
is still wreaking havoc on, millions of lives can justify the temporary restriction (not termination) 
of the commercial interests of corporations in favour of saving humanity. This can also be argued 
in the context of other trade agreements and their inequitable implications on various human rights 
and sustainable development objectives. Indeed, this is a fundamental global ethical predicament 
that requires a critical and pragmatic normative remedy. 
Given the above justifications for this research, the approach and contributions of this thesis to the 
debates on global justice and the IEO can be divided into two broad segments. The first part 
combines theoretical and normative approaches in establishing five key conceptual principles that, 
in the opinion of this thesis, should be considered as the first principles or primary guiding norms 
for policymaking and adjudication in the global economic arena. The conceptual principles are 
distilled from the theoretical principles of Distributive Justice, the Right to Development, and 
TWAIL.  
Distributive justice earned its relevance in this context because it remains the main political theory 
that is dedicated to the equitable allotment of goods, duties and privileges, in consonance with the 
merits or peculiarities of individuals, entities or states, and in the best interest of the wider society. 
Specifically, this thesis focuses on the theory as developed by John Rawls, in which he formulated 
two broad principles that he named “justice as fairness”.17 Of particular interest in Justice as 
Fairness is the “difference principle” (the last part of the second principle), which is a philosophical 
tool to justify inequality or differential treatment so long as it exists to serve the development or 
welfare benefits of the least advantaged in the scheme of the distribution of economic benefits. 
Even though Rawls limits the applicability of the difference principle to domestic governance, this 
 
15 Achal Prabhala, Arjun Jayadev and Dean Baker, ‘Opinion | Want Vaccines Fast? Suspend Intellectual Property 
Rights’ The New York Times (7 December 2020). 
16 ‘WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at 148th Session of the Executive Board’ 
<https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-148th-session-of-
the-executive-board> accessed 30 April 2021. 
17 See Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 for explanation of Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. 
14 
 
thesis, nonetheless, argues in favour of its relevance in the context of global economic 
governance.18  
Furthermore, this research adopts the Right to Development as its second lens because it strongly 
inclines towards the idea of approaching development as an inalienable fundamental human right 
that requires the necessary cooperation of all subjects of international law. Resurrecting the 
discussion on a human rights approach towards ensuring global cooperation for development 
objectives also strengthens the existing arguments of moral philosophers on the subject, as human 
rights justifications are gradually replacing moral persuasions on various subject matters in the 
present world, at least at the political level. This thesis also explores legal arguments on the legal 
status of the right to development including whether it could be considered to have attained the 
level of customary international law, or perhaps jus cogens. It must be emphasised here that the 
understanding of the right to development in the context of this thesis is not exclusive to the text 
of the United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development (UNDRD).19 While the UNDRD 
is undeniably a major source, the idea of the right to development predates the Declaration and it 
can be found across different sources, which are analysed in this thesis.  
Lastly, TWAIL, which is a branch of critical international legal scholarship, is a vital approach to 
critique the injustices in the IEO because it adopts deconstructionism and historical methods in 
challenging the Eurocentric pedagogy which attributes universality, neutrality, objectivity, and 
fairness to the international legal order. It presents an alternative viewpoint on the international 
legal order from the perspective of most countries of the Global South (so-called Third World); an 
order which is understood to have been founded and flourished upon colonialism and the 
subjugation of both the peoples and resources of nations of the Global South for the pleasure and 
interests of colonial empires. TWAIL scholars argue that the colonial foundation of international 
law still largely has an enduring effect in today’s relationship between states – and it is perhaps 
more observable in international economic law.20  
 
18 This position has also been differently expressed by some authors. See for examples: Garcia, Global Justice and 
International Economic Law (n 8); Allen Buchanan, ‘Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian 
World’ (2000) 110 Ethics 697. 
19 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 41/128 (1986). 




A combination of these three approaches (i.e., distributive justice, right to development, and 
TWAIL), therefore, serves as the basis for the five conceptual principles that this thesis proposes 
as essential for the realisation of fairness in the global economic governance. The adoption of 
multiple methodologies in addressing the question of justice in the IEO was inspired by Sen who 
argued that insisting on a single approach to justice, while disregarding other competing methods 
in total, “may be a mistake”.21 While there could be some slight conflicts in the three methods, 
adopting methodological pluralism in addressing an issue such as global economic justice, could 
help to cover multiple perspectives that cannot be exhausted through a single lens. 
The second segment of this thesis’s contribution to the discourse on global economic justice is a 
critique of the international trade subsidies regime, particularly the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), through the normative viewpoint of the five 
conceptual principles developed in the first segment of this thesis. The normative critique of the 
SCM Agreement serves as an opportunity to demonstrate how the conceptual principles can be 
operationalised in the context of international trade law.  
There are several reasons for selecting the SCM Agreement as the case study of this thesis. The 
foremost reason is due to the numerous controversies that the subsidies regime has generated in 
the international trade arena and the centrality of subsidy policies to the industrial and welfare 
development objectives of less-industrialised countries. This thesis premises its argument for the 
amendment of the SCM Agreement on the infant industry economic theory, which justifies 
governments’ interventions (such as export promotion and import substitution) and the protection 
of domestic industries from international competitors until they become mature, stable, and are 
able to compete in the global marketplace.  
Relying on the five conceptual principles from the first segment, proposals are thereafter provided 
for the improvement of the SCM Agreement in order to be more equitable and development 
compliant. Such proposals include the introduction of a special category of subsidy to be known 
as the “Non-Actionable Development Subsidies” (NADS), which generally aims to shield (or limit 
in some cases) the usage of certain development-centred subsidies that satisfy defined criteria from 
potential countervailing actions. Beyond NADS, the thesis also explores how the aforementioned 
 
21 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard University Press 2011) 10. 
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conceptual principles could be adopted and operationalised as the grundnorm of the international 
trade policy process and adjudication, through a proposed “development supremacy clause” 
(DSC). Also, some thoughts are offered on how the special and differential treatment provisions, 
which are the main WTO policy tool towards development concerns, could be improved and 
operationalised. 
1.2. Structure of the Thesis and Summary of Chapters 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter one provides a general introduction to the thesis 
by offering an insight into the nature, justification, core arguments, theoretical approaches, 
methodology, and structure of the thesis. It also defines the meaning of some key terminologies 
used in the thesis.  
Chapter two adopts a combination of historical, economic, and legal approaches in establishing 
the inequitable nature of the IEO. Particularly, section 2.2 provides a non-Eurocentric alternative 
view to the background of the modern economic globalisation from antiquity to the colonial and 
Bretton wood eras. With the aim of deconstructing the mainstream pedagogy that misrepresents 
economic globalisation as a post-war phenomenon, the section establishes a link between the 
various historical periods and how colonialism is central to the present global economic order. 
This historical section will also strengthen TWAIL’s perspective on the biased and unjust nature 
of the IEO. Chapter two, in section 2.3, further adopts the dependency economic theory, in 
explaining the effect of the IEO on the development goals of the Global South. The theory 
generally argues that the global economic structure is shaped by certain histories, which favours 
some countries to the detriment of others, thereby limiting the latter’s development possibilities.22 
Beyond the historical and economic analysis, the chapter further demonstrates the claimed inequity 
by critically analysing some of the displeasures of developing countries in three different WTO 
agreements (i.e., the Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, and the Dispute Settlement Understanding). 
Having established the existence of an unjust IEO in chapter two, chapter three combines three 
theoretical approaches (the Right to Development, Distributive Justice, and TWAIL) in developing 
 
22 Carol M Connell, ‘Dependency Theory’ in Charles Wankel, Encyclopedia of Business in Today’s World (SAGE 
Publications, Inc 2009). 
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the five conceptual principles, which this thesis proposes to be mainstreamed and operationalised 
as the normative basis for international economic policies and adjudication, with the aim of 
achieving global economic fairness. 
Chapter four thereafter adopts the five conceptual principles proposed in chapter three to offer a 
normative critique and proposals to improve aspects of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures. The chapter provides the economic rationale for the use of subsidies, 
the legal background of the subsidies regime in the WTO law, a normative critique of the 
prohibited subsidies within the Agreement, and an analysis of the effect of the prohibition on the 
policy space of less-industrialised countries to implement crucial industrial development 
strategies. The chapter also analyses the ineffectiveness of the special and differential treatment 
(SDT) provisions enshrined in Article 27 of the Agreement, which aims to address the 
development concerns of developing countries. Finally, chapter five offers the general conclusion 
and final recommendations that are relevant to WTO agreements in general, and not exclusive to 
the SCM Agreement. 
1.3. Methodologies and Approaches 
The multidisciplinary nature of this research demands the adoption of multiple methodologies and 
approaches. The main approaches are discussed below. 
1.3.1. Black-Letterism 
Also referred to as the doctrinal legal approach, this methodology is the usual commencement 
point of most, if not all, legal academic analysis. It is the standard positivist methodology that 
focuses on the position of the law as it is through the analysis of authoritative legal texts that are 
intrinsic to the discipline of law.23 This methodology is relevant in the context of this thesis for the 
explanation and understanding of the current state of the international economic legal regime and 
other associated legal analysis, through the combination of primary and secondary legal sources. 
Examples of legal sources that are prevalent throughout this research include international law 
instruments such as the various trade agreements of the WTO, the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, and human rights declarations; judicial and quasi-judicial interpretations such as 
 
23 Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton, Research Methods in Law (Routledge 2013) 9. 
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rulings emanating from the WTO’s dispute settlement bodies; national legislation and case law; 
and numerous scholarly materials. 
1.3.2. Theoretical and Normative Approaches 
This thesis strongly opines that a mere doctrinal analysis of the current state of the law is 
inadequate to provide any reasonable and pragmatic solution to the unfair status quo. Therefore, 
theories are particularly fundamental to this research. For instance, it adopts a developed version 
of Rawls’s distributive justice, which is a political theory, to explain how fairness and global 
justice should be understood in the context of international economic law. In addition, it also relied 
on the right to development and TWAIL in both understanding the unfairness of the IEO and 
distilling conceptual principles which are thereafter applied as normative values to critique the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures as well as offer proposals for the 
amendment of the law.  
Aside from political theories, economic theories, such as the infant industry theory and the 
dependency theory, serve as the basis to justify the economic and development positions adopted 
by this research. They also largely influence the choice of normative proposals offered with regards 
to the discussion in chapter four. 
1.3.3. Critical International Legal Methodology 
Even though critical international legal methods also serve as a theoretical basis, their objectives 
transcend just theories.24 They are also scholarly movements that combine multiple theories and 
methodologies in advancing their central claim that international law is largely an instrument of 
maintaining the status quo of an unjust global power structure and a codified form of various biases 
against marginalised nations. This thesis adopts TWAIL as its critical theory as well as 
methodology in critiquing the IEO from the perspective of the nations and peoples that are at the 
receiving end of the prevailing neo-colonial order. Through its espousal of deconstructionism, the 
Third World critical method challenges the prevailing international legal reasoning and pedagogy 
that pretends to afford neutral and objective treatment of claims while safeguarding structures of 
unfair political and economic power from fundamental re-examination and historical method. 
 
24 Obiora Chinedu Okafor, ‘Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory, Methodology, 
or Both?’ (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 371. 
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TWAIL also significantly relies on the historical legal approach to disentangle the development of 
legal principles, philosophies, the conscience of the communities underlying the law, the political, 
social, and economic structures which produced the law, and international relations (i.e., 
colonialism), which shaped the law at the international levels. Thus, different sections of this thesis 
provide historical backgrounds of concepts for a proper contextual understanding. 
1.3.4. Socio-Legal Methodology 
While the use of theories and critical methods in legal analysis can be vaguely classified under the 
socio-legal methodology, it is key to specifically emphasise its adoption in this thesis as various 
social analytical tools beyond the approaches mentioned in sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 above are also 
adopted in this research. Socio-Legal research methodology is generally understood as the study 
of legal concepts, practices and institutions in their social and historical contexts.25 It typically rely 
on empirical studies, rather than purely doctrinal examination, and it is often interdisciplinary. The 
methodology’s main objective is to understand the law in the context of its relationship to an ever-
changing society. Persuasive tools such as statistics, political arguments, history, and existing 
empirical findings are employed to understand the state of art and offer proposals to the IEO in 
this thesis. 
1.4. Definition of Selected Terminology 
The purpose of this section is to define what this research intends by the usage of key terminology 
that is used in this thesis. This section defines, development, less-industrialised countries, and 
global justice/fairness. 
1.4.1. Development 
The term development is used in multiple sections of this thesis, and its multidimensional and 
complex nature is sometimes used to contest normative arguments against its mainstreaming into 
international economic and trade policies. As described by development economists such as Janvry 
and Sadoulet, development can be generally understood as the enhancement of human wellbeing.26 
The concept of wellbeing itself is also multidimensional and context-specific depending on 
 
25 See generally, Reza Banakar and Max Travers, Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (Bloomsbury 
Publishing 2005). 
26 Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet, Development Economics: Theory and Practice (Routledge 2015) 30. 
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priorities and trade-offs in various jurisdictions. While to some policymakers, achieving a rapid 
rate of economic growth is their main development objective, other policymakers can prioritise 
other factors such as the importance of maintaining low inequality, reduction of poverty, and 
access to basic needs (such as health, food, education, and pension services) for all. While the 
debates surrounding the meaning of development often reflect social biases and ideological 
subjectivities, a reasonable starting point towards understanding the concept is through the set of 
17 objectives defined by the United Nations, known as the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs).27 The SDGs can be broadly divided into four dimensions, i.e., economic, social, cultural, 
and environmental. With a total of 169 targets, the 17 SDG goals focus on specific issues, such as 
poverty; food security; good health and wellbeing; quality education; promotion of 
industrialisation; innovation and infrastructure; gender equality; water and sanitation; reduction of 
inequality; climate action; employment and economic growth; among others. While the concept 
of development across the world is inevitably wider than the 17 specific dimensions, they 
nonetheless help reveal a broad international consensus on some fundamental components of 
development. 
From a conceptual perspective, Sen’s Development as Freedom presents a dialectical relationship 
between freedom and development,28 in which development is viewed as “an integrated process of 
expansion of substantive freedoms that connect with one another”.29 He sees freedom as both the 
main end and the principal means of development. Some of the freedoms, according to Sen, include 
freedom of opportunity, economic protection from poverty, access to health care, and political 
freedom – and each freedom encourages the development of another. Of particular relevance to 
this thesis is Sen’s idea that development entails the removal of “unfreedoms”, which are 
essentially social, economic and political factors that may impede the achievement of freedoms. 
For instance, poverty could be characterised by the lack of freedom to exercise economic choices 
and protection. He also called into question various unfreedoms facilitated by the neo-liberal 
development models, advanced by the IEIs, by demonstrating their need to enable people to 
develop their abilities to be free from the scourges of poverty, inequality and repression. In 
 
27 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 70/1. Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development (2015), A/RES/70/1. 
28 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Reprint edition, Anchor 2000). 
29 ibid 8. 
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applying this understanding of development to international trade, particularly the discussion on 
subsidies, it would mean that a development-consistent trade agreement would have to remove 
obstacles experienced by less-industrialised jurisdictions in order to increase their capacities to 
implement policies that could help them develop their infant industries. 
In addition to the above understandings of development, this thesis also understands the various 
development objectives, principles and indicators as fundamental human rights in accordance with 
the various human rights instruments acclaiming the concept as such, such as the United Nations 
Declaration on the Right to Development and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.30 
1.4.2. Less-Industrialised Countries 
The term less-industrialised country is mostly used in this thesis to distinguish between the 
industrialised developing countries (usually referred to as ‘Newly Industrialised Countries’ 
(NICs)) and other developing and least-developed countries. The NICs are understood as countries 
whose economies have transitioned from being primarily agricultural-centred into a more 
industrialised goods producing economy, such as manufacturing, construction, and mining.31 NICs 
are also more competitive in the global trade market and have a higher standard of living than most 
developing countries. Such countries include Argentina, Brazil, China, Russia, and Turkey. As 
such, this thesis opines that it might be inconsistent with an objective development evaluation to 
consider the NICs within the same policy context as most developing countries whose economic 
realities are incomparable. However, it must be emphasised that the usage of the term “developing 
countries” in this thesis includes all members of the category.  
1.4.3. Global Economic “Justice” and “Fairness” 
The terms “global justice” and “fairness” are sometimes used interchangeably in this thesis. 
However, while global justice, on the one hand, specifically refers to the theory of “global 
distributive justice” which is discussed in chapter three, global economic fairness, on the other 
hand, refers to the realisation of the five conceptual principles distilled from the combination of 
 
30 Adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986. 
31 ‘Newly Industrialized Country | Economics’ (Encyclopaedia Britannica)  
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the principles of global distributive justice, the right to development and TWAIL, which are 







2.0. ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: 
EVOLUTION, COMPLAINTS AND EFFECTS 
2.1. Introduction 
The term globalisation has ignited increasing debates among researchers, policymakers and the 
global populace from many centuries ago to the present. Unquestionably, the controversies came 
into existence due to the increasing irrelevance of territorial boundaries among nations and even 
continents in terms of cultures, ideas, politics, and economic activities. The varied impact of 
globalisation across the world is also a major contributor to the rise of the global debate, and it has 
led to the existence of rival ideological schools under the banner of pro-globalisation and anti-
globalisation advocates. However, a third movement also exists that agrees with the inevitability 
of the phenomenon, but advocates a fundamental modification to its structure and practices for the 
equitable benefit of the larger world. The overall objective of this chapter is to establish a 
convincing argument in favour of the notion that the IEO as it currently stands requires a theory 
of justice and a guiding human rights principle in order to ensure adequate fairness and equity in 
its operation. Therefore, the conclusion reached in this chapter will serve as the basis for the 
theoretical/legal approaches that will be examined in the succeeding chapters. 
In Stiglitz’s Globalisation and Its Discontents, globalisation was defined to mean “the closer 
integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the 
enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of 
artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people 
across borders”.32 Globalisation is, therefore, the explanation for the existence of Asian cuisines in 
London, Hollywood productions dominating the entertainment space in Africa, the practice of Ifá 
in the Americas and the Canary Islands, political unrest in the Middle East affecting the global oil 
price and the exchange rates of international currencies. It is also the reason why Shell, Chevron, 
Mobil and Halliburton rank among the top players in the Nigerian corporate industry. 
 
32 Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (n 1) 9. 
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While globalisation in its generic usage is broadly categorised into three main branches, which are 
political, cultural and economic globalisation,33 this thesis is mainly concerned with the 
globalisation of economic activities which could be via international trade, investment, and 
finance. This is not to say that the various categories of globalisation are not closely knit. In fact, 
they are complementary to one another in most circumstances. In determining the relevance of 
concepts such as distributive justice, right to development and the TWAIL in relation to the present 
IEO and its legal framework, it becomes pertinent to dedicate a segment of this thesis to the 
explanation of some foundational issues.  
In achieving the mentioned objective, this chapter looks into the evolution of economic 
globalisation from antiquity until the modern age, and critically examines the background of the 
major international economic institutions. It thereafter broadly examines the effect of the present 
IEO particularly from the perspective of the developing and least-developed nations, using the 
dependency theoretical approach of political economy. For the purpose of further establishing the 
asymmetric nature of the IEO, this chapter also discusses three key complaints of poorer countries 
regarding some aspects of the IEO, specifically relating to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, 
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), and 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). This chapter adopts both historical and critical 
approaches due to the fact that the existing global economic structures emanated from a certain 
historical background, which needs to be laid out in order to appreciate the objective of the thesis 
in an appropriate context.  
2.2. Evolution of Economic Globalisation and the International Economic Order 
Even the history of economic globalisation is disputed, particularly regarding the accurate period 
to situate its origin. Even though some authors have restricted its origin to the economic 
developments in the modern age,34 others have opined otherwise as will be demonstrated below. 
This thesis is also inclined toward favouring the position that regards economic globalisation as a 
phenomenon with an extended history. It is no coincidence that as early as the 2nd century BC, 
Polybius, the Greek historian of the Hellenistic period, was reported to have said: “Before, the 
 
33 George Ritzer, ‘Studying Globalization: Methodological Issues’, The Blackwell Companion to Globalization 
(Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2008). 
34 Daniele Conversi, ‘The Limits of Cultural Globalisation?’ (2010) 1 Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies 36. 
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events that took place in the world were not linked. Now, they are all dependent on each other”.35 
This points out that even though the reach and extent of globalisation in the antiquity may not be 
comparable to what is in existence today, the conception and gradual formation of a globalised 
political, cultural and economic world had gradually begun to play out since the ancient times. 
In classifying the significant eras in the development of economic globalisation, Friedman divided 
the periods into three, which are the years 1492 to 1800, 1800 to 2000, and 2000 to the present 
moment. He termed those eras Globalisation 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0, respectively.36 According to 
Friedman, the first era of globalisation commenced in 1492 when Cristopher Columbus set sail 
and inadvertently “discovered” the Americas and other territories which later came to be known 
by Europeans as the “New World”. This supposed discovery opened trade between the Old World 
(Africa, Asia, and Europe) and the New World. The developments from then until 1800 “shrank 
the world from a size large to a size medium”.37  
The expansion of multinational corporations and the industrial revolutions were the dynamic 
forces that drove globalisation in Friedman’s era 2.0, which lasted until the year 2000. This was 
despite the interruption of the First and Second World Wars and the Great Depression. Unlike the 
first and second eras of globalisation in which states and multinational corporations respectively 
were the main actors, Friedman states that globalisation 3.0 is centred around people across the 
globe with the ability to individually compete against each other. This third era which, according 
to him, started around 2000 is “shrinking the world from a size small to a size tiny [in terms of 
economic integration] and flattening the playing field at the same time”.38 Still, he concludes that 
“the world is not flat” yet.39 
There are arguably a number of gaps in Friedman’s classification of the major eras of globalisation. 
His choice of situating the commencement of economic globalisation at Colombus’s “discovery” 
of the Americas, perhaps, reveals that the author’s historical view was too centred in the activities 
surrounding the Western world. His classification also left out significant events that occurred in 
 
35 Cited in Jean-Yves Huwart and Loïc Verdier, Economic Globalisation: Origins and Consequences (OECD 2013) 
20. 
36 Thomas L Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (1st edn, Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux 2005) 9–11. 
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other continents, and the collective participation of the other worlds in the development of what 
led to today’s global economic order. This thesis will discuss some of the stated historical gaps, 
by adopting a historical classification based on specific events and relating back to the ancient 
times. 
2.2.1. Antique Globalisation 
The earlier statement credited to Polybius as far back as the 2nd century BC40 alludes to the gradual 
formation of a globalised economy since antiquity. This era, which can also be referred to as 
ancient or archaic globalisation, generally covers the economic events and developments from the 
earliest recorded civilisations until roughly the late 15th century.  
Trade activities in this age were divided according to geographical locations with each city having 
its own trading centre. These centres served as the exchange point and “break in bulk” for goods 
destined for markets that were more distant.41 The acceleration of globalisation in this era was 
nothing in comparison to what is in vogue today due to less advanced technology to aid 
transportation, production, and communication.  
Nonetheless, the era also had inventions that aided its development. The most significant 
inventions that facilitated economic advancement and integration in this phase of globalisation 
were writing, shipping, and the wheel.42 The invention of writing in the 4th century BC was crucial 
to write legal contracts as well as record harvests and livestock. The wheel, which was also 
invented around the same period in Mesopotamia, assisted by increasing the volume of goods that 
could be transported over long distances, instead of relying on just animals such as horses and 
camels with lesser capacity.43 Shipping, on the other hand, gave the biggest improvement to 
international trade, and still transports the largest amounts of freight today. 
The great empires controlled the world trade in this phase by politically unifying disparate 
territories for the undisturbed movement of merchants and their goods across continents. By the 
6th to 4th century BC, the Persian Empire had established trading routes for the movement of 
 
40 Huwart and Verdier (n 35). 
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merchants, which spread from the Mediterranean to the River Ganges with the participation of 
diverse people and civilisations. Alexander the Great’s Macedonian Empire, after taking over from 
the Persians in 330 BC, thereafter successfully linked the East to the West.44 This period witnessed 
immense cultural integration and transfer of trading skills, such as the use of currency. The city-
states also took benefit of the expanded borders to participate heavily in mostly maritime trade. 
The Romans, heirs to the Greeks, from the 5th century BC to the 5th century AD, also expanded 
international trade across a vast geographical area, from Scotland to Egypt and Spain to Asia 
Minor. The development of globalisation in this era was so tremendous to the extent that some 
have chosen the Roman Empire as the actual origin of globalisation. As carefully depicted by 
Lionel Casson, people’s lifestyle in this era actually reflected the integration of diverse cultures. 
He said: 
The Roman man in the street ate bread baked with wheat grown in North Africa 
or Egypt, and fish that had been caught and dried near Gibraltar. He cooked with 
North African oil in pots and pans of copper mined in Spain, ate off dishes fired 
in French kilns, drank wine from Spain or France … The Roman of wealth 
dressed in garments of wool from Miletus or linen from Egypt; his wife wore 
silks from China, adorned herself with diamonds and pearls from India, and 
made up with cosmetics from South Arabia … He lived in a house whose walls 
were covered with coloured marble veneer quarried in Asia Minor; his furniture 
was of Indian ebony or teak inlaid with African ivory …45 
The Islamic expansionism, which began in Arabia around the 7th century, also promoted the 
economic interdependence of geographically distant individuals from the Middle East to sub-
Saharan Africa. This expansionism, which mainly occurred in the period some historians refer to 
as the “Islamic golden age” entailed the rise and fall of different considerably imperial empires 
(such as the Abbasids, Fatimids, Almoravids, Moguls, the most recent Ottomans et al.) for many 
centuries. Extensive intercontinental trade networks were established which extended from the 
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Mediterranean to the Atlantic Ocean in the west, the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea in the 
east, and including most of the Old World.46 The network also included substantial areas of Asia, 
Africa, and Europe.47 The silver dirham currency was largely circulated across the Afro-Eurasian 
regions, including sub-Saharan Africa and northern Europe, mostly for the exchange of goods and 
slaves.48 
From the above-mentioned examples of economic and cultural integrations of diverse people from 
different continents and at various periods of this ancient era, and the mainstream description of 
globalisation which basically is the interconnectedness between regions and individuals, it can, 
therefore, be inferred that globalisation is a concept that has been in existence since antiquity.  
Being a work in progress, the mode and practice of globalisation will undeniably vary from one 
era to another. It is also instructive to note that no world system (economic inclusive), even until 
today, has ever been actually global in the strict sense that it guarantees all parts of the world a 
levelled participation among one another. Otherwise, there would be no need for multiple works 
dedicated to the yearnings of the Third Worlds or the larger parts of the world who feel 
disenfranchised in the modern IEO. As Hopkins rightly pens: “Today, as in the past, globalization 
remains an incomplete process: it promotes fragmentation as well as uniformity; it may recede as 
well as advance; its geographical scope may exhibit a strong regional bias …”49 
It has been posited that globalisation in an earlier age always influences the subsequent age. Thus, 
there are links between the modern IEO and the established structures in the ancient era, 
particularly the latter part. In Frank’s ReOrient: Global Economy in the Asian Age,50 the author 
who is a radical proponent of an extended historical origin of economic globalisation argued 
contrary to the opinion expressed in the works of some economic historians and social theorists 
whereby they held that the origin of the world economy only commenced around the 15th century. 
 
46 John M Hobson, The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization (Cambridge University Press 2004) 29–30. 
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He embraces the opposing view that the present world order actually has its roots in a peculiar 
Afro-Eurasiatic structure extending back for millennia.51 
Prior to Frank’s work, Janet Abu-Lughod’s ground-breaking book titled Before European 
Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-135052 argued against the prevailing Eurocentric 
narrative in the works of Henri Pirenne, Max Weber and similar leading social theorists who had 
presented a hierarchically dichotomous historical account of a superior (occidental) as opposed to 
inferior (oriental) cities in the ancient era. Abu-Lughod noted that the prevailing narrative “tend[s] 
to treat the [modern] European dominated world system that formed in the long sixteenth century 
as if it had appeared de novo”53 without the influence of a pre-existing world economic structure.54 
She argued that the view that generalises the existence of a period known as “dark ages” in the 
world’s history was ill-conceived because “if the lights went out in Europe, [in the era preceding 
the rise of the West] they were certainly still shining brightly in the Middle East”.55 
She established that, prior to the 15th/16th century that was inaccurately adopted by the 
aforementioned scholars and their ilk as the starting point of the history of economic globalisation, 
there was already an existing Afro-Eurasiatic world system of international trade in place in the 
13th century. This world system comprised of eight interlinked city-centred regions in three 
connected and interlocked sub-systems. Abu-Lughods’s world-system consisted of: (1) the 
European subsystem, which comprised the Champagne fairs, industrial cities of Flanders, and the 
merchant mariners of the Genoa and Venice regions; (2) The Mideast heartland and its three routes 
to the east across Baghdad/Persian Gulf, Cairo, and the Mongol Asia; (3) and the Indian Ocean 
subsystem, which included India, Southeast Asia, and the silk route to China.56 
What was principally important to her was to establish the link between the modern Western-
dominated world system and the previous Afro-Eurasian system, and explicate how Europe joined 
and continued that previous system. She maintained that if the Moguls had not supported the trans-
Asian caravan trading in the 13th century and onwards, the networks that enabled Europe’s 
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incorporation into the larger space of the Eurasian commerce would not have existed. Even more, 
some of the technologies that made the European exploration and expansion possible were 
inventions from the East, from that earlier Asian dominated world system. However, Abu Lughod 
made it clear that the Asian-centred world system degraded due to its specific internal situations, 
and not due to the rise of the West. 
Even though Abu Lughod’s work is a major influence on the emergence and consolidation of post-
Eurocentric perspectives on global history, which is radically influencing the reinterpretation of 
the origins of the world’s development,57 a work of such an ambitious scope cannot be without 
some gaps. As noted by Gills, Abu-Lughod omitted to include the West African-trans-Saharan-
Mediterranean circuit from her list of interlinked regions, even though this commercial link played 
an important part in the development of the medieval West African cities.58  
2.2.2. 15th Century – 18th Century 
This was the era immediately following the archaic globalisation, and it was the starting point for 
the rise of the maritime European empires. This period, which is also known as the “Renaissance”, 
because it was characterised by the revival of learning and culture in Europe, saw significant 
technological developments and the expansion of “trade” across all continents.59 Although in the 
context of the origin of economic globalisation as opposed to general history, some historians 
prefer to categorise this period as “proto-globalisation”.60  
The intellectual inquisitiveness that characterised this period fostered technological inventions and 
the discovery of new production methods, such as using cotton to make clothes. Proto-
globalisation also involved increased interaction between Western Europe and the existing Afro-
Eurasian global system. The developments in transportation (larger ships and fleets) and the 
improvement of navigation techniques (such as the compass) led to a significant turning point, at 
least from the European viewpoint – the so-called “great discovery” of the “New World” through 
the adventures of Christopher Columbus and Vasco de Gama (among others). 
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The rise of trade in slaves as a new commodity, which was primarily coordinated by the European 
colonial empires, was also a major characteristic of this period – if not the most influential to the 
colonial economies.61 The Atlantic slave trade thrived due to the need for mass production by the 
Europeans who found it less costly to import crops and goods rather than do the production 
themselves. It began with the Portuguese and Spanish empires in the 15th and 16th centuries, 
followed by the French and British empires in the 17th century. The Dutch, German and Swedish 
also participated, albeit to a much lesser degree in comparison with others. The establishment of 
those colonial empires and recourse to slavery stimulated improved production quantity and the 
movement of goods and people across continents.  
One major feature of globalisation in this era was the establishment of the so-called “triangular 
trade” that lasted mainly from the 16th century until the 19th century.62 It involved Europeans sailing 
to the West African coast to barter manufactured goods for slaves who were thereafter transferred 
to the east coast of North America for labour. Products such as sugar, tobacco and cotton would 
then be sent back to Europe from America, which would then be used to trade with Asian nations 
for goods such as spices, tea, and cloth. 
It is also worth mentioning that this period saw the emergence of the active involvement of private 
companies in global trade. Companies like the British East India Company (1600) and the Dutch 
East India Company (1602) are often referred to as the first multinational corporations in the world.  
Notwithstanding the mass production and considerable technical advancements, this period also 
witnessed the dominance of “mercantilism”. This is a school of thought in the international 
political economy whereby states jealously defend their trading boundaries by applying 
protectionist barriers to hinder the free flow of goods. The prevalence of this doctrine – which was 
inspired by the idea that the amount of wealth in the world was limited and a state must block the 
economic interests of another to secure its own – spanned from the 15th century until the 
technological progression of the industrial revolutions and the subsequent rise of economic 
liberalism (a counter-theory) centuries afterwards.63  
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2.2.3. Late 18th Century – 1945 
This period in the evolution of economic globalisation was characterised by the industrial 
revolution, British hegemony, prominence of economic liberalism and its later destruction, 
renewed imperialism on a larger scale and the two world wars among others.  
The rise of learning culture in Europe, as mentioned in the section above, and the desperate need 
to compete with other trading competitors in production led to the first industrial revolution that 
began in Britain in the late 18th century and continued until the 1870s. The first phase of the 
industrial revolution was the profusion of new technologies and the application of machinery to 
production, especially in textile manufacturing. The quantity of production accelerated with the 
aid of the new discoveries, and the British were able to overtake their Indian and Dutch rivals in 
the production of textiles in terms of competitive advantage. In fact, India’s textile economy 
collapsed by the 1840s because of the British’s massive production.64 
The second phase of the industrial revolution saw the emergence of the steam era and new methods 
of transportation. Rail transportation and ships tremendously improved in terms of size and speed 
due to the developments in iron and coal power. New trading routes were also constructed, such 
as the Suez Canal and Panama Canal for the smooth transportation of people and goods. Although, 
construction of the former led to the bankruptcy of Egypt and their virtual rule from Britain.65 
With the advancement in technology and growth in international relations, this period also marked 
the blossoming of the liberal ideologies, which generally favours a peculiar progressive way of 
organising social, political and economic life in a state. In relation to the international economy, it 
theoretically advocated the ability of persons and corporations to engage freely in economic 
activities with limited state interference. It essentially promotes free competition and a self-
regulating economic environment.  
The British positioned themselves as the main promoters of this ideology, with the famous Scottish 
economist, Adam Smith, being known as the expounder of the doctrine of “laissez-faire, laissez-
passer” translating from French to mean “let it be, let it pass”.66 It refers to permitting goods to 
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pass borders without any hindrance, such as the various tariff and non-tariff barriers. The liberal 
theory of comparative advantage, which basically is the ability of a person, business or nation to 
produce a specific good at a lower opportunity cost than its competitor, was also articulated in the 
British parliament by David Ricardo to make an intellectual case for free trade.67 
Governments in support of free trade, particularly championed by the British, backed this ideology 
by eliminating or reducing existing protectionist measures. For example, the British Parliament 
repealed the Corn Law, which had earlier protected the aristocrats against competition from 
foreign cereal producers since 1815.68 This greatly improved international trade to the extent that 
the global trade volume grew sevenfold between 1840 and 1913.69 The era also saw the increase 
of bilateral custom treaties across Europe for the elimination or reduction of import tariffs.  
It is important to note that multilateralism was still not in question at this stage of globalisation, 
and the acceptability of the liberal doctrine was relatively mixed because states like the US and 
Germany strengthened their protectionist policies, especially after the Second Industrial 
Revolution, which was largely favourable to the duo. 
Other ideologies also emerged with varying agendas such as Marxism led by Karl Marx who was 
embittered with the prevailing capitalist exploitation of the labourers and envisioned a new societal 
structure (communism) that would favour collectivism in ownership of production and sought to 
equally distribute the wealth derived from people’s labour.70 This ideology continues to influence 
the political economy of some states (such as China and Cuba) even in the 21st century.  
The industrial revolution that led to an unprecedented economic growth was immediately followed 
by an unparalleled renewal of imperial expansion. Although, colonialism and slavery by European 
imperialists began in the 1400s with their main focus on the Americas and coastal parts of Africa. 
However, between 1879 and 1913, they had expanded their empires into the interiors of Africa 
and Asia, covering over one-sixth of the planet.71 The imperial expansionism in Africa, which was 
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termed the “scramble for Africa” spanned approximately 35 years with the entire continent (except 
Ethiopia) being under colonial subjugation. Mass wealth was accumulated through the exploitation 
of both human and natural resources on the continent. For example, King Leopold of Belgium 
established his private empire in Congo, and not less than ten million Africans lost their lives in 
the effort to harvest rubber for export.72 Another example is Cecil Rhodes whose aim to accumulate 
vast wealth led him to subjugate the people of Ndebele and created a new country named after him 
(Rhodesia – modern-day Zimbabwe). His legacy is preserved till today via the establishment of 
the Rhodes Scholarship at Oxford University.73 
The liberal and imperialist global economic order that dominated the 19th century came to an end 
with the First World War starting in 1914. The war disordered the existing pattern of international 
trade and finance and positioned the United States, which was the least affected Western country 
by the war, as the largest exporter of agricultural products in the world. The inter-war period saw 
the re-domination of protectionism, with countries increasing their customs duties in order to 
shield themselves from international competition. For example, Belgium and Italy raised their 
tariffs from 9% to 15% and 18% to 22% respectively.74 By 1925, the average tariff for 
manufactured products in the United States was raised to 37% and even went further up in 1930 
upon the passage of the Smooth Hawley law.75 Trading allies also hit back by adopting various 
protectionist measures. 
Prior to the commencement of the Second World War in 1939, international trade was starting to 
gain its lost ground before the war struck again. The devastating economic situation at the end of 
this era was directly responsible for the measures that led to the growth of multilateralism, which 
went hand in hand with the escalation of multinational corporations that became the major players 
in the post-1945 or modern IEO, which is examined in the next sub-chapter. 
2.2.4. Modern Economic Globalisation and the International Economic Institutions 
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Modern economic globalisation captures the economic developments from the post-World War II 
era until the present moment. Most of the events that occurred and the decisions that were made 
by the leaders of the industrialised world after the war are responsible for moulding the IEO of the 
present time. Some major characteristics of this period include the Cold War political and 
economic relationship, decolonisation, technological advancements that birthed the information 
revolution as well as the emerging fourth industrial revolution, advancement of neoliberal 
economic principles, and the proliferation of economic multilateralism through the Bretton Woods 
institutions and other regional economic bodies. 
By the end of the two World Wars, the Cold War divisions and diverse competing political and 
economic philosophies marked international relations between 1945 and 1989. This political order 
led to the classification of the world’s countries into three categories. The First World consisted 
of the United States of America and her allies in Western Europe, Japan, South Korea, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The Second World was another bloc that 
comprised the communist-socialist states of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, while the Third 
World was used to refer to the rest of the world’s states that were not politically aligned to either 
of the blocs.  
It is instructive to mention that the usage of some of these classifications is evolving from time to 
time and now vary from the initially intended political classification because the original concept 
is somewhat outdated and does not represent the political and economic reality of today’s world 
states. For instance, scholars of the dependency theory like Andre Frank and Walter Rodney have 
consistently used the term “Third World” to refer to “periphery” countries that are dominated by 
“economic core” countries, according to the ideas canvassed in their theories of the world system.76 
Nonetheless, due to the fact that many Third World countries were poor and non-industrialised, 
the term became a stereotype to refer to the developing and poor nations. Thus, while some 
European countries like Switzerland, Sweden and Austria could be correctly classified as Third 
World nations because they were politically non-aligned during the Cold War, they are hardly 
referred to as such. On the other hand, some countries of the communist bloc such as Cuba are 
usually referred to as a Third World nation due to their economic status. However, there is no hard 
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and fast rule to the evolving usage of the term,77 because newly industrialised nations like India, 
Brazil and China are still often referred to as Third World countries. Nonetheless, the scholars of 
the TWAIL – which will be a focal discussion in the next chapter of this thesis – have defined the 
term, within the context of their realm, to represent every marginalised country and group across 
the world. These groups could mean the poor countries or could even be marginalised peoples in 
the developed communities, such as Aborigines or natives, people of colour, women, and poverty-
ridden cohorts in the community.78 These classifications remain relevant to contemporary 
discussions on the global economy and inequality. 
Beyond the Cold War and the economic/political classification of the countries of the world, the 
modern economic system, which was driven by the expansion of multinational corporations – 
mainly originating from the United States and Europe was considerably facilitated by the 
combined effect of technological improvements and series of multilateral agreements. The 
agreements were signed by mostly the leaders of the First World countries towards the end of the 
Second World War at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held in Bretton 
Woods from July 1 to July 22, 1944. Essentially, the Bretton Woods agreements are the main 
pillars that shape the face of the modern economic globalisation because they form the framework 
for international finance and commerce, and led to the establishment of the major IEI. 
The political basis for the agreements flows from the ideas that the Second World War had 
occurred due to the failure of the involved countries to deal with the economic problems after the 
first war, and that too much controlling power was concentrated in a small number of states. In 
articulating the objective of the agreements, Henry Morgenthau who was the Treasury Secretary 
to Franklin D. Roosevelt described them as: “Collective measures to safeguard world populations 
from threats to peace ... must not rest solely on an international system that manages disputes and 
prevents aggression, but also on economic co-operation among nations aiming to prevent and 
eliminate social and economic maladjustments.”79 
 
77 ibid. 
78 Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, ‘Ethical Dimensions of Third-World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): A 
Critical Review’ (2015) 8 African Journal of Legal Studies; Chimni, ‘Critical Theory and International Economic 
Law’ (n 11). 
79 Huwart and Verdier (n 35) 34. 
37 
 
These series of agreements introduced a new monetary system in which currencies were pegged 
to the price of gold, while the United States dollar was linked to the price of gold as the reserve 
currency. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was specifically created to lend the reserved 
currency to nations and “monitor” the exchange rates. Although, the global monetary liberalisation 
was still limited at this stage because the system did not make all currencies convertible among 
themselves. Nonetheless, it was a record harmonisation of monetary relationship. The outcome of 
the agreement also established the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD), which today is part of the World Bank Group, for the purpose of administering economic 
reconstructions and regulations. Despite the active participation of the representatives of the Soviet 
Union, which was the main rival political and economic bloc in the negotiations, they, however, 
declined to ratify the agreement, resting on the claim that the institutions created were only 
“branches of the Wall Street”.80 Some of the reasons suggested by commentators for the Soviet 
Union’s non-ratification of the agreement include the resolve of the United States that the Bretton 
Woods’ monetary system should rest on both gold and the US Dollar and the allotment of the 
biggest decision-making quota to the US. 
By the mid-1960s, the US post-war hegemony began to decline, and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and Japan emerged as international economic powers in their own right. 
Dissatisfaction increased against the privileged role of the US dollar as the international currency. 
Eventually, the monetary system collapsed between 1968 and 1973 when monetary imbalances 
threatened the US economy, particularly when US President Richard Nixon declared the 
“temporary” suspension of the US Dollar’s convertibility into gold in 1971.81 Before this, the US 
Dollar had struggled throughout the 1960s within the standard adopted at Bretton Woods; this 
marked the collapse of the monetary system. Subsequent attempts made to restore the fixed 
exchange rates were unsuccessful. 
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Ever since the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system, member states of the IMF freely 
choose any form of currency exchange arrangement they desire (with the exception of pegging 
their currency to gold) such as: letting the currency float freely, domesticating the currency of 
another country, pegging it to another currency or set of currencies, agreeing with one or more 
countries to form a currency bloc, or forming part of a monetary union. This change in the system 
is synonymous with increased globalisation and liberalisation of capital, especially from the 1970s 
– 1980s when the UK, Western Europe, Japan and Scandinavia opened their borders to capital 
flows, and the US also did away with the controls of inward and outward capital flow. This 
monetary liberalisation increased the internationalisation of the financial markets and foreign 
direct investment (FDI).82 
By the late 1980s, the World Bank and IMF promoted the exportation of some of these measures 
(representing the prevailing “neoliberal ideas”) to developing countries, within the framework of 
the “Washington Consensus”. The countries were pushed to adopt some structural adjustment 
programmes (SAP) as a condition for granting them loans.83 Some of such conditions include 
currency devaluation, austerity measures, elimination of food subsidies, cutting wages, improving 
governance and fighting corruption, raising the price of public services, privatisation of state-
owned industries and resources, opening financial markets, and so on.84 However, the impact of 
these measures on most of those countries was largely controversial and multiple criticisms were 
made about various elements of the SAP, particularly after its devastating effects on the welfare 
and economic growth of many African and some Latin American countries. Some of the criticisms 
and allegations are that: the cuts on social spending imposed by the SAP led to a dramatic cut in 
government spending on health and educational sectors; the forced privatisation of industries and 
resources are transferred to national elites and/or foreign corporations; the programmes undermine 
the national sovereignty of states and are used to advance neo-colonialism or neo-imperialism 
among other numerous criticisms.85 Beate Jahn, in a rather sweeping opposition to “commercial 
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empires” and the SAP in his critique of Immanuel Kant’s conception of liberal internationalism, 
said:86 
[P]rivate interests within liberal capitalist states continue to pursue the opening 
up of markets abroad, and they continue to enlist their governments' support, 
through multilateral and bilateral arrangements—conditional aid, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Trade Organization (WTO) … The Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) connected to IMF loans have proven singularly 
disastrous for the poor countries but provide huge interest payments to the rich. 
In both cases, the “voluntary” signatures of poor states do not signify consent to 
the details of the agreement, but [their desperate economic] need. Obviously, 
trade—with liberal or nonliberal states—is not a moral obligation, yet 
conditional aid, like IMF and WTO policies, aims at changing the cultural, 
economic, and political constitution of a target state clearly without its consent. 
The International Trade Organisation (ITO) would have been the third institution to be produced 
by the conference for the regulation of international trade, but its negotiations eventually failed 
due to the disapproval of the United States’ Congress. Prior to the establishment of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which 
was signed by 23 countries in 1947, and became effective on January 1, 1948, served as the 
framework for the gradual liberalisation of international trade. The measures in the GATT were 
aimed at eliminating an array of customs duties and state-imposed barriers to free trade. The WTO 
built on the GATT by establishing a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and expanding beyond the 
initial objective of trade negotiation to other sectors such as services and intellectual property. 
Today, the WTO remains the only global international institution that deals with rules of trade 
between nations, notwithstanding criticisms. 
Another very significant development in the post-war global economic order has been the 
establishment of various regional economic institutions. From the end of the Second World War, 
a number of such institutions were created such as the European Economic Community (EEC) in 
 




1957 which has now been absorbed into the wider framework of the European Union (EU), the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) in 1975, the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) in Latin 
America in 1991, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, and the most 
recent African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) which is still at its developing stage. The 
main objective of these bodies is to facilitate trade among their members and strengthen economic 
collaboration.  
However, it remains a subject of debate if the aforementioned regional institutions and others are 
actually complementary to the advancement of global integration or a distortion of the international 
economic liberalisation objective by being facilitators of privileged relations among some classes 
of countries to the exclusion of other countries. For instance, when the Organisation for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was established in 1948 for the implementation of the Marshall 
Plan and to facilitate free trade among European states, the Soviet Union led Communist Bloc 
countries felt the compelling need to retaliate by establishing their Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (COMECON) – another privileged economic community – in 1949. In addition, while 
the initial agenda of ASEAN was to bring the non-communist South-Asian countries together, the 
promoters of AfCFTA and ECOWAS emphasise principles of Pan-Africanism as core objectives. 
While these economic collaborations may be beneficial to member states in their particular 
regions, they also reflect the world’s ideological and continental divisions, which may be a 
hindrance to the proper integration of the global economy. Also, the fact that regional bodies such 
as ASEAN and the EU primarily promote and defend the interests of their member states in 
international trade negotiations, even within the larger WTO framework, seems contradictory to 
the WTO’s non-discriminatory principle, which states that countries must open their borders to all 
nations without discrimination. Nonetheless, regional organisations may still be appreciated as a 
necessary component of economic globalisation due to the cultural and geographical closeness 
they have to their member countries. 
As has been the case at the beginning of every stage of globalisation, technological developments 
also played a major role in the progression of modern international trade, finance, and investment. 
To begin with, the rapid growth of commercial civil aviation to transport people and cargo after 
the Second World War brought its operators closer, especially after the establishment of the 
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Convention on International Civil Aviation (also known as the “Chicago Convention”) in 1944, 
with the objective of harmonising and standardising the use of airspace for safety, efficiency, and 
regularity of air transport.87  
The development of the “containerisation” technique in the merchant marine after the war was also 
a major element in the present era of globalisation. It significantly improved international trade by 
lowering shipping cost, shortened shipping time and losses of transported goods from theft and 
damages – thus lowering the cost of insurance in comparison with the previous system. Prior to 
this development, goods to be transported were manually handled as “general cargo” or “break 
bulk cargo” – an old method whereby goods are loaded individually in bags, crates, boxes or 
drums, as opposed to containers or in bulk. According to a 2017 statistics, international trade via 
the use of containers now accounts for approximately 60 per cent of the global seaborne trade and 
valued around 12 trillion US dollars.88 
The digital revolution (also referred to as the “Third Industrial Revolution”), which gradually 
began around the late 1950s, saw the radical shift to digitalisation from the mechanical and 
analogue technology. Even though Friedman’s imagination as to the flattening of the global 
playing field may not be consistent with the reality as evidenced in numerous empirical statistics, 
it nonetheless portrays the noteworthy inventions that have been achieved in that realm. It is also 
undeniable that technological innovations, particularly in information and telecommunications, 
have transformed the methods of production, distribution and consumption of goods and services 
globally; and it is breaking imposed barriers especially for the creative industries in the developing 
economies.89 Another emerging technological landmark that has been predicted to hugely affect 
the future of the global economy in this era is what has been described as the “Fourth Industrial 
Revolution”. It means an expansion on the prior digital revolution, but characterised by “a fusion 
of technologies that is blurring the lines between the physical, digital, and biological spheres”.90 
Emerging technological breakthroughs in a number of fields such as advanced robotics, artificial 
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intelligence, 3D printing, biotechnology, autonomous vehicles, internet of things and even virtual 
currencies (such as cryptocurrency) are among the things that have been predicted to drive the 
Fourth Industrial Revolution. According to the World Economic Forum, these innovations will 
affect economic practice globally in a number of ways, and cultural and organisational practices 
will have to be rethought.91 
2.3. The Effect of the Modern International Economic Order 
The general impact of the present IEO is a mixed phenomenon that sharply varies depending on 
the continent, country, gender, race, and even classes within countries. In giving an insight into 
the effect of the IEO, this section of the thesis draws on some ideas of the dependency theory. This 
theory, which is a school of thought within the realm of international political economy, explains 
the “economic development of a state in terms of the external influences—political, economic, and 
social—on national development policies”.92 The theory contends that the global economic 
structure is shaped by certain histories, which favour some countries to the detriment of others, 
thereby limiting the latter’s development possibilities.93 While this theory, which originally 
evolved in Latin America in the late 1950s, has the tendency to neglect certain realities within 
some of the countries it seeks to advocate for, the general notion of the theory nonetheless 
represents the reality of the structure and the manner in which policies are implemented in the 
modern IEO. Adopting some positions of the theorists of dependency theory should not also be 
taken to suggest that this thesis is canvassing the dismissal, rather than the reconstruction, of the 
globalised economic order and its structures, as radically canvassed by anti-globalisation 
advocates.  
While there exists those who view the developments in the current order as a facilitating tool for 
rapid economic prosperity and simplistically generalise the developments across the world,94 many 
others argue that the entire structure only serves the needs of the privileged few at the expense of 
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the peripheral world.95 For instance, Irogbe, who is a scholar of dependency theory, argues that the 
relationship between the developed and underdeveloped nations is asymmetric, and that the socio-
economic and political structure of those underdeveloped countries has been subordinated to 
propagate the interests of the controlling nations using the IEI (particularly the World Bank, IMF, 
and WTO) as the manipulating device to the material benefit of their multinational corporations.96 
He emphasised the inaccuracy of many contemporary scholars of globalisation who paint the 
effects of the post-war global system as generally rosy and beneficial for all, thereby conveniently 
or inadvertently dismissing the persistent resistance from a large portion of the world.97  
Counterarguments usually arise regarding the continued voluntary participation of the protesting 
underdeveloped countries in the IEIs even though they indeed find their practices unfavourable 
and unjust. In canvassing fairness in the GATT/WTO framework, Brown and Stern addressed such 
concerns by stating that the weaker nations are more often obliged to compromise with the rules 
and procedures that are pressed for adoption by more influential nations, because a withdrawal 
from membership of the IEI may lead to those countries emerging worse in terms of status.98 This 
is because they will then lose all their existing rights in the regimes, such as the dispute settlement 
mechanism, the most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment, access to developmental loans,99 and 
other benefits that are exclusive to the membership of the IEIs. Another reason why such 
withdrawal may be unthinkable for the weaker countries is that a withdrawal from the multilateral 
institutions will leave them no choice but to enter into bilateral negotiations where they will be in 
a weaker position with counterparts who can easily bully them into accepting more unfavourable 
terms. This is one reason why this thesis, like many scholars, has chosen to advocate a fairness 
and justice-based restructuring of the institutions and the strengthening of multilateralism via the 
existing IEIs, rather than call for their eradication. 
For developed countries and some developing nations, notwithstanding the existence of advocates 
within who are against some aspects of globalisation, such as the pro-Brexit lobby and President 
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Trump’s attack on institutions like the WTO, their gains from the global order are nothing in 
comparison with what could be suggested as benefits for their underdeveloped counterparts as 
consistently proven by numerous global empirical statistics on wealth and income inequality 
between nations. Although stressing the importance of the domestic policy environment, through 
interrelating with the process of globalisation, bringing about pro-poor economic growth is very 
fundamental. However, the administration of the policies and terms imposed by the IEO (such as 
the aforementioned SAP) hardly take the peculiarities of the poorer nations into proper 
consideration, thereby further increasing the existing impoverishment.  
Notwithstanding the asymmetric nature of the effect of the IEO on different nations, historic and 
modern realities have proven that global economic integration and collaboration among nations 
with the aid of an unbiased and internationalised body cannot be argued against. Stiglitz, in his 
book, recognises that pro-globalisation policies have the potential to do a lot of good, provided 
they are properly undertaken and with the incorporation of the characteristics of each participating 
nation.100 Nonetheless, the former chief economist of the World Bank and a Nobel Prize winner 
criticised the IMF for mismanaging the globalisation process for the least-developed countries as 
earlier canvassed.  
Another major contributor to the debate on globalisation and its effect is Thomas Pogge. In his 
World Poverty and Human Rights,101 he combines both normative and empirical analysis to prove 
that the IEIs are harming poorer countries via their policies. He explained that the poor nations 
continue to face unlimited barriers to export their own produce and even greater obstacles to 
offering their services where a decent income could be fetched. He further explained that the 
international negotiation order is fashioned in a manner in which the powerful nations enjoy a 
crushing advantage in terms of expertise and bargaining power, and the powerful nations who 
already have such advantage do not consider the interest of the greater poorer population as part 
of their objective.102 Pogge established the need for reform of the IMF, World Bank and WTO so 
that their harm to the Third World is reduced. Like many authors, he is also not inclined to the idea 
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of dismantling the IEIs, because of their capability to be beneficial. He, therefore, calls for change 
in their behaviour towards the Third World countries.103 
Brown and Stern pointed out that liberalisation in trade does not really extend to the developing 
countries in practice, especially in relation to the barriers and biases against exports from 
developing countries.104 According to them, the most obvious instance of the bias is the array of 
measures which are used to restrict trade in agricultural products, and the high tariffs formerly 
imposed on products in which developing countries have a comparative advantage.105 
Milner, in her Globalization, Development, and International Institutions: Normative and Positive 
Perspectives, also noted that the impact of globalisation on developing countries via the IEIs has 
been powerful, but not always beneficial.106 She observed that the pressure that is constantly 
exerted on the IEIs by private producers and investors through developed countries has shaped the 
functioning of the IEIs to the detriment of most of the developing nations.107 Four possible sources 
of problems with the IMF, World Bank and the WTO were identified as follows: (i) no impact; (ii) 
capture by powerful developed countries; (iii) capture by private producers and investors; and (iv) 
internal dysfunctions and failure of accountability.108 
She suggested that perhaps the IEIs have little or no real impact on the developing nations, relying 
on the data that the IMF and World Bank only “constitute about 19 per cent of total debt 
outstanding by developing countries and only 13 per cent among middle-income countries.”109 
Herdegen also noted in his book Principles of International Economic Law that the welfare gains 
of globalisation did not materialise as anticipated for many poor countries due to the “great 
imbalances” between regions in international trade and the flow of investment.110 He mentioned 
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that not even the preferential treatment principle for developing countries in WTO law is capable 
of addressing the gross asymmetry and inequalities.111 
Considering all the claims above regarding the asymmetric nature and substantial 
unfavourableness of the IEO to the poorer nations, the next section will explore some specific 
complaints of developing nations regarding the imbalances in the prevailing economic order. 
2.4. The International Economic Order and Complaints from Developing Countries 
Following claims from scholars and experts regarding the asymmetric nature and detrimental 
impact of the IEO on the developing world as discussed in the previous section, this part will 
discuss some of the complaints expressed by developing countries with a view to establishing a 
basis to embrace fairness in the administration of the IEO. The scope of the complaints to be 
discussed will cover issues from three different aspects of international trade law. Specifically, the 
WTO dispute settlement system, the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, and the 
Agreement on Agriculture. It must be emphasised that the sole purpose of the analysed complaints 
in this section is mainly to affirm the earlier claims of unfairness in the IEO in sections 2.2 and 
2.3, which are mainly based on historical and economic perspectives, from a legal point of view. 
Also, these three analysed complaints do not form an exhaustive list of all the aspects of 
international economic relations that less-developed jurisdictions find problematic to their social 
and economic development interests. They have been selected for discussion due to their 
popularity and importance in the policy discourse. Beyond the three selected complaints, there are 
numerous other areas of pressing concern, such as matters relating to intellectual property as well 
as the subsidies regime. This thesis specifically critiques the unfairness in the international 
subsidies’ regime as the major case study in chapter four. 
2.4.1. The WTO Dispute Settlement System and Developing Countries 
One of the most celebrated innovations to the international trading system by the ministerial 
meeting in Marrakesh (also known as the Uruguay Round) was the introduction of the current 
quasi-judicial dispute settlement mechanism. Many scholars and experts regarded it as an 





the inception of the new system in 1995, over 600 dispute settlement applications have been 
received by the WTO and over 350 rulings have been issued.112 This is far more than the total 
number of disputes that were accepted for settlement under the old GATT system. The need for an 
effective dispute settlement mechanism cannot be overemphasised in a system like the WTO, 
because of its ability to reduce uncertainties by securing market access rights, which will ultimately 
promote efficiency and confidence in the global economy.  
That being said, the effectiveness and impact of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) have been 
controversial, particularly in relation to developing countries. While the above figure shows an 
improvement in claims initiated by WTO Members, the ratio of claims initiated by developing 
countries is far less than their developed counterparts despite their majority status. To date, no 
least-developed country (LDC) has been a complainant or respondent in any WTO dispute.113 
Many reasons have been postulated for this “under-utilisation” of the settlement system by poorer 
Members, such as the burden of heavy cost to prosecute the cases, lack of trust in the impartiality 
and independence of the system, and the lack of coerciveness in the enforcement of the DSB’s 
ruling.114 While attempts have been made by some to blame the under-utilisation on low volume 
of trade from those countries,115 Bown devised an innovative method (more accurate in my 
opinion) which generates a complaints-filed-to-complaints-possible ratio to disprove the low trade 
volume point of view.116 It is also relevant to state that there have been few efforts to address the 
issue of unaffordable litigation costs. For instance, the Advisory Centre of the WTO (ACWL), a 
non-governmental organisation independent of the WTO, was established in 2001 with the mission 
of providing “developing countries and LDCs with the legal capacity necessary to enable them to 
take full advantage of the opportunities offered by the WTO”.117 Nonetheless, the sustainability of 
such an entity whose main source of funding is from voluntary donation from a few mostly 
 
112 ‘WTO, Dispute Settlement Gateway’ <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm> accessed 30 
April 2021. 
113 ‘WTO, Developing Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement’ 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c11s1p1_e.htm> accessed 30 April 2021. 
114 T Stostad, ‘Trappings of Legality: Judicialization of Dispute Settlement in the WTO, and Its Impact on Developing 
Countries’ (2006) 39 Cornell International Law Journal 811. 
115 Peter Holmes, Jim Rollo and Alasdair Young, Emerging Trends in WTO Dispute Settlement: Back to the GATT? 
(The World Bank 2003). 
116 Chad P Bown, ‘Participation in Wto Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders’ (2005) 
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developed countries is unpredictable. It is also unclear if such an independent entity can be 
successfully brought under the scrutiny of justice obligations like it would have been for an 
organisation like the WTO, which is actually responsible for the management and allocation of 
public goods. This thesis is therefore inclined to Stostad’s view that “in order to put developing 
country respondents on a level field vis-à-vis wealthier complainants, legal assistance, up to and 
including outright advocacy, should be provided through the WTO itself”.118 
It is important to mention that a comprehensive assessment of the DSU119 was supposed to have 
been carried out within four years from the date it entered into force, with the objective of 
determining whether its provisions would be needed to be revised, terminated or simply 
extended.120 However, this assessment never occurred. Also, in the Doha Round, which was 
officially launched in 2001, the improvement of the dispute settlement system was included as one 
of its agenda items with a deadline of 2003 for Members to submit proposals. By 2004, about 40 
suggestions had been submitted by Members to improve the system, including ideas for a 
compensation mechanism that would be genuinely enforceable with more effective and timely 
remedies. Alas, the impasse that negotiations at the Doha Round have faced made the realisation 
of these suggestions uncertain. Nonetheless, this paper still strongly opines that urgent changes are 
required to cure the defects in the existing system. 
Many issues have been raised concerning the dispute settlement system in relation to developing 
nations and LDCs. But among all, this thesis takes the view that the most profound irregularities 
are the issues bothering on the nature of the available remedies and the mode of enforcement of 
the rulings of the DSB. As will be argued below, the system is wanting of elementary justice and 
adjudicatory rudiments that can be sufficient to dissuade Members from flouting the WTO 
agreements and can compel defaulting Members to discontinue an existing breach against other 
Members, especially if the Member state suffering the breach is a poor nation.  
 
118 Stostad (n 114) 840. 
119 Dispute Settlement Understanding: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
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(1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
120 ‘WTO | Decision on the Application and Review of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes <https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/53-ddsu_e.htm> accessed 30 April 2021. 
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2.4.1.1. Methods of Resolving Trade Dispute under the DSU 
To begin with, it is crucial to layout the ways in which trade disputes can be resolved under the 
DSU. Article 3.7 of the DSU provides:  
In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute 
settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures 
concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the 
covered agreements. The provision of compensation should be resorted to only 
if the immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable and as a temporary 
measure pending the withdrawal of the measure which is inconsistent with a 
covered agreement. The last resort which this Understanding provides to the 
Member invoking the dispute settlement procedures is the possibility of 
suspending the application of concessions or other obligations under the covered 
agreements on a discriminatory basis vis-à-vis the other Member, subject to 
authorization by the DSB of such measures. 
In essence, there are three ways in which trade disputes can be resolved under the DSU: (1) the 
respondent party that is accused of the breach is required to discontinue the conduct in question; 
(2) voluntary compensation may be provided to the party suffering the breach if the discontinuation 
of such breach is deemed impracticable within a reasonable time, for any reason; (3) the 
complaining party (subject to the approval of the DSB) may have the right to retaliate by 
suspending the application of any other existing concession or obligations under the WTO 
Agreement that was breached with respect to the other Member.  
2.4.1.2. Implications for Poor Countries 
From all of the above, it can be observed that the WTO dispute settlement system has no provision 
for compulsory compensation nor a viable penalty against a party that contravenes the WTO 
Agreement. In fact, it appears to tolerate the continued breach of the Agreement under the guise 
of its “member-driven” approach as opposed to standard judicial methods as practised in other 
international adjudicatory systems. By implication, the DSB appears to only have a declaratory 
authority to rule on the breach of the Agreement without the power to impose a specific mandatory 
sanction. Even in the event that compensation may be rightly due to the winning party as provided 
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for in the DSU, the DSU still expects the terms of the compensation to be voluntarily negotiated 
among both parties. Article 22.2 of the DSU states: 
If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered 
agreement into compliance therewith or otherwise comply with the recommendations and 
rulings within the reasonable period of time determined pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 
21, such Member shall, if so requested, and no later than the expiry of the reasonable period 
of time, enter into negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute settlement 
procedures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation. 
The implication of this “voluntary negotiation” on weaker nations, especially when the party in 
breach is a developed country, is that it compels them to enter a bilateral negotiation on the terms 
of the compensation. This thereby essentially defeats the objective of WTO as a multilateral forum 
that seeks to protect weaker nations from such a potential asymmetric negotiating position. More 
importantly, reaching a resolution on what, when, and how to compensate (be it monetary, market 
access, tariff concession, or any other means) all depends on the will of the party found to be in 
breach of the Agreement to tender any compensation – and the ability of the winning party to 
obtain it in an effective and timely manner. Poor developing countries and LDCs that obtain a 
favourable ruling will most likely be unable to pull such political and economic strength that could 
be capable of compelling a breaching developed counterpart to compensate them in a manner that 
is commensurate to their loss or at all.  
The compensatory mechanism under the DSU fundamentally deviates from established domestic 
and other international judicial practices because it possesses some features that are ambiguous to 
elementary principles of judicial practices. Aside from the concerns above, another feature of the 
DSU system is that compensation does not apply to injuries or losses already suffered by a party 
as a result of the breach of another party. This is contrary to the standard method of computation 
of damages in general civil matters where the Judge or Arbitrator takes account of all the previous 
losses suffered by the winning party until the date the party in breach complies with the order of 
the court. Rather, the DSU only envisages compensation for breaches that continue to occur after 
the DSB’s ruling, which is only effective in a prospective manner. A careful perusal of the wording 
of Article 3.7 of the DSU will demonstrate that the objective of the dispute settlement mechanism 
is primarily to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if they are found to be in breach 
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of any of the WTO agreements. Thus, compensation can only come to play as a supplement to the 
withdrawal remedy in the event that the party in breach refuses to discontinue the inconsistent 
measure. In other words, actions in line with the DSU are not taken for breaches that occurred 
before the judgment regardless of the damages it might have caused to others, and the losing party 
which is in breach can only compensate the winning party for the post-judgment continued breach 
if this is agreed. This flagrantly deviates from the general principles of State responsibility for an 
international wrongful act which require retrospective restitution in addition to full compliance 
with international obligations.121 
Another issue with the settlement system is that, even if compensation is paid, the conduct of the 
party in breach is not required to be terminated. Both Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU provide 
that compensation is only a temporary measure. Therefore, if the party in breach chooses to 
continue the WTO-unlawful conduct, the winning party may continue to suffer the injury. Also, 
the DSU failed to stipulate the nature or forms the compensation may take. The only related 
provision on the form is Article 22.1 which states that “compensation is voluntary and, if granted, 
shall be consistent with the covered agreements”. However, a potential legal issue may arise if the 
losing party chooses to compensate the other by making further commitments on market access 
and tariff concession, because such reduction of tariff and market access to an exclusive member 
may violate the MFN principle of the WTO. Even though the DSB has no power to interfere with 
negotiations between parties, other Members may institute claims against such discriminatory 
measure.  
Aside from the powers of the DSB to declare the conduct of the breaching party as inconsistent 
with the Agreement, and the second option which requires both parties to enter into negotiation 
for voluntary compensation, the party suffering the breach may consider retaliation as a last resort, 
by suspending the application of any other existing concession or obligations under the covered 
agreement with respect to the other Member. Prima facie, this can only be reasonable in disputes 
between two economically equal parties. Apart from the fact that it seems like a judicial 
endorsement of self-help, it technically disenfranchises poor states (i.e. most developing nations 
and LDCs) with a less-diversified economy and minimal trade volumes from reaping the benefits 
 
121 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ 
(2001) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Articles 31 and 36. 
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of the dispute settlement mechanism. This is because, unlike cases between developed nations, 
there is likely not going to be enough leverage. Moreover, retaliation cannot be an option for many 
of these nations, as it may lead to additional damage to their economy. For instance, in analysing 
the implication of Nicaragua’s retaliation against the European Community after the EC – Bananas 
dispute,122 Jiaxiang maintained that the country’s retaliation in another sector was “in essence only 
an emotional one or a kind of anticipated benefit”.123 This is because the trading volume resulting 
from the retaliatory measures cannot adequately compensate the actual losses suffered by the 
Nicaraguan banana industry, which is critical to its economy.124 Resulting from the same Banana 
dispute above, Ecuador initially accepted the European Community’s offer of compensation, but 
it was in fact not made whole. The Ecuadorian government finally settled on the last alternative 
by retaliating against the EC. With the DSB’s approval, it withdrew its existing commitment to 
the EC on the protection of intellectual property. However, such retaliatory measure was a no-win 
result for Ecuador because the EC’s interest in intellectual property protection in Ecuador was not 
significant. On the other hand, the country turned itself into a hostile environment for other foreign 
investors who became wary of an environment where piracy was rampant and intellectual property 
rights were not adequately protected.125 
In view of all the above, this thesis opines that there is almost no gain for the participation of poor 
countries in the WTO dispute settlement system, since aside from the heavy cost of litigation, 
compliance with the adopted rulings and the compensation that may be due to the winning party 
are technically made subject to the conscience of the party in breach of the agreement. 
2.4.2. Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and Developing Countries 
The SPS Agreement is among the agreements reached at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of 
the multilateral trade negotiations, for the purpose of regulating the application of sanitary (relating 
 
122 Panel Reports, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
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(Mexico) / WT/DS27/R/USA (US), adopted 25 September 1997, as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:II, p. 695 to DSR 1997:III, p. 1085. 
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124 ibid. 
125 ibid 14. 
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to animals) and phytosanitary (relating to plants) standards dealing with food safety and 
animal/plant health. The preamble of the SPS Agreement affirmed the right of Members to adopt 
and enforce necessary measures to protect the lives and health of humans, plant and animals, 
provided such measures are not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminatory in application. In 
recognition of the fact that the measures had been and can further be used as “disguised restriction 
on international trade”, the SPS Agreement also affirmed in the fourth paragraph of its preamble 
that its aim is to minimise the negative effect of such measures on trade.126 While the Agreement 
also seeks to harmonise the SPS measures of various Member states by recommending (not 
obligating) an international standard,127 it, however, does not exclude them from applying higher 
standards where it is believed that there is scientific justification to that effect or appropriate risk 
assessment.128  
The stated objective of the SPS Agreement is commendable because it aims to balance the 
contending goals of protection of health, on the one hand, and liberalisation of trade, on the other 
hand. Also, one must be aware of the attempt made by the SPS Agreement to recognise the fact 
that developing countries may encounter special difficulties in complying with some of the 
imposed measures, either due to less technical capabilities or for other reasons. However, it has 
been disputed that the SDT provisions for developing countries (including LDCs) in the 
Agreement achieve their stated desire to “assist them in their endeavours in this regards”,129 just 
like other SDT provisions in other WTO Agreements.130  
Adibe contends that the SPS measures and other technical barriers to trade (TBT) usually pose a 
greater burden on developing countries, because most of the standards, other than those set by 
international bodies, are usually set by developed countries.131 Consequently, this subjects poor 
countries to standards that impose far greater costs of compliance, which as a result excludes their 
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products from markets of developed countries.132 As will be argued under the subsequent chapter 
dwelling on distributive justice and IEL, the need for effective SDT provisions in the SPS 
Agreement and other international economic regulatory disciplines need to be recognised in light 
of economic, historical, technological and political peculiarities of various Members; thus, “one 
size does not fit all”.133 As Hamwey notes: 
[T]he playing field resulting from international trade agreements that have 
ostensibly equivalent rules for all contracting parties, may provide a much 
smaller policy space for developing than developed countries because of 
differences in initial conditions and national policy implementation capacities. 
Efforts to establish a level playing field for international trade must recognise 
and address this disparity.134 
In Mayeda’s critique of the harmonisation of the SPS and TBT measures, she succinctly describes 
the asymmetric implication of the measures as follows: “Because the standards of developed 
countries will tend to be more similar in other importing developed countries than will the 
standards of developing countries, the costs of compliance for developed countries tend to be 
lower”.135 Adibe notes that apart from the fact that the lack of effective SDT provisions accentuates 
the existing economic imbalances between poor and rich nations, the SPS measures may be used 
as another protectionist mechanism, which militates against the stated development objectives of 
the WTO.136 He concludes that it would not be a violation of the SPS Agreement if developed 
countries are advised to adopt standards that are similar to those which are observed by developing 
countries, rather than obligating outright identity with developed countries’ complex standards.137 
This would not necessarily amount to lowering the level of consumer safety in the export market 
of developed countries, especially considering the fact that some of those imposed measures are 
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arbitrary and could be inconsequential to the actual health and safety concerns of consumers,138 if 
compared with other less costly standards. 
Notwithstanding the above, it is appropriate to examine some of the SDT provisions in the SPS 
Agreement in order to determine to which degree the stated desire to assist developing countries 
in complying with the measures is given effect. The primary SDT provisions are contained in 
Article 10 of the SPS Agreement, although, Article 14 and paragraphs 2, 8, and 9 of Annex B also 
enshrine provisions that may be considered as forms of SDT for developing countries. 
Article 10.1 of the SPS Agreement provides that, “In the preparation and application of sanitary 
or phytosanitary measures, Members shall take account of the special needs of developing country 
Members, and in particular of the least-developed country Members”. This is because some 
developed countries apply complex and onerous methods in verifying the compliance of products 
with their SPS requirements, which in turn, often creates complications for many developing 
countries due to limited technological capacity and dissimilar methods. Therefore, if adequate 
consideration is taken at the time of preparing and applying the measures, such complications 
could be avoided. However, while the provision appears progressive, judicial interpretation and 
practice do not seem to favour the claim. Even though it is trite law that the use of the word “shall” 
in legal instruments, as above, is to be construed in the mandatory sense,139 the lack of specificity 
in terms of how the special needs of developing countries should be taken into account renders the 
provision ambiguous and almost inoperative. 
In the EC–Biotech dispute,140 Argentina presented the first opportunity for a WTO panel to 
interpret Article 10.1 of the SPS Agreement. The claim was concerning certain measures taken by 
the EC and its Member States which affected agricultural and food imports from Argentina. 
Argentina contended that the EC had failed to apply its legislation in a manner which takes account 
of developing country Members’ needs. The Panel held that the phrase “take account of”, as 
contained in the provision, does not prescribe any specific result to be achieved and that merely 
because a developed country did not afford SDT to a developing country Member does not 
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establish a prima facie case that the developed country Member did not “take account of” the 
developing country’s needs when it made its decision. The Panel stated in its report: 
[T]he obligation laid down in Article 10.1 is for the importing Member to “take 
account” of developing country Members’ needs. The dictionary defines the 
expression “take account of” as “consider along with other factors before 
reaching a decision”. Consistent with this, Article 10.1 does not prescribe a 
specific result to be achieved. Notably, Article 10.1 does not provide that the 
importing Member must invariably accord special and differential treatment in 
a case where a measure has lead, or may lead, to a decrease, or a slower increase, 
in developing country exports.141 
The above position was cited with approval by the Panel in the most recent US–Animals case, 
where Argentina, again, challenged some US measures affecting the importation of animal 
products from Argentina.142 Although the Panel found the measure imposed by the US as 
inconsistent with the rules on other grounds, it failed to agree with Argentina’s claim that Article 
10.1 had also been contravened.143 
In light of the interpretation of Article 10.1 of the SPS Agreement in the above cases, it could be 
concluded that the use of mandatory language for SDT provisions is not sufficient to make such 
provisions enforceable: SDT provisions, including those beyond the SPS Agreement,144 therefore 
require specific and unambiguous conditions to be met, and actions to be taken in response to the 
envisaged needs of developing countries. 
Similar to Article 10.1 discussed above, Article 10.2 of the SPS Agreement further provides:  
Where the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection allows scope 
for the phased introduction of new sanitary or phytosanitary measures, longer 
 
141 Ibid, para. 7.1620. 
142 Panel Report, United States — Measures Affecting the Importation of Animals, Meat and Other Animal Products 
from Argentina, WT/DS447/R (2015). 
143 ibid. paras. 7.1620-7.1621. 
144 For example: Article 15 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (which has a similar SDT provision) was also held not 
to impose any obligation because of its “undefined parameters” in EC-Bed Linen, US-Steel Plate and EC-Pipe Fittings. 
57 
 
time-frames for compliance should be accorded on products of interest to 
developing country Members so as to maintain opportunities for their exports. 
The quoted provision is a relevant SDT measure because compliance with new SPS requirements 
often requires investment in new resources, building new infrastructure, and substantial changes 
to processing and production systems. For that reason, it is important that considerable time should 
be afforded to developing country Members before compliance ought to be expected. Unlike 
Article 10.1, as analysed above, this provision has not been subjected to the interpretation of the 
WTO adjudicatory bodies. However, it has generated controversies due to the lack of 
implementation by developed nations, and its ambiguous legal effect if its wording is strictly 
analysed. This prompted a group of developing countries, at the run-up to the Doha Ministerial 
Meeting, to push for the modification of Article 10.2 to include a specific and mandatory period 
of at least twelve months between the date of the notification of the measure and the date of its 
entry into force. An agreement was eventually reached that the phrase “longer time-frames for 
compliance” shall be understood to mean a period of not less than six months.145 
Notwithstanding the adopted interpretation at the Doha Ministerial Meeting, possible contentions 
may still arise from the interpretation of the Article if presented before a panel. This is because the 
use of the word “should” has been held in a similar provision of another WTO Agreement to be a 
hortatory word that ordinarily imposes no obligation. In EC-Bed Linen, the Panel in interpreting 
Article 21.2 of the DSU held: 
[W]e find nothing in that provision which explicitly requires a Member to take 
any particular action in any case. Nor has India pointed to any contextual 
element which would suggest that the hortatory word “should” must nonetheless 
be understood, in Article 21.2 of the DSU, to have the mandatory meaning of 
“shall” … In addition, the fact that there is no specific action set out in Article 
21.2 makes it unlikely that Members intended the provision to be mandatory – 
the lack of specificity in this regard implies rather a hortatory use of should.146 
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While it is hoped that WTO adjudicatory bodies in the future will not follow the above position if 
a case arises on that ground, the intention of this thesis for analysing the above two provisions 
(Articles 10.1 and 10.2 of the SPS Agreement) is to point out the weaknesses and inherent lacunas 
in the provisions that seek to protect developing countries in the SPS Agreement. Another aspect 
of the SPS Agreement, among others, that has generated issues is the lack of specificity and 
mandatory construction of Article 10.4 of the SPS Agreement which encourages the facilitation of 
developing countries’ participation in international standard setting which is dominated by 
developed Members. 
In general, while it is recognised that the need to grant concessions to developing countries’ 
concerns should not be an excuse to jeopardise the right of Members to impose necessary measures 
that are scientifically justifiable for the prevention of unacceptable risks, the bone of contention is 
that creating relaxed regulations through which standards that are masked methods of 
protectionism can slip undermines the stated objective of the SPS Agreement to enable fair market 
access. 
2.4.3. The Agreement on Agriculture and Developing Countries 
The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) is one of the treaties negotiated at the Uruguay Round, and 
it entered into force with the establishment of the WTO in 1995. The stated objective of the 
Agreement is to set new standards for the liberalisation of agricultural trade and to “establish a fair 
and market-oriented agricultural trading system”.147 Yet, the degree of fairness in the system has 
attracted wide criticism from analysts of various interests. Some have opined that nowhere is the 
tension between the opponents and supporters of the existing international trading system more 
obvious than in matters involving agricultural trade.148 Agriculture has always been one of the most 
controversial subjects in multilateral trade negotiations, and it was also one of the most contentious 
issues in the Doha Round.149 The contention stems from the fact that the AoA is perceived to favour 
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industrialised countries, particularly the United States and the European Union, to the detriment 
of developing countries. The rules are seen to encourage the aforementioned territories to 
enormously subsidise agricultural production domestically, and dump their excesses on the global 
market at artificially low rates while requiring developing countries to open up their markets to 
injurious and unfair competition from producers operating under the subsidised condition of some 
of the industrialised territories.  
In expressing a human rights perspective on agricultural trade and the WTO, Smaller opines that 
the AoA adopts an export-oriented agricultural policy – which only benefits the privileged few 
that have access to the enabling infrastructure, credits, resources and foreign market – as opposed 
to a human rights oriented policy that would be capable of improving people’s livelihoods.150 In 
her words, the AoA “entrenches the right to export rather than human rights”.151 This is 
notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 13 and 14 of the Doha Ministerial declaration which 
reaffirm the commitment “to enable developing countries to effectively take account of their 
development needs, including food security and rural development” regarding the AoA.152 The aim 
of this section is to evaluate some of the complaints of developing countries regarding the AoA.  
2.4.3.1. International Agricultural Trade before the AoA 
Prior to the GATT of 1994, agricultural trade was effectively excluded from the previous 
international trade treaties, based on the dominant opinion that agriculture was a unique sector 
which could not be treated like other sectors for reasons of national food security. Also, with the 
development of the manufacturing economy, agricultural trade saw a relative decline. This led to 
social and political agitations calling for an end to the decline, and that agriculture should be 
protected from the rigours of the international market. Although some individual agricultural 
products did appear as commodities in negotiations (one thinks of the International Wheat 
Agreement and the International Dairy and Meat Agreement that were negotiated under the 
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Kennedy Round), it was not until the opening of the Uruguay Round that it was firmly placed on 
the GATT negotiation agenda.  
As a result of the exemption of agriculture from the previous GATT rules, quantitative import 
restrictions, use of agricultural subsidies, and numerous protectionist measures were largely 
unregulated and unrestricted for many years. This led to high levels of protectionist measures and 
domestic/exports subsidies for agriculture, mainly in the industrialised countries. These measures 
by mainly industrialised nations created large distortions to the global food market, and it led to 
the depression of the global price for temperate agricultural products to noncompetitively low 
levels. Eventually, the need to reduce the incessant friction between the European Commission 
and the United States over agricultural matters inspired the consensus of bringing agricultural trade 
within the ambit of the GATT negotiation and the eventual agreement after seven years of 
negotiation. 
2.4.3.2. Components of the AoA 
It is vital to explain the main components of the AoA before any attempt to analyse their 
implications for developing nations. The AoA has three key components which are: market access, 
domestic support and export subsidies. Each of these components is referred to within the AoA as 
market access (Article 4), domestic support (Article 6), and export subsidy commitments (Article 
9). The stated objective of the market access component is to increase international agricultural 
trade by decreasing border barriers to trade such as taxes and duties, which are commonly known 
as tariffs. This component requires countries to abolish “quantitative restrictions”, which basically 
limit the quantity of agricultural goods entering their markets. The AoA also requires the 
conversion of all non-tariff import restrictions (such as quotas, variable import levies, minimum 
import prices, embargoes, and non-tariff measures maintained by state enterprises) into tariff 
barriers that provide a corresponding level of protection – a process known as “tariffication”.153 
The corresponding tariffs ensuing from this conversion, in addition to existing duties, are then 
required to be bound and reduced below a 1986-88 base level over a period of several years, 
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depending on whether the country is developed, developing or least-developed.154 The exact 
amount of the reduction is also specified in the tariff schedule of each individual country.  
Domestic support generally includes all types of governmental assistance to farmers, ranging from 
production subsidies for specific agricultural products or guaranteed prices to the provision of 
infrastructure and even facilitation of research for the promotion of agriculture. The largest 
percentage of domestic supports is provided by developed countries, and their farmers are paid 
billions of dollars as production subsidy each year. The stated objective of the AoA’s domestic 
support component was to limit the amount of monetary interventions by governments that are 
going into production of farm goods, in other words, to decrease subsidies that distort the 
independent decision of farmers regarding what and how much they will produce.  
For ease, the domestic supports are categorised into three colour-coded so-called “boxes” (amber, 
blue and green boxes) which represents their levels of permissibility.155 The amber box entails the 
kind of subsidies that are considered by the AoA to be the most distorting. These domestic 
subsidies are required to be reduced within a certain span based on an “Aggregate Measure of 
Support” (AMS), which aims to estimate all possible financial factors that may influence a farmer 
to produce a certain product. Unlike the amber box, the blue and green boxes are permissible. The 
green box policies are deemed not to have any major effect on trade and production. Examples of 
the green box policies include income support to farmers decoupled from production, crop 
insurance programs, income safety-net programs, and payments under environmental programs. 
On the other hand, blue box subsidies are considered to fall into neither of the amber or green 
categories but are also exempted from the AMS calculation. They are policies that permit countries 
to make direct payments to farmers if the payments are for programmes that limit the quantity of 
production.156 Examples are the deficiency payments of the United States and the compensation 
payments by the European Union, in which farmers are paid the difference between a government 
target price for agricultural produce and the corresponding market price.157  
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The third component of the AoA is the export subsidy. It refers to payments given by governments 
to firms that export agricultural produce to cover the cost of doing business. The AoA provides a 
list of six export subsidies that should be reduced by WTO Members158 within a given period, 
depending on the development status of the country. It also prohibits the introduction of new 
subsidies that were not subsidised during the 1986-90 base period.159 However, the above position 
changed after the 2015 Ministerial Declaration in Nairobi, when all Members finally reached 
agreement on an immediate standstill and gradual elimination of agricultural export subsidies over 
specified period of time, depending on the status of each country.160 This was described as the most 
significant outcome of the tenth Ministerial Conference of the WTO,161 although the use of export 
subsidies by countries had largely declined even prior to the Nairobi agreement,162 and most 
controversies relating to subsidy are usually about the domestic subsidies. 
2.4.3.3. Complaints about the AoA 
There are a number of criticisms about the regulation of trade in agriculture by WTO developing 
Members, and even some developed countries.163 Such disapprovals range from the fact that the 
rules have locked all countries into an uneven playing field, which encourages some Members to 
be at a more advantageous position to the detriment of others, to the fact that the Agreement has 
failed to realise its stated purpose of facilitating a fair trading system. While a simplistic study of 
the rules may initially suggest that they are capable of addressing its stated aims, the reality in 
practice has revealed numerous deficiencies and gaps in the AoA. 
To begin with, the provisions on market access have turned out to produce very little liberalisation, 
especially in the highly protected markets of OECD countries.164 Notwithstanding the 
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“tariffication” requirement which obliges the conversion of existing non-tariff barriers to tariffs 
and the further prohibition on new non-tariff barriers, many industrialised countries have evaded 
this obligation by employing what is largely referred to as “dirty tariffication”. This involves the 
setting of tariff equivalents for non-tariff barriers at unjustifiably high levels,165 therefore nullifying 
the aimed benefits of tariff reduction and bindings. Dirty tariffication in most cases results in higher 
protectionism than under the old system where quantitative restrictions were permissible. Some 
research also claims that the highest tariffs by developed countries were imposed on products of 
particular interest to developing nations, such as tobacco, sugar, meat, milk, and to a lesser degree, 
vegetables and fruits.166 
The implementation of the AoA’s requirement on tariff reduction has also been used by some 
developed countries to restrict market access, which largely affected producers from developing 
countries. According to a publication of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO), OECD countries made large tariff reductions on agricultural produce that was not 
domestically produced or that already had quite low tariff levels, in order to make minimal 
concessions on agricultural imports that competed with items that were domestically produced.167 
This was possible because the tariff reduction provision of the AoA requires a 36 per cent average 
reduction in tariffs (subject to a 15 per cent minimum reduction on each tariff), and thereby 
permitted countries to select which tariffs to reduce as they wish. An example of this mentioned 
by the FAO is that tariff reduction on temperate-zone products are usually lower in the OECD 
countries, as against tropical products that are often higher. This is because while developing 
countries mostly have the capacity to produce both tropical and temperate agricultural products, 
their production of temperate products competes directly with agricultural products of most 
developed countries.168 
The strategic use of the special safeguard provision of the AoA also created an opportunity for 
developed countries to restrict market access. Article 5 of the AoA provides for the special 
safeguard which can be invoked by imposing additional duties where there is an import surge or 
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the prices are particularly low in comparison with 1986-88 levels. This was alleged to have been 
abused by the EU and most OECD countries by setting trigger prices far above the 1986-88 average 
world price used for conversion of non-tariff barriers into tariffs. On the other hand, most 
developing countries do not have access to the special safeguard provision because it is only 
available for countries that have historically engaged in tariffication. Therefore, many poorer 
nations do not have a similar ability to protect their domestic farmers against dumping from over-
subsidised importers.169 This provision could have been fairly beneficial to poorer countries if it 
was equally available to all without the technical exclusion. 
Furthermore, the AoA has enabled some Members (mostly developed countries) to maintain trade-
distorting subsidies by the exclusion of the blue and green box subsidies from the Current Total 
AMS. This undermines the effectiveness of the subsidy reduction obligation by excluding the exact 
types of supports that are being utilised by the US and EU. The EU’s compensation payment and 
the US’ deficiency payment are within the ambit of the acceptable blue box subsidies: both of 
which farmers are paid the difference between the original market price for a given agricultural 
product and a higher target price which is established by the governments. As argued by Khor and 
some others, the green and blue box subsidies can be just as distorting to trade, because the effects 
could sometimes be the same or even more than the amber ones.170 He mentioned that while the 
payment of higher prices and even export subsidies could have been stopped, this is still made up 
for through the implementation of various kinds of permissible subsidies.171 On the other hand, the 
amber box subsidy reductions as required by the AoA have been proven to be less significant 
because they were based on the 1986-88 period of extremely high subsidies. Thus, only a few 
percentages were required to be reduced by WTO Members for compliance by 1995 when the 
AoA went into effect. 
The implication of all the above, among many other complaints, is that the AoA has enabled the 
more powerful nations to maintain import restrictions and unfair subsidies that are trade-distorting. 
In fact, while the markets of developed nations are largely inaccessible for agricultural producers 
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from developing nations, the level of agricultural subsidies in OECD countries grew higher after 
the AoA.172 This evidences that the AoA has largely been unsuccessful in achieving its stated 
fairness objective as contained in the second preambular paragraph of the Agreement. While it is 
necessary to acknowledge that the AoA also attempts to embody some provisions that are people-
centred with the perceived aim of protecting some groups of people from the harmful effect of its 
liberalisation policies, the implementation of such provisions is not effective enough to protect the 
livelihood and human rights of the vulnerable global population. For example, the SDT principle 
that is enshrined in all WTO Agreements, including the AoA, and seeks to grant more flexibility 
to developing and LDC Members, is often weak and less helpful. Reports have also shown that the 
provisions that require that special attention should be given to food needs of LDCs and net food-
importing developing countries (NFIDC) have hardly been complied with, as LDCs and NFIDCs 
were increasingly forced to buy food on commercial terms, while their incomes were declining.173 
Beyond the specific issues arising from the AoA, one also needs to consider the fact that most 
developing countries have also been locked into further liberalisation obligations under the World 
Bank and IMF’s structural adjustment programmes and other free trade agreements.174 Most of 
them have been pressured to lower their existing trade barriers and remove or drastically reduce 
their already limited subsidies under the aforementioned programmes, as conditions for loans or 
other aids.175 On the contrary, developed nations are hardly subject to such obligations. This has 
left many developing countries little or no space to introduce trade policies to support their 
agricultural sector. 
2.5. Conclusion 
The crux of this chapter was to establish the asymmetric nature of the IEO and justify the dire 
necessity of fairness in the global economic system. As analysed in section 2.2 of this chapter, the 
global economic system has developed through various historical, ideological and political stages, 
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and those distinct but connected phases are relevant to any suitable investigation of the present 
state of the IEO. The modern IEO, which was heavily influenced by a set of neoliberal tenets has 
been advanced and dominated by some states, primarily consisting of past colonial powers. This 
economic system, according to several studies and scholarly opinions,176 is unjust and continues to 
advance the dominance, interests and privileges of certain states to the disadvantage of others.177 
It is evident that the management and policies of the IEIs contribute to the determination of the 
fortune and misfortune of the global populace and nations. Just as James also maintained, “the 
organization of the global economy is of the first practical significance for lives, countries and 
regions of the world”.178 Therefore, complaints about inequity and unfairness in the system cannot 
be left undiscussed. By explaining, in sections 2.3 and 2.4, the effects of the IEO and some of the 
key complaints emanating mainly from developing countries and LDCs, such as the issues 
concerning the AoA, SPS, DSU and even the negative effect of the SAP programmes, this section 
of the thesis concludes that the management of the IEO via the IEIs is inequitable and in many 
cases ruinous to a sizeable part of the world.  
In furthering this point of view, Linrelli blames the injustice in the current economic order on the 
regimes of international law as a whole and their instrumental usage, having been rooted in the 
exploitation of distant peoples.179 This alone explains the significance of the various efforts and 
ideas that are aimed at emancipating the so-called Third World from the consequences of that 
origin. This view also extends to the interests that international economic law and the IEIs were 
founded to serve,180 as global fairness, inclusivity, sustainability, human rights and other social 
considerations are largely neglected and mostly classified as “non-economic realms”. Global 
capitalism as practised under this system promotes the primacy of pure economic concerns and an 
obdurate commitment to profit at the expense of the aforementioned social values and concerns. 
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This neglect explains why Kinley proposed “civilising globalisation” by demonstrating how and 
why human rights and the global economy should intersect rather than being at odds.181 
Nevertheless, while the bald claims regarding the unfairness of the IEO are hardly unfamiliar to 
many, the most controversial subject among scholars and policymakers is usually regarding how 
fairness in the IEO should be perceived and realised. Different methodologies have been suggested 
in approaching the issue of fairness in the IEO. While some scholars have favoured a human rights 
approach, others prefer to approach the issue from the perspective of political/legal theories. 
Another group of scholars (known as TWAIL scholars) perceive the entire international legal 
system as objectionable and call for an inclusive system that will justly serve the interests of the 
entire global populace. The ultimate objective of this thesis is to explore the issue of fairness or 
equity in the IEO via a mixed methodological approach drawing from distributive justice, right to 











3.0. THEORETICAL AND NORMATIVE APPROACHES TO GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
FAIRNESS 
3.1. Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, this thesis analysed the historical background, asymmetric effect and 
some major criticisms of the IEO particularly from the perspective of developing countries, and 
consequently established the existence of unfairness in the IEO. Having done so, it therefore 
becomes necessary to explore theoretical and normative approaches that, in the opinion of this 
author, should be considered as first principles or primary guiding standards for policymaking in 
the global economic arena, particularly as it relates to the case study analysed in the latter part of 
this thesis. In achieving this, this research adopts three theoretical approaches from which five 
conceptual principles will be distilled in section 3.5, and through which the case study will 
eventually be appraised with the aim of providing proposals that may ameliorate the unfair status 
quo. It will also be argued in this chapter that a harmonised operationalisation of the three 
approaches, which are Global Distributive Justice, the Right to Development and TWAIL, is an 
essential missing link for realising the desirable level of fairness in the IEO. 
The choice of these distinct, yet related approaches may be justified for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the TWAIL approach is relevant due to the fact that a reasonable number of complaints 
against the policies of the IEIs and their unpleasant effects are in relation to the so-called “Third 
World” nations, which make up the majority of the developing and least-developed countries. 
TWAIL can also be justified if one carefully considers the fact that historically, as pointed out in 
section 2.2.4, most of the existing international institutions, including the IEIs, were not founded 
to function for the concerns of most Third World countries. More crucial is the fact that most Third 
World states historically had little say in the development of the international legal order in which 
they found themselves after overcoming the struggles of receiving recognition as sovereigns post-
colonialism. As captured by Snyder and Sathirathai, the Third World methodology, therefore, 
serves as a scholarly medium to “reject, modify, and challenge some of the existing treaties, 
customs and general principles of international law developed by the former world community 
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which was dominated by the stronger ‘civilized’ nations of the world”.182 Due to its critical nature, 
the role of TWAIL, unlike the two other approaches in this research, will predominantly be a 
medium of critiquing the IEO, rather than a theory through which principles would be deduced. 
On the other hand, distributive justice draws its relevance from its very nature, being a 
political/legal theory of justice that deals with the equitable allotment of goods, duties and 
privileges, in consonance with the merits or peculiarities of individuals and in the best interest of 
society at large. The modern reality of globalisation and global governance, therefore, demands 
global applicability of the theory, especially at this time when various social institutions are being 
used to make decisions that affect the global population. Specifically, issues concerning the 
distributive fairness in different WTO agreements, such as the AoA, SCM and SPS measures are 
of particular concern to most developing countries and LDCs as there are claims that they possess 
substantial competitive potential in the agricultural sector of international trade. Principles of 
global distributive justice can complement the critiques of the TWAIL approach by providing 
theoretical solutions to the problems the latter identifies. 
Lastly, due to the need to mainstream the development concerns of those who are the most 
vulnerable to poverty and other basic social needs into legal and institutional practice of the IEIs, 
the right to development being a human rights approach serves as an appropriate framework 
through which relevant proposals can be drawn towards achieving a fair IEO that would uphold 
the primacy of development of the global populace. 
The ambition of all three approaches is to offer a just alternative to the status quo. Nonetheless, 
each one of the three has its own limitation and criticisms. The objective of this chapter is, 
therefore, to analyse the three proposed complementary approaches with the aim of distilling 
practicable conceptual principles, which will later serve as the basis to evaluate, critique and 
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3.2. The Right to Development and International Economic Order 
This section dwells on the concept of the right to development (RTD) and its intersection with the 
IEO. It also seeks to address the extent to which the RTD should be linked to the needed reforms 
in the IEIs and their policies in achieving global economic fairness. RTD is defined in Article 1 of 
the Declaration on the Right to Development (UNDRD) as an “inalienable human right by virtue 
of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy 
economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms can be fully realised”.183 
The reason for exploring the RTD, among other relevant approaches, in relation to the IEO is due 
to public concerns regarding the social impact of modern economic globalisation, and the need for 
a fundamental shift from the prevailing profit and market-driven global economic system to a 
development-driven and human-centred system. As will be discussed later in this chapter, another 
key reason why this human rights approach is essential is because the institutional, legal and policy 
cultures of international human rights law and international trade law have always operated almost 
completely in isolation from each other. This is partly because, as a matter of international law, 
both regimes are primarily treaty-based, and there is generally a strong presumption against 
normative conflict.184 Thus, except for some human rights norms such as those that have been 
elevated to the higher status of jus cogens, treaty-based human rights obligations and the WTO 
Agreements are of equal status and are generally understood to be unable to influence each other, 
except where there is a provision integrating such treaty into the WTO law. As such, it is crucial 
to explore how these regimes can evolve together by complementing each other in terms of 
operation. The statement of T.C. van Boven, a one-time director of the United Nations’ Division 
for Human Rights, is relevant to this position. He said: 
It is a challenge of utmost importance, for unless we can effectively bridge the gap between 
the realms of human rights and economics we risk the pursuit, on the one hand, of an 
international economic order which neglects the fundamental human development objective 
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of all of our endeavours, and, on the other hand, of a shallow approach to human rights which 
neglects the deeper, structural causes of injustice, of which gross violations of human rights 
are often only the symptoms.185 
Even though the idea of RTD is not novel and the adoption of the UNDRD by the UN General 
Assembly was over thirty years ago, the acceptance of RTD as a fundamental human right, that 
should influence policymaking, still remains a subject of political and academic controversy. 
While it was welcomed as a major breakthrough in the history of human rights in some quarters, 
some others have described it with various rather emotional terms such as distracting, mythical, 
an intellectual disaster,186 and a dangerous ideological initiative.187 The adoption of the UNDRD 
itself was either opposed or boycotted by a significant number of industrialised nations, thereby 
strengthening the claim of a political dimension to the issues surrounding the right, which has led 
to its relatively insignificant success in terms of implementation. In examining RTD in relation to 
the IEO, this section explores the background, sources, meaning, main principles, legal status, 
criticisms, obstacles affecting the implementation of RTD, and the relevance of RTD to the 
international trading system.  
3.2.1. Background and Meaning of the Right to Development 
The idea of the RTD emerged at the international level following the political wind of 
decolonisation around the 1960s. The idea was particularly articulated by the newly independent 
African states as a “necessary companion of their newly acquired political emancipation”.188 
According to Balakrishnan, the post-1960s debate on the right revolved around issues that were 
identified by the advocating countries as “international barriers to development” such as: 
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[T]he lack of democracy at the international level and the resulting concentration of economic 
and political power of the North; the rigged rules of the system which worked against 
developing countries; the precarious condition of self-determination in developing countries; 
the lack of effective sovereignty over natural resources due to the aggressive interventionist 
policies of powerful countries; and the prevalence of structural conditions that prevented the 
state in the developing world from performing a more robust function in economic policy 
formulation, coordination, and implementation.189 
Due to the above concerns, among others, voices comprising organisations, activists and scholars 
from within and outside the developing nations began to call for a change to the prevailing 
institutional and structural unfairness through the RTD. In the circles of legal jurists, one of the 
earliest expressions of RTD is often credited to Senegalese Jurist Keba M’Baye when he asserted 
in a 1972 lecture at the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg that “every man has 
a right to live and a right to live better”.190 
Broadly, RTD became associated with two main agendas. The first is a demand for a “new 
international economic order” that is envisioned to be beneficial to the economic development of 
developing countries, and the second is the call for adherence to the view that peoples must have 
complete control over their natural resources and wealth. Hence, the objective of the RTD has 
always been about rectifying the existing wrongs in the IEO and to address the effects of the 
asymmetric relationship between the industrialised and developing nations. The right was 
originally envisioned as a collective peoples’ right claimable against the international community 
as a whole (i.e., of an erga omnes nature).191 However, the understanding of the RTD soon evolved 
to include an individual human right, thereby positioning both “all peoples” and “every human 
person” as holders of the right.  
The central elements of RTD gradually developed via prominent pronouncements mostly in the 
late 1960s and 1970s. A major one was the declaration at the first ministerial meeting of the Group 
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of 77 developing countries (otherwise known as the “Charter of Algiers”) in 1967. Among other 
issues, the Charter stated that: 
The international community has an obligation to rectify these unfavourable trends and to 
create conditions under which all nations can enjoy economic and social well-being, and have 
the means to develop their respective resources to enable their peoples to lead a life free from 
want and fear.192 
The next progress in the recognition of RTD occurred in 1977 when the UN Commission on 
Human Rights recognised the RTD as a human right and then recommended that the Economic 
and Social Council invite the Secretary-General to undertake a study on the international 
dimensions of the RTD as a human right “in relation with other human rights based on international 
co-operation, including the right to peace, taking account the requirements of the New 
International Economic Order and the fundamental human needs”.193 The Commission reaffirmed 
this recognition two years afterwards and added: “that equality of opportunity for development is 
as much a prerogative of nations as of individuals within nations”.194  
The debate on the RTD was thereafter formally elevated in the UN agenda after the creation of a 
Working Group of Governmental Experts in 1981. After a series of sessions by the Working 
Group, it adopted its report for transmittal to the Commission on Human Rights in December 1985. 
Eventually, the UNDRD was adopted at the 41st session of the UN General Assembly in 1986. 
According to Fukuda-Parr, the UNDRD is “the only international human rights instrument that 
addresses the need for joint international action to address the human rights consequences of global 
economic arrangements”.195 
The RTD, as formulated in the UNDRD, was reaffirmed in several international instruments 
including the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993. Both developing and 
developed countries present reached the consensus that the RTD is an inalienable and universal 
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right and an integral part of the fundamental human rights.196 In follow-up to the Vienna 
Conference, the UN General Assembly established the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) saddled with the responsibility to, among others, “promote and protect 
the realisation of the right to development and to enhance support from relevant bodies of the 
United Nations system for this purpose”.197 In an attempt to achieve this goal, several bodies (such 
as the UN independent expert on RTD, various Intergovernmental Working Groups and a High 
level Task Force on the implementation of the RTD) have been created and serviced by the 
OHCHR with the duty to interpret and analyse the scope and content of the UNDRD, as well as to 
recommend ways to tackle the challenges of its global implementation and realisation. 
In 2000, world leaders present at the Millennium Summit pledged in the Summit Declaration, 
which later became known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), to make the RTD a 
reality for everyone.198 Following the expiration of the MDGs in 2015, core elements of RTD are 
also emphasised in its successor, which is the 2030 development agenda known as the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). There is no doubt that the development goals (MDGs and SDGs) are 
associated with the RTD, and that their realisation would go a long way in achieving the RTD. 
However, one must also note that there are restrictions to the SDGs’ approach in terms of its 
practicality and the nature of obligations it imposes. This is because approaching development as 
a matter of fundamental human rights imposes more commitment from relevant actors, and it also 
attaches superior importance to development than a mere developmental programme that 
sometimes wears the appearance of charity that should only be committed to out of mercy. This 
thesis opines that a human rights approach to development is more practical and coercive in nature 
than a non-legally binding approach, notwithstanding the challenges that the RTD may be facing. 
This position was similarly expressed by Martin Khor at the Human Rights Council meeting held 
to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the UNDRD. He said: 
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The approach and instruments of the right to development would be useful to apply when 
implementing the SDGs. In turn, the fulfilment of the SDGs would be helpful for the 
realisation of the right to development. At the same time we should be mindful that there are 
limitations to the set of SDGs, and to the SDG approach. This should be supplemented by 
other instruments and approaches that are needed for a comprehensive understanding of the 
dynamics of development and thus of the right to development.199 
Khor’s reference to “other instruments and approaches” to supplement the SDGs could be inferred 
to mean human rights instruments and human rights-based approaches. In furthering the significant 
cause of the human rights approach, the UN Human Rights Council appointed a Special 
Rapporteur on RTD for a period of three years commencing from September 2016, with the 
mandate to “contribute to [the work of the Working Group on] the promotion, protection and 
fulfilment of the right to development in the context of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development”200 and some other internationally agreed outcomes of 2015.201 The 
Special Rapporteur is also required: 
To engage and support efforts to mainstream the right to development among various United 
Nations bodies, development agencies, international development, financial and trade 
institutions, and submitting proposals aimed at strengthening the revitalized global 
partnership for sustainable development from the perspective of the right to development.202 
In September 2018, the UN Human Right Council at its 39th session adopted its annual resolution 
tasking the Intergovernmental Working Group on RTD with commencing “the discussion to 
elaborate a draft legally binding instrument on the right to development through a collaborative 
process of engagement, including on the content and scope of the future instrument”.203 The Chair 
of the Working Group was also asked to prepare a draft legally binding instrument “to serve as a 
basis for substantive negotiations on a draft legally binding instrument, commencing at its twenty-
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first session”.204 This resolution was voted on, attracting 30 votes for, 12 against, and 5 abstentions. 
In a consistent voting pattern with other RTD resolutions, states from the Global South generally 
supported the resolution while most from the Global North did not. 
The above provides an update on the development of the RTD at the UN level and also explains 
why the human rights approach to development is crucial. The RTD remains highly relevant to the 
concrete challenges to human rights in an integrated and unequal twenty-first century where 
globalisation is proceeding at a rapid pace. 
3.2.2. Legal Foundations of the Right to Development 
This thesis considers the legal formulation of the RTD beyond just the UNDRD, even though the 
Declaration is still crucial to understanding and achieving the right. It opines that some 
fundamental principles of the RTD are also expressed in some international treaties, which 
therefore also serve as the legal basis for the operationalisation of the right in international 
economic policymaking. As will be discussed later, this position will, perhaps, reduce the 
controversies as to whether the RTD should be considered as a binding right or not. This is because 
the issues concerning the implementation of the RTD are usually evaluated from the sole premise 
of the UNDRD, which appears to consistently generate political distractions. 
Notwithstanding some of the earlier mentioned declarations and international instruments, it is 
reasonable to begin with the Charter of the United Nations as the first source of the legal 
formulation of RTD. Even though the primary objective of the Charter is for peace and security 
among its members, it nonetheless emphasises the importance of human rights and justice as a 
prerequisite for a stable international order. The preamble includes two references which hint at 
the connection between development and human rights. The first is the determination “to promote 
social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”, and the other is the resolve “to 
employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all 
peoples”.205  
Beyond the preamble, specific relevant provisions of the UN Charter are Articles 55 and 56. 
Pursuant to these articles, the international community pledge themselves to take joint and separate 
 
204 ibid. 17(f) 
205 Charter of the United Nations, Preamble. 
77 
 
action in cooperation with the UN to promote and facilitate the social and economic development 
of all nations and peoples, as well as to promote solutions to the international economic and social 
problems, and universal respect for human rights. Article 55 provides that the United Nations shall 
promote: 
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social 
progress and development; 
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international 
cultural and educational cooperation; and 
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.206 
These provisions, even though often overlooked, are essential legal foundations of human rights 
and development, as they seek to create a condition of “stability and well-being which are 
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples”.207 Thus, even though no precise reference is made 
to RTD in the Charter, it establishes a legal basis for commitment to human rights and 
development. 
About three years after the UN Charter came into force, the UN General Assembly adopted the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR). This path-breaking document in the UN history 
enjoined states to promote and respect identified rights and freedoms, and to secure their universal 
observance and effective recognition through progressive national and international measures. 
Provisions of the UDHR, such as Articles 22, 28, and 29, cover civil, political and economic 
concerns, which are relevant to this thesis.208 Specifically, Article 22 provides: 
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realisation, 
through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organisation 
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and resources of each state, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his 
dignity and the free development of his personality.209 
The above provision shows that the UDHR anticipated the preparation of specific and binding 
human rights treaties to ensure the accomplishment of its economic and social objective. 
Subsequently, two separate human rights treaties materialised: the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR)210 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR).211 The emergence of two separate treaties is due to the lack of political 
cooperation between the Western bloc fronted by the United States and the Soviet bloc, because 
of the ideological differences between the West and the Communist states. While the US-led bloc 
urged respect for civil and political rights but rejected the notion of economic and social rights, 
the Soviet bloc, on the other hand, emphasised the overriding importance of economic and social 
rights. Even though neither covenant explicitly mentioned the RTD, many of the principles 
contained in them, especially the ICESCR, are crucial to the understanding of the RTD.  
It is essential to mention that efforts have also been made by some regional bodies in relation to 
the recognition and implementation of RTD, albeit at the regional level. Both the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (also known as the “Banjul Charter”)212 and the Arab Charter on 
Human Rights recognise the right to development.213 The former remains the only instrument that 
confers an individual and collective RTD with binding and enforceable obligations imposed on 
states. The African states, in the Preamble of the Charter, stated their conviction that: 
It is henceforth essential to pay a particular attention to the right to development and that civil 
and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their 
conception as well as universality and that the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural 
rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights.  
Article 22 of the Charter further provides that “all peoples shall have the right to their economic, 
social and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in equal 
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enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind”, and that “States shall have the duty, individually 
or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development”. The African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) has substantially developed the RTD 
jurisprudence and has, despite some objections, exemplified the operationalisation of the right in 
at least seven cases against various African states. For instance, in Democratic Republic of Congo 
v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda,214 the African Commission held that depriving the people of DR 
Congo to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources, due to a regional military occupation 
by the respondent states, had violated their economic, social and cultural development, and 
therefore was in breach of Article 22 of the African Charter. 
3.2.3. Substance of the Right to Development in the UNDRD 
Notwithstanding the fact that the UNDRD may be insufficient to represent the entire idea of what 
constitutes the RTD, it is nonetheless the only existing UN instrument that is specifically dedicated 
to the right, and for that reason germane to understanding the material characteristics of the RTD. 
The UNDRD, which was adopted with 146 votes in favour, 1 opposing vote, and 8 abstentions,215 
has been criticised by even some of the advocates of RTD as vague and poorly drafted. This 
purported vagueness, as opined by Bunn, perhaps reflects the inherent complexity of the idea of 
the RTD.216 Ian Brownlie also notes that the UNDRD’s content reveals a problem of identity with 
the consequence “to perhaps blur the conceptual profile and make the task of promulgation of the 
right more difficult”.217 Regardless of the various conceptual criticisms, there is the need to 
understand that the UNDRD going by its content did not set out to be an exclusive instrument on 
the RTD. Just as the case of other legal and human rights fields, the commitment of all relevant 
stakeholders is still necessary for the development of RTD’s jurisprudence through scholarly 
contributions, treaties and judicial interpretations. Article 10 of the UNDRD also clearly expressed 
that “steps should be taken to ensure the full exercise and progressive enhancement of the right to 
development, including the formulation, adoption and implementation of policy, legislative and 
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other measures at the national and international levels”. It is for this reason that this section of the 
thesis will explain the nature and substance of the RTD as primarily conceived by the UNDRD. 
The Preamble of the UNDRD makes clear from the inception of the document that it did not 
emerge out of the blue, and that its basis is well-grounded in existing international law instruments. 
It did so by cross-referencing the Charter of the United Nations, the UDHR, the ICESCR, the 
ICCPR and other relevant instruments under different provisions. It further defines “development” 
fairly comprehensively as:  
a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant 
improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of 
their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of 
benefits resulting therefrom.218 
While the concept of development, especially economic development, is often tinged with 
controversies in the contemporary discourse, the UNDRD carefully adopted an unrestrictive 
approach by recognising the multidimensional nature of development in its economic, social, 
cultural and political context. This is to reflect the varying developmental needs and levels of 
different countries. As Ansbach put it, “The UNDRD did not – and rightly so – draw a very definite 
picture of what development is … What is at stake here is the equal opportunity to develop, not an 
equal or identical development”.219 The UNDRD also sees development beyond a mere 
improvement in terms of growth in economic figures or other statistical measures by including 
non-material living standards of individuals in its definition. Of more importance to the economic 
fairness objective of this thesis is the UNDRD’s inclusion of the notion of fair distribution of 
benefits and meaningful participation as a vital component of development. In general, this places 
development as both a process and a goal. 
As mentioned earlier, the UNDRD describes the RTD as “an inalienable human right by virtue of 
which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy 
economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental 
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freedoms can be fully realised”.220 From the above definition and the content of the document, it is 
easily noticeable that the UNDRD has an anthropocentric outlook. This is evident, inter alia, in 
that it recognises “the human person as a central subject of development”, the human being as “the 
main participant and beneficiary of development” as well as “the active participant and beneficiary 
of the right to development”.221  
It is important to point out that one of the major issues of controversy regarding the UNDRD, both 
in the UN debates and academia, has been the identification of the subjects of the RTD. Ian 
Brownlie describes the text, which makes different mentions of “every human person”, “all 
peoples” and “all human beings … individually and collectively” and “states … individually and 
respectively”, as an apparent confusion. He says: 
The confusion apparent in the text of the Declaration stems from the complex ancestry of an 
enterprise which is partly rooted in the tradition of human rights (the Universal Declaration 
and Covenants), partly in the developments concerned with the establishment of a New 
International Economic Order (the Charter of the Rights and Duties of States), and partly in 
the doctrine of collective rights (the rights of peoples) of which the right to development has 
been regarded an example in the literature.222 
Nevertheless, this objection had earlier been voiced in the initial report of the UN on the RTD.223 
While citing the various instruments mentioned by Brownlie, the report justified the deliberate 
preference for a multistranded approach by maintaining that: 
[T]he enjoyment of the right to development necessarily involves a careful balancing between 
the interests of the collectivity on one hand, and those of the individual on the other. It would 
be a mistake, however, to view the right to development as necessarily attaching only at one 
level or the other. Indeed there seems no reason to assume that the interests of the individual 
and those of the collectivity will necessarily be in conflict.224 
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The UNDRD provides for a variety of duty holders, entailing both states and individuals. 
According to the UNDRD, all human beings have a responsibility for development by promoting 
and protecting an appropriate political, social and economic order.225 However, states have “the 
primary responsibility for the creation of national and international conditions favourable” to the 
RTD,226 and they are required to take steps, individually and collectively.227 Some of the 
responsibilities required of states include duties to formulate suitable national development 
policies;228 take resolute steps to eliminate massive and flagrant violations of the human rights of 
peoples and human beings;229 take steps to eliminate obstacles to development resulting from 
failure to observe civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights;230 
encourage popular participation in all spheres as an important factor in development;231 and as 
catch-all elements, undertake all necessary measures for the realisation of the right to 
development232 and ensure its full exercise and progressive enhancement.233  
While these obligations apply to states both individually and collectively, the UNDRD also 
specifies a number of exclusively collective duties such as the duty to: cooperate in ensuring 
development and eliminating obstacles to development;234 and the duty to take steps, individually 
and collectively, to formulate international development policies with a view to facilitating the full 
realization of the right to development.235 
Overall, the RTD as formulated in the UNDRD represents a comprehensive framework and 
approach that aims to integrate aspects of both human rights and development theory and practice 
into the policies and programmes of all relevant actors. While the acceptability, implementation 
and progress of the UNDRD face many political obstacles, not least the fact that it is just a non-
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legally binding declaration, it could still be said that the Declaration has significantly developed a 
substantive vision in the form of the RTD, despite the fact that follow-up action is wanting. 
3.2.4. Regional Interpretation of the Substance of the Right to Development  
It could easily be observed from the analysis of the substance of the UNDRD in the section above 
that the text of the Declaration might be inadequate for proper appreciation of the RTD. It is for 
this reason that this section will further examine the substance of the RTD as perceived in another 
source. Particular focus will be on how the RTD has been interpreted by the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights. As pointed out in section 3.2.2, the African Charter enshrines the 
RTD as a binding and enforceable right on its members via Article 22, and it remains the only 
tested international instrument on the RTD with an evolving jurisprudence on the subject. It is for 
this reason that the perspective of the African Commission could serve as an inspiration for the 
operationalisation of the RTD at the global level, especially since the conceptual development of 
the right is strongly linked to the continent’s jurists. This view of adopting the African regional 
understanding of the RTD as a model for advancing the right at the global level was also articulated 
by Oduwole, as she observed that: 
[T]he relevance of this regional right to analysis of the universal RTD lies in its contextual 
guidance regarding the original intent of the African developing country players who initiated 
this right at the regional level, as well as the continent’s contribution in the area of 
jurisprudence on the RTD so far.236 
The African regional human rights system has recorded key developments regarding both the 
conceptual and operational understanding of the RTD. As at 2021, at least 10 of about 240 decided 
decisions that had been rendered by the African Commission are relevant to the RTD. The RTD is 
either specifically involved as an issue in these cases, or it can be deduced from the issues, for 
instance, if they address relevant economic, social and cultural aspects of development. So far, the 
most celebrated decision of the African Commission on the interpretation of Article 22 of the 
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African Charter, which is the main provision on the RTD is the Endorois Case.237 This case is 
important in the development of the RTD at the African regional level because it was the first time 
that the African Commission extensively elaborated on the substantive nature and principles of the 
RTD and what its violation entails.  
The case involved a complaint lodged by the Centre for Minority Rights Development, with the 
assistance of Minority Rights Group International and the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions 
(which submitted an amicus curiae brief), on behalf of the Endorois community (an indigenous 
pastoral group in Kenya). The complaint is centred on the eviction of the Endorois people from 
their ancestral land, on which they had existed for centuries, by the Kenyan government to 
establish a national game reserve and tourist facilities. After the complainants had exhausted all 
internal remedies up to the Kenyan apex court without the desired result, they approached the 
African Commission, alleging several violations of the African Charter, including the RTD. They 
also alleged, inter alia, that the Endorois people’s RTD had been violated as a result of Kenya’s 
creation of a game reserve and the its failure to adequately involve the Endorois in the development 
process.  
At the end of the process, the African Commission found that the Kenyan government had indeed 
violated the RTD of the Endorois indigenous people pursuant to Article 22 of the African Charter 
and other relevant international instruments. In reaching the verdict, the Commission clarified 
some important issues concerning the substance of the RTD by noting that: 
The right to development is a two-pronged test, that it is both constitutive and instrumental, 
or useful as both a means and an end. A violation of either the procedural or substantive 
element constitutes a violation of the right to development. Fulfilling only one of the two 
prongs will not satisfy the right to development.238 
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The Commission further approved the Complainant’s submission that there are fundamental 
elements that are required to be present before a policy can be said to have fulfilled the 
requirements of RTD. It states that: 
[T]he right to development requires fulfilling five main criteria: it must be equitable, non-
discriminatory, participatory, accountable, and transparent, with equity and choice as 
important, over-arching themes in the right to development. In that regard it [the 
Commission] takes note of the report of the UN Independent Expert who said that 
development is not simply the state providing, for example, housing for particular individuals 
or peoples; development is instead about providing people with the ability to choose where 
to live. He states “… the state or any other authority cannot decide arbitrarily where an 
individual should live just because the supplies of such housing are made available”. 
Freedom of choice must be present as a part of the right to development.239 
The Commission further expounded some of the above mentioned principles while reaching its 
decision. For instance, in rejecting the argument of the Kenyan government that some members of 
the Endorois community participated and were consulted in the decision-making process, the 
Commission clarified that mere participation or consultation is not sufficient to fulfil the 
participatory principle of the RTD. The nature of the participation has to be in good faith,240 
adequate and effective, and the standard of consultation has to be appropriate to the 
circumstances.241 Effective and adequate participation, according to the African Commission, 
means that the concerned parties must be given the opportunity to shape the policies, and not just 
by imposing a decision on them after it has become fait accompli.242 It particularly drew the 
attention of the Respondent to Article 2(3) of the UNDRD which guarantees “active, free and 
meaningful participation” of people in the process of development.243 This principle is specifically 
relevant to the complaints of some developing and least-developed countries concerning the 
inadequate participation and lack of transparency during trade negotiations. 
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Flowing from the above, the African Commission also held that the result of any policy (which 
could be interpreted in the broader sense to mean any governmental, regional or continental policy) 
must be for the improvement of the capabilities and choices of the people and not otherwise.244 It, 
therefore, amounts to a violation of the RTD if a policy decreases the well-being of the people,245 
especially in the absence of a mutually agreed equitable sharing of the benefits made, which could 
be in form of compensation in the instant context.246 Again, principles like this would be able to 
invalidate unfavourable policies of the IEIs that could have disastrous effect on people, such as the 
SAP already discussed in the previous chapter. 
Another important principle to note from this case is how the African Commission discussed the 
need for an equal bargaining position while negotiating an agreement as a fundamental component 
of the RTD. The Commission held that the fact that the so-called representatives that the Kenyan 
government claimed to have consulted with were illiterates and could not have fully understood 
the terms of the agreement amounted to an unequal bargaining position and therefore fails to 
comply with the requirements of the RTD.247  
While the Endorois case appears to be the most resourceful African Commission decision on the 
nature and substance of the RTD, there are few other cases decided by the same Commission which 
have also contributed to the jurisprudence of the RTD. In an earlier case between Democratic 
Republic of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda,248 the Commission emphasised the direct link 
between the right to wealth and natural resources and the RTD and linked those rights to the ability 
of states to fulfil their collective and individual obligations to achieve the RTD. The Commission 
held that:  
[T]he deprivation of the right of the people of the Democratic Republic of Congo, in this 
case, to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources, has also occasioned another 
violation - their right to their economic, social and cultural development and of the general 
 
244 ibid. 
245 ibid. para 294. 
246 ibid paras 294 -296. 
247 ibid para 282. 
248 ‘African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and 
Uganda, Communication No. 227/99, May 29, 2003’ <https://www.achpr.org/sessions/descions?id=138> accessed 
30 April 2021. 
87 
 
duty of States to individually or collectively ensure the exercise of the right to development, 
guaranteed under Article 22 of the African Charter.249 
The most recent opportunity that the African Commission had to interpret the RTD pursuant to 
Article 22 of the African Charter on merit was in 2016, in the case between the Open Society 
Justice Initiative v. Côte d’Ivoire.250 This case served as an opportunity for the Commission to 
clarify the controversy on whether individuals can also allege a breach of a right to personal 
development. This was a debated issue because Article 22 of the Charter specifically mentions 
“peoples” as the holder of the right. In deciding this issue, the African Commission referenced 
some of its previous decisions on the RTD including the Endorois case, and also invoked some 
provisions of the UNDRD being “the most advanced political and legal recognition of the RTD at 
the international level” in clarifying its position as follows: 
[T]he Commission considers that there is indeed a fundamental convergence to comprehend 
the right to development as an inalienable, individual or collective right, to participate in all 
forms of development, through the full realization of all fundamental rights, and to enjoy 
them without unjustifiable restrictions. In any case, the conception of this right in the spirit 
of the Charter and the mere mention of the term “peoples” in the provisions of Article 22 of 
the Charter cannot adequately interpret the right to development as being solely and 
exclusively collective. In spite of its community emphasis, particularly with regard to the 
right to development, the Charter clearly recognizes the crucial role of the individual without 
whose self-fulfilment the development of the peoples may be compromised … [I]t is 
immediately recommended that the individual and collective right to development should be 
respected, protected and promoted.251 
Another case that has consistently been referenced as a relevant example of the recognition of the 
scope of the RTD in the African human rights system is the case of SERAC & Anor v. Nigeria.252 
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Yet, this case appears like a missed opportunity for the Commission to expound on the principles 
of the RTD in depth, particularly in relation to economic and social development. This case was 
instituted by two non-governmental organisations on behalf of the Ogoni people (who live in an 
oil-producing region in the south-eastern region of Nigeria) against Nigeria, regarding contracts 
entered by the military government for oil exploitation on the Ogoni-land by Shell Petroleum. The 
complainants alleged that the many years of oil operations by Shell, via the facilitation and 
condonation of the Nigerian government, had caused several violations, including environmental 
degradation and health problems resulting from the contamination of the environment among the 
Ogoni people. The Ogonis whose traditional occupation and main means of livelihood was fishing 
and farming also alleged that the oil development had poisoned much of the soil and water upon 
which they farmed and fished, and that the Nigerian government had destroyed and threatened 
their food sources through a variety of means. They also argued that the Ogoni people did not 
participate in the conclusion of the contract that deprived them of their lands and natural resources, 
and no benefit or compensation was given to them for the violations. 
All the above issues represent legitimate violations of economic, social and cultural development 
rights, and the case could have served as the earliest opportunity for the African Commission to 
elaborate on the RTD jurisprudence, even before the Endorois case. However, while the 
Commission agreed with the complainants that various rights had been violated including the 
RTD, it merely mentioned the RTD while considering the violation of the right to food. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the right to food was linked to the violation of the RTD in the case could 
be taken as a relevant contribution to the interpretation of the right, even though unsatisfactory. 
Perhaps the many criticisms by legal commentators against how the Commission treated the RTD 
with less significance in this case, despite having been raised by the complainants, could have 
inspired their subsequent emphasis on the right. 
From all the above, it can be deduced that the scope of the RTD at the African regional level is 
still evolving. Nonetheless, the interpretation of the RTD pursuant to Article 22 of the African 
Charter and other relevant instruments is instrumental in at least two ways. Firstly, it offers a more 
detailed conceptual understanding of the RTD. Secondly, for the purpose of enforcement, the 
system might serve as a clue for the advocates of a similar enforcement model at the global level. 
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The challenges, usefulness, limitations and achievements of the African model could also provide 
some critical thoughts for the support of an enforceable global treaty on the RTD.  
3.2.5. Legal Status of the Right to Development 
The determination of the legal status of the RTD is important because it is relevant to the prospect 
of the right being recognised and implemented. Despite the existence of multiple international 
instruments affirming the principles of the RTD, as already discussed in details under section 3.2.2, 
commentators are still divided as to whether these conclusively demonstrate the existence of RTD 
in international law. For instance, Roland Rich even though in support of the idea of the RTD, still 
opined that despite the passage of the UNDRD, the RTD remains a “putative right” which cannot 
be said to have been fully accepted into the body of international law.253 Despite Rich’s middle-
way approach to the RTD, his support for the idea of the RTD has been criticised by scholars like 
Ian Brownlie as straying from the confines of positive international law.254 Regardless of contrary 
opinions on the existence of the RTD as part of the international law, the 1979 Secretary-General’s 
report had rightly expressed that an analysis of legal norms from various existing international law 
instruments and documents  
indicates that there is a very substantial body of principles based on the Charter of the United 
Nations and the International Bill of Human Rights and reinforced by a range of conventions, 
declarations and resolutions which demonstrate the existence of a human right to 
development in international law.255 
This position was also reinforced by Philip Alston as he asserts that: 
It is appropriate to acknowledge that, as a general proposition in terms of international human 
rights law, the existence of the right to development is a fait accompli. Whatever reservations 
different groups may have as to its legitimacy, viability of usefulness, such doubts are now 
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better left behind and replaced by efforts to ensure that the formal process of elaborating the 
content of the right is a productive and constructive exercise.256 
Considering all the above, the concern of this section is to briefly look into some of the issues 
surrounding the legal standing of the RTD. It is settled that the UNDRD, like most human rights 
instruments, is a mere resolution of the UN General Assembly which cannot be said to have any 
binding effect. While the General Assembly may take decisions that would be considered binding 
on matters concerning the internal management of the UN like budgetary resolution, the body is 
however only empowered to make recommendations in most matters. It has also been argued that 
the General Assembly resolutions, which are legally synonymous to declarations, are not included 
as part of the formal sources of international law as described in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. Nonetheless, this does not mean that such resolutions are to be 
ignored or deemed to have no value. According to a memorandum prepared by the UN Office of 
Legal Affairs, a ‘declaration’ in the United Nations’ practice “is a formal and solemn instrument, 
suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are being enunciated, 
such as the Declaration of Human Rights”.257  
This position supports the view that the UNDRD must be considered a serious undertaking. It is 
also instructive to recall that the UDHR, adopted in 1948, also took the form of a resolution of the 
General Assembly. Today, the UDHR is not only considered as the cornerstone of the international 
human rights system, but the principles it enshrines are also largely considered as customary 
international law.258 This now leads us to the next phase of inquiry, which is: how may UN General 
Assembly resolutions which are primarily considered to be non-binding find their way to become 
a binding instrument under international law? The only realistic approach to this is to explore if 
the validity of the principles of such a resolution can be derived from traditional sources of 
international law. Among all sources, the most promising source with respect to the RTD is 
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customary law. This has been asserted by Victor Umbricht, among several other legal scholars, 
even before the UNDRD. He said:  
The right to international development has become integrated in the thinking and practice of 
states … it has effectively passed into the reality of international custom and forms part and 
parcel of customary international practice which constitutes one of the sources of 
international law.259 
However, Umbricht’s claim is still required to be established using the two essential elements of 
customary international law. In determining the existence and content of a rule of customary 
international law, it is necessary to ascertain whether there is a general practice and whether such 
practice is accepted as law (opinio juris),260 and each of the two constituent elements must be 
ascertained individually.261 This is not an enquiry that this thesis intends to dwell on in depth, but 
it is worthwhile to briefly analyse existing views on the topic.  
With regard to the first element, which is the practice of states, Bunn is of the view that there is 
nothing evidencing the existence of state practice in support of the RTD under customary 
international law,262 and her argument is largely premised on her repeated claim that there is lack 
of precise understanding of what the RTD entails.263 This thesis opines that this claim may not be 
entirely accurate regarding the RTD. While the claim could probably be justifiable regarding the 
content of the UNDRD which appears to be Bunn’s primary focus, the objective of the RTD as a 
right that is primarily and specifically concerned with the economic, social and cultural freedoms 
of people is hardly ambiguous. Neither should the controversies surrounding the scope and extent 
of the RTD be a justifiable ground to dismiss the right as vague. Such controversies relating to the 
meaning and scope of legal concepts are not uncommon, even in relation to other human rights.264 
For instance, the fact that debates regarding euthanasia, the death penalty and abortion are greatly 
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disputed by people of various interests under the right to life should not be taken as justification to 
reject the fundamental right as lacking “precise understanding”. The most germane factor in the 
human rights jurisprudence is the objective it seeks to achieve, which in the case of the right to life 
is to preserve the sanctity of life, as in the case of the RTD, it is to guarantee the economic, social 
and cultural progression of people. Thus, other procedural or substantive issues regarding the right 
can be discussed on merit without necessarily affecting the primary substance or objective of the 
right. 
Some authors have proposed promising perspectives on how state practice could be established in 
relation to the RTD. Roland Rich attempts to establish state practice based on the treatments 
accorded to developing countries.265 Specific examples he explored in detail are: 1) the 
advancement of development is a major goal of international organisations to which most countries 
belong; 2) developing countries in some cases are treated as special subjects of international law; 
3) nations behave as though they are under the obligation to provide development assistance; and 
4) there is the consistent recognition of substantive inequality between developing and 
industrialised nations. These instances seem compelling in establishing state practice. However, 
the range of practices mentioned is quite limited when compared with the actual scope of the RTD. 
While it might be sufficient to justify preferential treatment for developing countries, the actual 
scope of the RTD extents to every nation and individual. Moreover, the principles of the RTD are 
not primarily grounded in the mere provision of developmental assistance. Nonetheless, Rich’s 
analysis serves as a relevant starting point. 
Similarly, FV Garcia-Amador proposed the possibility of establishing state practice through the 
duty to cooperate for development, as enshrined in various international instruments including the 
UN Charter. He maintains that such duty is correlative to the RTD.266 He asserted that “focusing 
on the nature of such a duty … will throw light upon the question whether the right to development 
is, in fact, a genuine right”.267 However, the duty to cooperate can only establish a component of 
the RTD. 
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Another promising perspective which could be explored is to see whether state practice could be 
established through the provisions of the UDHR that affirm principles of the RTD, such as Articles 
22 and 28. Since the UDHR is generally considered as part of customary international law, this 
might serve as an acceptable premise to establish state practice. It is understood that evaluating 
how state practice could support customary international law is enormously complex in legal 
interpretation. Nonetheless, the above perspectives expose that the RTD has huge potential of 
being established as state practice, through a dedicated study on the issue.  
As for the second element, which is opinio juris, this thesis recognises that this might be 
challenging to establish due to the stringent condition attached to it. The main interpretation of this 
element is expressed by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases as follows:  
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be settled, 
or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered 
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.268 
While it could be argued that this condition is present for most African countries, because the 
justiciability of the RTD via the African Charter and judicial authorities is not in doubt, this most 
likely cannot be said concerning other countries. Even though the UNDRD has benefitted from a 
high degree of international consensus through its reiteration in annual resolutions and various 
forums, the narrow requirement for evidencing opinio juris, which requires a sense of obligation 
rather than merely committing to an action, presents a great hurdle.  
Also, a rule of customary international law may not be applicable to persistent objectors, like the 
United States and its allies, who have consistently objected to most resolutions in relation to the 
RTD. This view was expressed in the most recent UN Resolution on the Identification of 
Customary International Law.269 The only exception is if such rule of customary international law 
is considered a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens).270  
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The idea of considering the RTD as possible jus cogens is relevant because it designates the right 
as a compelling norm from which no derogation is permitted by way of particular agreements or 
policy.271 This is particularly relevant to the relationship between the RTD and international trade 
because other subjects of international law, such as international organisations and corporations, 
that are not directly mentioned under the UNDRD may become bound. Policies emanating from 
such organisations in the form of treaties would then have to be subject to the supremacy of the 
jus cogens rule. In arguing this position in relation to the RTD, Bedjaoui insists that the RTD, by 
its nature, is so incontrovertible that it should find its place in the doctrine of jus cogens from 
which no derogation is permitted. He premised his argument chiefly on the fact that the RTD flows 
from the right to self-determination and the duty of solidarity, which are “essential first and 
primary conditions from which flow the principles governing the international community”.272 
This thesis agrees with Bedjaoui with no reservations, but it is yet important to note that the 
understanding of the scope of jus cogens in international law is also controversial. As Ian Brownlie 
observes, “more authorities exist for the category of jus cogens than exists for its particular 
content”.273 However, certain legal commentaries and opinions of ICJ judges indicate that the UN 
Charter, freedom of high seas, international humanitarian law of armed conflict, the prohibition of 
the use of force,274 and fundamental human rights form a significant part of the jus cogens.275 
However, opinions are divided on whether the RTD would be included in the list of fundamental 
human rights. Nonetheless, Bedjaoui’s assertion which has also been expressed by some other 
scholars and experts seems to be keeping with the intention of jus cogens. 
While this thesis is more inclined towards the view that there could be a strong basis for the RTD 
to be recognised as jus cogens, some authors have suggested that the RTD is at least a soft law.276 
 
271 Article 53 and 64, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
272 Mohammed Bedjaoui, International Law: Achievements and Prospects (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1991) 1184–
1185. 
273 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (5th ed, Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press 1998) 
516–517. 
274 Bunn (n 187) 136. 
275 J Frowein, ‘Ius Cogens’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
<http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1437> accessed 30 April 
2021; See also, Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and 
General Principles’ [1988] Australian Year Book of International Law 82. 
276 Karin Arts and Atabongawung Tamo, ‘The Right to Development in International Law: New Momentum Thirty 
Years Down the Line?’ (2016) 63 Netherlands International Law Review 221. 
95 
 
However, legal commentators do not seem to be in agreement regarding the concept of soft law. 
The term “soft law” has been described as lacking precision and misleading to some extent because 
it blurs the line between binding and non-binding norms.277 In fact, it is unclear if it could be 
considered as an independent, formal source of international law. All the same, it still plays a 
valuable role in providing a legal basis for the development of binding legal principles. Moreover, 
most of what is referred to as “hard law” today finds its origin from the so-called soft law. For 
example, the ICJ in the Nicaragua v United States278 looked more favourably upon soft law as the 
basis of opinio juris in establishing a norm under customary international law. Yet, this thesis is 
of the view that the category of soft law is not where the RTD is expected to be placed, considering 
the fundamental nature of the right, and the fact that the UNDRD has existed for over 30 years.  
All the above arguments point to the evolving nature of international law, and how subsequent 
entrants into the international system are seeking to fit their concerns within the existing 
international order. 
3.2.6. Relevance of the Right to Development to the International Trading System 
From ancient times, there is a long-standing consensus among experts and non-experts that trade 
has one of the most significant links to human growth and all kinds of development. Trading has 
always supported livelihoods, improved the quality of people’s lives, and even served as a major 
catalyst for innovations. Apart from the fact that it is arguably the strongest link between peoples 
and cultures, it also touches all facets of human development, from the most basic to the most 
sophisticated. The significance of trade to the development of communities is so enormous to the 
extent that it has consistently created frictions amongst nations as they compete to safeguard their 
various interests.  
While the relevance of trade to the development of nations is agreed by almost everyone, the 
contemporary argument, albeit ironic, is whether the institutions overseeing the international 
trading system should be concerned with issues of development, poverty, human rights, and other 
social concerns – mostly termed as “non-economic values”. For example, one writer maintains 
that the WTO “cannot and should not get involved with questions that have little to do with 
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international trade” because it is not a development institution.279 Without doubt, views of this 
nature only promote the philosophical understanding of profit and market growth as the ends of 
trade relations with little or no concern for its equitable nature and its impact on the living standards 
of people. Such views also go contrary to stated and implied values of the international trading 
system as affirmed, at least theoretically, by the WTO. It is in acknowledgement of this significant 
relationship between trade and development that the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO 
recognises that: 
[T]heir relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a 
view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily 
growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and 
trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and 
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with 
their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.280 
It is also relevant to mention that the Doha Round was specifically fashioned as the “Doha 
Development Agenda” or “Doha Development Round”, with the stated aim to put the less 
developed countries at its heart. Even though the success of the Doha Round and how well the 
development concerns of developing countries have materialised is a different subject, the fact that 
development was the central purpose of the negotiating round emphasises how fundamentally 
inseparable trade and development are. The Doha Ministerial Declaration launching the Doha 
Development Round reads: 
We strongly reaffirm our commitment to the objective of sustainable development, as stated 
in the Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement. We are convinced that the aims of upholding 
and safeguarding an open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system and acting for 
the protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable development can and 
must be mutually supportive.281 
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These kinds of affirmations appear repeatedly in many other trade treaties, which could serve as 
an indication of the global community’s commitment to ensuring harmony between international 
trade and development. Nonetheless, while it could be rightly said that development is 
incorporated in the works of the WTO via some provisions in its Agreement, the premise of this 
thesis is that international trading rules are in fact unfair and constitute a major obstacle to the 
realisation of development. In addition, it was concluded by a UN task force that “the current 
international trading system is stacked against developing countries, a situation that severely 
hampers development and ongoing attempts to eradicate poverty”.282 This extends by implication 
to the RTD. 
Moreover, specific provisions in the WTO Agreements that suggest the commitment of the 
organisation to development, such as the special and differential treatment provisions which 
implicate an underlying principle of the RTD, have often been criticised as imprecise and 
ineffective. Complaints of this nature led to the Doha Ministerial Declaration where it was agreed 
that “all special and differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to 
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational”.283 Other negotiating 
concerns raised by developing countries as the agenda unfolded included the problem of 
protectionism via technical barriers, more market access, range of issues in the agricultural sector, 
issues surrounding investment liberalisation, issues relating to the intellectual property rights and 
so on.  
In conclusion, the overall relevance of the RTD to the international trading system is that the 
principles of the RTD, as can be gleaned from various sources, represent the required ethical values 
and standards that trade and other economic activities should espouse. Principles such as equality, 
equity, transparency, accountability, reasonable and beneficial participation, non-discrimination, 
and the ultimate aim of improving the standard of living of the global populace should be embraced 
as the non-derogatory grundnorm of the policymaking process in the international economic 
system.  
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3.3. Global Distributive Justice and the International Trading System 
Justice can be described as “the constant and perpetual will to render to each his due”.284 However, 
variations of ideas exist as to its nature and scope, what it entails, and what matters should be 
considered relevant to its domain. In view of this, an important initial enquiry that should be 
addressed before going into detailed analysis about global distributive justice (GDJ) and its 
relationship with the international trading system is whether trade law is in need of any theory of 
justice in the first place. Justice theories as intended in this research refer to that branch of 
political/legal philosophy that is concerned with the allocative fairness of social institutions. This 
broadly entails a consideration of how resources, rights, privileges and opportunities are allocated 
among people belonging to a certain community or enterprise.  
While it may appear as commonsense to a reasonable person that the regulations of any social 
institution ought to be guided by underlying principles that aim to guarantee a fair and equitable 
order within such institution, such assumptions are however often met with challenges emanating 
from different premises. For example, most “positive economists” will reject any economic 
analysis that is premised on the value of economic fairness, or what the economy should be or 
ought to be. This is similar to the approach of their counterpart in the legal realm (legal positivists) 
to matters of trade law or economic law in general. To proponents of economic positivism (as 
opposed to normative economics), economics should only be concerned with the description and 
explanation of economic phenomena (i.e. what is). Thus, economic value judgements (such as 
inequality, poverty, gender issues, distributive or allocative fairness, social welfare, morality or 
other ethical considerations) are often considered not to have a place within the scope of 
economics. Even though this thesis is clearly not in agreement with their position, this economic 
school of thought is alas dominant amongst contemporary economists and policymakers today.  
It is important to note that this has not always been the case in the economic realm, as most leading 
economists in the first half of the 20th century devoted a significant part of their research to 
normative issues for the evaluation of public policies.285 In lamenting the modern situation and “the 
strange disappearance of welfare economics”, Atkinson wrote that “economists do not devote a 
 
284 The phrase is said to have been popularised by Cicero in De Natura Deorum before it was later codified in the 
Justinian Corpus of Civil Law. 
285 Such as Hicks, Kaldor, Samuelson, Arrow, Pigou etc.) 
99 
 
great deal of time to investigating the values on which their analyses are based. Welfare economics 
is not a subject which every present-day student of economics is expected to study”.286 It is for the 
above reason that most expert analysis concerning international trade and other economic matters 
is usually more focused on the market and growing figures than other pertinent considerations such 
as human development. 
Apart from the challenges from the perspective of contemporary positivist-economists, there are 
various objections to the application of theories of justice to international trade law even from 
within political/legal philosophers. Most of these objections are usually premised on the fact that 
most classical political theories have typically envisioned the application of their theories of justice 
through a domestic viewpoint. They mostly argue relying on different philosophical grounds that 
the international economic institutions lack the required underlying social structure for the 
application of any justice theory. For instance, some contractarians may argue that the perceived 
lack of “social contract” at the global level makes a global theory of justice impracticable. 
Communitarians may also argue that there is no global “community” of the sort that is required to 
trigger the obligation of global justice. Similarly, relativists may object to justice in the 
international trading system on the ground that there is no global normative consensus that really 
gives rise to transnational norms of justice.  
The main problem with most of these objections is that they inaccurately assume that the social 
basis for global justice should necessarily be exactly the same as that of domestic justice. They 
also fail to take the nature and effects of modern globalisation into account in their theorisations. 
Taking the communitarians’ objection as an example, the idea of a domestic political community 
as the ideal basis for the legitimacy of governance and justice might need to evolve considering 
the overwhelming changes in the global social relations and structure. Not only is the wealth 
distribution of nation-states now fundamentally conditioned by transnational and global 
institutions, but the understanding of domestic justice systems is also now inaccurate without 
reference to transnational and global institutions. A similar argument also applies to the 
contractarians’ objection. While it is not intended to be argued in this thesis, as some others have 
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attempted, that the global economic structure entirely fits the necessary elements of the traditional 
social contract idea, it may still be appropriate to argue that global justice does not require a social 
contract of such nature and elements as the domestic model. Perhaps, the mere establishment of 
cooperation to create benefits and burdens and the arising need to decide on how they can be fairly 
allocated may well be sufficient for justice to apply from an improved lens of ‘global’ 
contractarianism. 
Notwithstanding the various ideological oppositions to the relevance of justice theories in trade 
law and policy, justice theories are significant to international trade law for many important 
reasons. One key reason is that they can help to determine the proper objectives and values for 
policies in the international trading system, in accordance with a guided and well-reasoned 
understanding of what is helpful, fair, and just. Another reason is that they can serve as lenses to 
evaluate the fairness and unfairness in the treaties, regulations, governance and overall institutional 
structure of the IEO and the international trading system in particular. Lastly, and perhaps most 
importantly for lawyers and adjudicators, a theory of justice can play an important role in the 
interpretation of treaties and other legal documents. This is because of the need to resolve legal 
ambiguities and lacunae according to standards which are many times beyond the legal text that 
are primarily required to be interpreted, to guide legal reasoning and to serve as a justification for 
conclusions. 
All the above have become crucial due to modern globalisation which has led to the proliferation 
and growth of IEIs along with their increasing subsidiary agencies. For the certain reason that the 
IEIs, which are forms of transnational governance, play a fundamental role in shaping the contours 
of the global economy and its resources, opportunities, and burdens, it is therefore much needed 
that their normative underpinnings, legitimacy and allocative effects be brought under the scrutiny 
of justice perspectives. 
3.3.1. A General Description of Distributive Justice 
Having provided a basis for the relevance of theories of justice to the international trading system 
in the preceding section, this thesis therefore adopts distributive justice theory as the most pertinent 
political/legal theory of justice for the reason already mentioned in section 3.1. Thus, this section 
will attempt to provide a broad description of distributive justice. 
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In a less technical way, distributive justice principles may be described as frameworks that are 
concerned with the allotment of goods, obligations, burdens and privileges, in consonance with 
the merits or peculiarities of individuals and in the best interest of society at large. These 
frameworks are important because of the role the resultant benefits and burdens play in affecting 
people’s lives. According to Lamont and Favor, the principles of distributive justice are therefore 
best thought of as “providing moral guidance for the political processes and structures that affect 
the distribution of benefits and burdens in societies, and any principles which do offer this kind of 
moral guidance on distribution, regardless of the terminology they employ, should be considered 
principles of distributive justice”.287  
Distributive justice is to be distinguished from corrective justice because while the former is 
mainly concerned with a just distribution, the latter mainly addresses the deviations that may arise 
from such distribution. In relation to the international trading system as an example, it could be 
said that, while distributive justice theories are relevant to how the substantive rights and 
obligations imposed by the system are distributed, the latter is specifically related to the dispute 
settlement mechanism and how its remedies are administered. 
Distributive justice principles differ in various dimensions according to different theorists. They 
differ in terms of the subject matters that are considered relevant to distributive justice (such as 
wealth, income, opportunities, development, welfare, utility, etc.); in terms of the objects or 
recipients of the distribution (such as individual persons, groups of persons, states, etc.); and the 
basis upon which the distribution should be made (such as equality, free transaction, according to 
individuals’ peculiar characteristics, developmental needs, maximisation, gender concerns, etc.). 
These differences in approaches and methodologies, which lead to divergences among justice 
theorists, usually provide an avenue for opponents of distributive justice, from among 
professionals and policymakers, to dismiss the relevance of distributive justice literature as 
imprecise and lacking definite direction. But the fallacy in such dismissal is apparent as such 
debates about perspectives on issues, whether moral or empirical, exist in every other realm of 
knowledge. Moreover, such dismissal also suggests a misunderstanding of the nature of 
distributive justice, as it is impossible not to take a stand on the topic. In the context of this thesis, 
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for example, any opinion in support or against the current operation of the IEO still amounts to 
taking a substantive position on the distributive nature of the existing system, because the views 
are still concerned with what qualifies as the appropriate order, and instruct the IEIs on how 
allocative decisions should be made. Some authors have taken the view that such objectors to 
distributive justice in trade matters on the insistence of “no theory of distributive justice” are best 
classified somewhere between “egoists” and “utilitarians” within the theoretical classifications.288 
While the former may simply refuse to consider trade through the lens of justice because the order 
seems favourable to their position, the latter, in their economic version, insist that trade policies 
should only be judged by its effect on efficiency and “aggregate welfare”.289 Garcia best sums up 
both positions as follows: “I am in the winner’s position in the aggregate welfare calculus, so it is 
best to keep the whole conversation of justice off the table – it isn’t going to improve my 
position”.290 
Notwithstanding the unending debates, the primary concern of this thesis is the distributive 
principles designed to cover the distribution of the benefits and burdens of economic activities, 
particularly in relation to international trade law. Among various contending theories of 
distributive justice, this thesis favours a reformed adaptation of John Rawls’s “Justice as Fairness” 
theory as one of the normative models for the discussion on global justice and the international 
trading system. 
3.3.2. Why Rawls’s Theory of Distributive Justice? 
Rawls’s theory as the choice of this thesis can be justified on numerous grounds. Firstly, his theory 
of justice is founded on the general framework of liberalism. Adopting the understanding of 
Waldron, a major characteristic of liberalism as a form of justification is its assertion that the 
consent of every person in any political order is essential for such an order to have legitimacy.291 
This best suits the analysis of the current international trading system whose policies are largely 
influenced by states that consider themselves Western-style liberal democracies. Therefore, an 
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analysis of justice that is rooted in liberal philosophical values may be a more persuasive tool to 
justify the proper integration of appropriate distributive justice principles into international trade 
policies as an ethical obligation upon the most influential parties involved.  
Secondly, among the different strands of liberalism, Rawls’ theory is also founded on 
egalitarianism, as opposed to utilitarianism and libertarianism. This particularly suits the objective 
of the thesis because of the theory’s “liberal” commitment to “equality”. Other scholars such as 
Dworkins have also argued that the idea of equality is very central to liberalism, even more than 
ideas such as liberty.292 Therefore, if it is accurate that equality is central to liberalism, it goes 
without saying that Rawls’s “Justice as Fairness” theory being the leading liberal-egalitarian 
theory of justice is an appropriate starting point for this enquiry. 
3.3.3. Preliminary Issues on Justice as Fairness  
The issue of inequality is central to Rawls’s theoretical enterprise, and the principal work in which 
he laid down his response to inequality is his famous book A Theory of Justice.293 The theory he 
set forth in the book was named “Justice as Fairness”, and it will substantially form the basis of 
this thesis’s view on distributive justice. It may be worthy to mention that Rawls further developed 
aspects of his justice as fairness in two subsequent books – Political Liberalism294 and The Law of 
Peoples.295 The former is not so much relevant to the discussion in this thesis as it mainly relates 
to the structure of political liberty and discourse, as opposed to the distributive aspect of justice as 
fairness. The latter is however relevant to this thesis because Rawls presented his opinion on the 
applicability of justice as fairness to international relations – a view that will form the basis of 
discussion in section 3.3.5. 
In understanding justice as fairness, two preliminary issues need to be clarified. The first is that 
Rawls is concerned about the inequalities that arise with respect to the distribution of what he 
described as “primary goods”.296 He described primary goods as “things that every rational man is 
presumed to want” or things that would “normally have a use whatever a person’s rational plan of 
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life”.297 He further divides primary goods into two basic varieties, namely “social primary goods” 
and “natural primary goods”. Rawls theory is particularly interested in the former. Social primary 
goods are goods that are directly at the disposition of the “basic structure of society” such as “rights 
and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth”,298 while natural primary goods are 
defined as those goods that are not subject to the basic structure because of their natural nature. 
Examples are “health and vigor, intelligence and imagination”.299 He, however, claims that the 
possession of natural primary goods can still be influenced by the basic structure.300 
The second issue that needs to be clarified is that, according to Rawls, the justice as fairness theory 
is primarily applicable to what he termed “the basic structure of society”,301 which he described, in 
turn, as “the arrangement of major social institutions into one scheme of cooperation”.302 He 
elaborated many years afterwards in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement that his theory is 
concerned with the “the basic structure of society, that is, its main political and social institutions 
and how they fit together into one unified system of social cooperation”.303 He also explains that 
“these principles are to govern the assignment of rights and duties in these institutions and they 
are to determine the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social life”.304 
3.3.4. The Two Principles of Justice as Fairness 
By way of initial summary, Justice as Fairness has two principles, and the central idea of the two 
principles is that all social primary goods, which consist of income and wealth, liberty and 
opportunity, and the basis of self-respect, should be distributed equally unless an unequal 
distribution is to the benefit of everyone, especially the least favoured.305 The theory also describes 
injustice as inequalities that are not to the benefit of all. Rawls contends that a proper application 
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primary goods, and would fulfil the Kantian obligation of mutual respect, to treat each other as 
ends and not as means.306 The two guiding principles of Rawls’ theory are as follows: 
First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for 
all. 
Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged in order 
to satisfy two conditions: (a) They are to be attached to offices and positions 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and (b) They are to 
be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of the society.307 
The first principle is related to equal basic liberties and freedom, and the second principle applies 
mainly to economic institutions. The second principle will be the primary concern of this thesis, 
because of its clear implications for assessing the distributive justice of the international trading 
system and its institutions. Therefore, much emphasis will not be placed on the first principle 
because it is not commonly considered a principle of distributive justice given that it does not 
relate to the allocation of economic goods strictly speaking – even though still related and 
fundamental. I will nonetheless briefly provide an insight into the first principle before going into 
the details of the second, because the fulfilment of the first principle, according to Rawls, takes 
priority over the second, just as 2(a) has lexical priority over 2(b).308 
Rawls’s first principle affirms that citizens should have the basic rights and liberties, such as the 
freedom of speech, right to vote, liberty of conscience and freedom of association, right to be 
treated in accordance with the rule of law, and so on. This principle accords these rights and 
liberties to everyone within the basic structure equally. This is usually a concern of domestic 
constitutional orders – and if stretched to the international level, it is also relevant to the concerns 
of international human rights law and international criminal law regimes. 
Unpacking the second principle, which is our main concern here, it itself contains two sub-
principles – the fair equality of opportunity principle (2a) and the difference principle (2b). The 
 
306 ibid 179. 




fair equality of opportunity principle essentially provides that factors that result in social and 
economic inequalities, such as educational and economic opportunities, must be equally opened 
to every individual of equal talents, abilities and motivations, regardless of whether they were born 
rich or poor.309 This presents an egalitarian starting point. However, unlike in strict egalitarianism 
where a radical or absolute kind of equality is usually canvassed, the difference principle provides 
a different path. 
The difference principle, which is the second part of the second principle, is ethically motivated 
by the idea of “equal respect for persons”310 and the ideal of deep social unity. The principle is 
primarily concerned with the distribution of income and wealth. The main crux of the principle is 
that, while equality in distribution of wealth and income should be the primary standard, inequality 
should, however, be considered as fair, provided that it is to benefit everyone, especially the worst-
off group or the least advantaged. The goal of the difference principle is to ensure that people in a 
privileged position do not get richer at the expense of the less fortunate. The principle ensures that 
a person does not merit more of a social good just because of his natural endowment or skills. 
While it is not arguing for everyone to be allotted the same share, its main point is that natural 
abilities can be utilised to make everyone better off. Rawls contends that a principle that permits 
some citizens advantages that do not benefit the worst off in the society suggests that the latter are 
not equally worthy members of society. 
3.3.5. Debates on the Global Applicability of the Difference Principle 
Rawls’s theory of distributive justice, especially the difference principle, has been one of the most 
influential works in modern political philosophy. This is mostly due to its liberal approach to 
equality and particularly its justification of a kind of inequality for the betterment of the situation 
of the least privileged in the economic distribution scheme. The prominence of this theory has 
therefore exposed it to numerous appraisals. As it has been adopted as the basis to justify many 
policies and academic arguments, so have aspects of it also been the subject of different criticisms. 
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This thesis, as some others have previously done, finds the second principle of justice as fairness 
largely relevant to the distributive problems of the modern IEO.  
However, the first obstacle in the adaptation of justice as fairness to the international economic 
regime is that Rawls himself had famously argued against the application of distributive justice 
theory (especially his difference principle) globally. He stated that “I shall be satisfied if it is 
possible to formulate a reasonable conception of justice for the basic structure of society conceived 
for the time being as a closed system isolated from other societies”.311 This view was further 
expounded in his book The Law of Peoples,312 which came about 28 years after the publication of 
A Theory of Justice. He contended that there cannot be a global difference principle, as distributive 
justice can only apply among what he described as “well-ordered societies” under the basic 
structure as opposed to “burdened societies”, which include most of the developing world.313 This 
demonstrates that like many other traditional political theorists, Rawls also mostly conceives the 
applicability of distributive justice only within domestic boundaries. As Nagel puts, “the ideal of 
a just world for Rawls would have to be the ideal of a world of internally just states”.314 Rawls, 
however, loosely mentioned that the so-called well-ordered societies have a “duty of assistance” 
to the burdened societies.315 The import of this duty seems ambiguous, but it is unmistakably not 
an attempt to justify distributive justice in the economic relationship among states. According to 
Rawls, the main problem of the so-called burdened societies is not resources or wealth distribution, 
but their social and political attitude. He said:  
I believe that the causes of the wealth of a people and the forms it takes lie in 
their political culture and in the religious, philosophical, and moral traditions 
that support the basic structure of their political and social institutions, as well 
as in the industriousness and cooperative talents of its members, all supported 
by their political virtues.316 
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The above quote seems appealing and substantially accurate for the motivation of appropriate state 
policies for national development; but not so much attractive if considered in the general context 
of The Laws of Peoples which focuses on justice in international relations. This only serves as a 
distractive justification to ignore empirically established global economic inequalities and the 
various legitimate distributive irregularities that are inherent in the IEO. Even though Rawls 
acknowledges the existence of negotiated international arrangements for economic matters such 
as trade and finance in various parts of the book, he however conveniently ignores the extent of 
their influence and effect on the economic and political lives of domestic societies.  
Rawls’s view on global distributive justice has been subject to intense debate, and it will be 
considered as the antithesis of this section. This thesis will be most inclined towards the general 
cosmopolitans’ approach to global justice which holds that no consistent logical argument can be 
sustained to limit the applicability of distributive justice to a certain domain and to the exclusion 
of the entire global community. The cosmopolitans’ view on global distributive justice, in 
opposition to the nationalists, can be justified on both theoretical and factual grounds. In Pogge’s 
World Poverty and Human Rights, he, on the basis of moral universalism, faults Rawls’s failure 
to extend the application of the difference principle to the global economic order. He claims that 
Rawls runs afoul of moral universalism because “he fails to meet the burden of showing that his 
applying different moral principles to national and global institutional schemes does not amount 
to arbitrary discrimination in favor of affluent societies and against the global poor”.317  
Adopting Rawls’s idea of the “basic structure” in A Theory of Justice, Buchanan was able to 
demonstrate that a global basic structure actually exists, in rejecting the limiting approach.318 
According to Rawls’s own definition, the basic structure is to be understood by the nature of their 
distributional effect, and he described it as “the way in which the major social institutions [which 
include major economic and social arrangements] distribute fundamental rights and duties and 
determine the division of advantages from social cooperation”.319 This basic structure, according 
to Rawls, is the “primary subject of justice because its effects are so profound” and “the major 
institutions define men’s rights and duties and influence their prospects, what they can expect to 
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be and how well they can hope to do”. It is, therefore, mystifying how the above description has 
failed to fit the distributional effects of the global economic institutions, which is a form of 
transnational governance with distributive capacities of global goods. Buchanan asserts that the 
global basic structure exits, and it is composed of: 
[R]egional and international economic agreements (including General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, North American Free Trade Agreement, and 
various European Union treaties), international financial regimes (including the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and various treaties governing 
currency exchange mechanisms), an increasingly global system of private 
property rights, including intellectual property rights that are of growing 
importance as technology spreads across the globe, and a set of international and 
regional legal institutions and agencies that play an important role in 
determining the character of all of the preceding elements of the global basic 
structure.320 
The main point of all the above is that in a character similar to the domestic basic structure, a 
global basic structure also exists, which effectively determines the prospects of individuals, 
groups, including peoples as conceived by Rawls. Buchanan concludes that:  
[i]t is therefore unjustifiable to ignore the global basic structure in a moral theory 
of international law—to proceed either as if societies are economically self-
sufficient and distributionally autonomous (so long as they are well-governed) 
or as if whatever distributional effects the global structure has are equitable and 
hence not in need of being addressed by a theory of international distributive 
justice.321  
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Other cosmopolitan theorists from within liberal-egalitarianism such as Beitz and Pogge322 also 
agree that a global basic structure exists, and Rawls’s justice as fairness theory including the 
difference principle consequently applies to the global economic order. 
Beyond the theories and from a practical perspective, globalisation itself which has given rise to 
global governance necessarily creates the need for a global distributive theory of justice – at least 
to the extent of those aspects of international relations that have been empirically confirmed to 
affect the lives of people. The growing integration of individual states’ economies into a global 
one means that nations are increasingly affected by the policies and happenings in other states. 
States can now hardly be described as absolutely independent of the others to such extent that they 
can autonomously implement their own justice principles, as internal situations are now heavily 
affected by international factors. As Beitz says:  
[I]t is not even clear that the question is intelligible as it arises for contemporary 
developing societies which are enmeshed in the global division of labor: a 
society’s integration into the world economy, reflected in its trade relations, 
dependence on foreign capital markets, and vulnerability to the policies of 
international financial institutions, can have deep and lasting consequences for 
the domestic economic and political structure. Under these circumstances, it 
may not even be possible to distinguish between domestic and international 
influences on a society’s economic condition.323  
In general, while it might be understandable for Rawls, being an academic philosopher in the 
1970s, not to take the effects of the modern economic globalisation and other developments in 
international economic relations into consideration, it is certainly not tenable today, as the requisite 
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3.3.6. The Difference Principle and the WTO Law 
For the reasons already discussed in the previous section, this section will proceed to consider the 
adaptability of the justice and fairness theory, particularly the difference principle in international 
trade relations. Garcia has produced extensive works on how Rawls’s distributive justice principles 
could be adapted to IEL. He claims that such adaptation will require three elements, which are: (a) 
establishing the facts of the existence of inequality; (b) examination of the choice of problem faced 
by those in the original position; (c) and an identification of the principles of justice which result.324 
All three elements were adequately established by Garcia.325 Thus, combining Rawls’s justice as 
fairness which is rooted in liberal-egalitarianism, and the cosmopolitans’ vision of global 
distributive justice, Garcia suggested a principle of “international difference principle” as follows: 
“International social and economic inequalities are just only if they result in compensating benefits 
for the least advantaged states”.326 
Since the focus of this thesis is on international trade law, it will be appropriate to conclude by 
demonstrating, with a few practical examples, how relevant the difference principle is to the WTO 
law and practice. There will be no need to restate the arguments on how the WTO and other IEIs 
meet the requirement of an international basic structure based on the Rawlsian model, and how 
they possess the institutional capacity to distribute benefits and burdens relating to global goods 
among states. Such facts have become incontrovertible by modern realities. In fact, the WTO’s 
distributive mandates for allocative decision-making, and even the enforcement of resulting norms, 
continue to increase in scope.327 The policies of the institution many times regulate and affect 
domestic policies, as they effectively control the terms of market access and the enforceability 
rights relating to intellectual property and investment. These policies directly affect the wealth of 
states and their people. Thus, even though a justifiable difference exists between domestic and 
international institutions for some reasons, both still share the same basic predicate with regards 
to the applicability of distributive justice theory, being that they involve the creation and allocation 
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of benefits arising from social cooperation. In fact, these institutions now make it questionable if 
any society can actually be called a closed society anymore in the Rawlsian sense.  
In applying the above international difference principle to trade law, one can suggest that, for 
international trade law to be just, it needs to operationalise the difference principle by making 
inequalities work for the benefit of the least advantaged in the scheme. In the context of the existing 
principles under the WTO Agreements, one can relate the international difference principle to the 
SDT provisions. The purpose of SDT provisions which are contained in the WTO Agreements is 
to “give developing countries special rights and … give developed countries the possibility to treat 
developing countries more favourably than other WTO Members”.328 However, as earlier 
discussed in section 2.4.2, while illustrating the inequities of the SPS Agreements, SDT provisions 
mostly suffer from serious pragmatic and normative problems. In other words, they are commonly 
ineffective and can hardly be relied upon for different reasons. In some cases, SDT provisions 
employ purely hortatory language that relegate the effect of the provisions to a mere moral 
persuasion that confers no actual directive or obligation. An example is the first paragraph of the 
Enabling Clause which states that “contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable 
treatment to developing countries”.329 Such elective expression will hardly be given a binding 
effect by the adjudicatory bodies. Even in some instances where mandatory terms such as “shall” 
are used, the lack of specificity on how the provision should be complied with, or the adoption of 
neutralising clauses, often render such provisions unenforceable.330 
In essence, the difference principle can, in addition to practical and empirical enquiries, serve as a 
normative tool to evaluate if the SDT provisions relating to market access, domestic policies of 
developed states, or other trade policies actually operate to make inequalities work in such a way 
that it benefits every state, especially the least advantaged states. 
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3.4. The International Trading System from a Critical Third World Approach 
Being one of the theoretical lenses adopted in this thesis, this section briefly provides an overview 
of the TWAIL, particularly as it relates to the international economic system. It describes the nature 
of the critical methodology, its central themes, and further justifies its relevance in the international 
economic governance. The significance of a Third World approach in analysing the global order 
cannot be overemphasised, because the dominant perception of the so-called Third World nations 
about the regime of international law, especially the IEL, is that its existence is mainly to sustain 
the historical domination of the powerful developed countries over others. It is, however, essential 
to be mindful that, while TWAIL could be unreservedly critical of the present global system, it 
still acknowledges that the way out of the established hierarchical and inequitable order can only 
be achieved through a reformed international legal system. Thus, the following subsections will 
provide more understanding of the discussion.  
3.4.1. General Background and Nature of TWAIL 
The mainstream attribution of universality, neutrality, objectivity and fairness in describing the 
nature of the contemporary international legal system has never been well-received by several 
critical scholars of various interests. It is against this mainstream understanding that some scholars 
have been more devoted to critical international legal scholarship. The centrality of such diverse 
scholarship is to adopt critical methods and theories to deconstruct, demystify and disrupt 
dominant narratives, interpretations, and how legal phenomena are understood. Critical 
international legal scholars mostly adopt a socio-legal lens in presenting alternative viewpoints to 
how we perceive the law and the world around us, through doctrinal, empirical, historical and 
interdisciplinary methodologies to legal studies. They are opposed to the absolute positivist 
approach adopted by other legal scholars, which overemphasises formalism or rule-centred 
doctrinal specificity while rejecting the significance of coherent abstraction.331 Examples of critical 
approaches to international legal scholarship (some of which are classified as post-modernism)332 
include the feminist approaches to international law (FtAIL), new approaches to international law 
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(NAIL), and TWAIL. Among the various competing and complementary critical approaches, this 
thesis only intends to focus on TWAIL and demonstrate its relevance to IEL.  
TWAIL has been conceptualised in various ways. It has been described as a theory, a methodology, 
a community of scholars; a project; a decentralised network; a political movement; a set of 
approaches; a school of thought; and several other descriptions.333 It may nonetheless be safer to 
simply define TWAIL as an approach to international legal scholarship that attempts to critically 
engage the mainstream claims of universality, justness and impartiality that are usually associated 
with international law, especially as they concern the Third World. Through a critical 
understanding of international law’s history, structure and process, TWAIL scholars attempt to 
analyse international law from the context of the lived experiences of ordinary people of the Third 
World, with the aim of transforming the system into “an international law of emancipation”.334 
This is because TWAIL scholars unanimously characterise international law as carrying forward 
the legacy of its imperial, colonial, and Eurocentric foundations, notwithstanding the fact that it 
guarantees sovereign equality in principle.335 For instance, Mutua, among others, strongly opines 
that the international legal system is a “predatory system that legitimizes, reproduces and sustains 
the plunder and subordination of the Third World by the West”.336  
While TWAIL as a coinage was introduced as an intellectual movement at Harvard Law School 
in the mid-1990s, the idea that characterises TWAIL had been in existence for decades. TWAIL 
scholars typically trace the background of TWAIL, as a political idea and movement, from the 
Bandung Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference of 1955. It was the period that saw the surge of anti-
colonial/decolonisation movements across Latin America, Africa and Asia after World War II. 
The Bandung Conference, which took place in Indonesia, was convened to create a coalition of 
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Third World states337 that would articulate political and economic concerns peculiar to them, with 
the aim of forcing those matters into the international agenda. While the success of the Conference 
in terms of outcome is a different subject, it at least marked the birth of multiple nations coming 
together with the aim of resisting an international legal order that was understood to be based on 
the subjugation of non-Western Third World states to the domination of the West. 
There are arguments that the Third World classification has become anachronistic today because 
the world has moved on from the Cold War era. According to Walker, the “great dissolutions” of 
1989 terminated all Cold War categories and “as a label to be affixed to a world in dramatic motion 
the Third World became increasingly absurd, a tattered remnant of another time”.338 However, the 
apparent problem with statements such as Walker’s is that they ignore the obvious fact that the 
structures and processes of the present global capitalism are nothing short of a continuation of the 
past, and the political realities are not radically different from the perspectives of the so-called 
Third World countries. From a TWAIL perspective, the conception of the phrase “Third World” 
is, therefore, a group of states that are culturally, economically and politically diverse, but are at 
the same time united in their common history of colonial domination, which is still being sustained 
under the present neo-colonialism.339 The overemphasis on the expiration of the Cold War 
categorisation by critics of TWAIL is unnecessary. The growing political and economic divide 
between the North and South is sufficient evidence, if any were needed, for the relevance of the 
“Third World” categorisation. Chimni also supported the view, like TWAIL and post-colonial 
scholars, that “once the common history of subjection to colonialism, and/or the continuing 
underdevelopment and marginalization of countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America is attached 
sufficient significance, the category ‘Third World’ assumes life”.340 This TWAIL understanding 
has also been embraced by all kinds of scholarship that is dedicated to post-colonial approaches to 
international law, such as NAIL. According to Shetty, “[t]he ‘post’ in ‘postcolonial’ does not refer 
to ‘after a period of colonialism’ or ‘triumphing over colonialism’, but to the ‘continuation of 
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339 Mutua and Anghie (n 336) 35. 
340 Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’ (2006) 8 International Community Law 
Review 3, 5. 
116 
 
colonialism in the consciousness of formerly colonized peoples, and in institutions imposed in the 
process of colonization”.341  
3.4.2. The Central Themes of TWAIL 
TWAIL is often described as a decentralised network of academics because it is not organised 
around vertical hierarchies of knowledge production.342 TWAIL scholarship is an expansive, 
heterogeneous and polycentric dispersed network and field of study. It is a discipline with internal 
contestations and varied agendas among its scholars because it seeks to address the concerns of 
different classes within the Third World. As such, TWAIL scholars adopt different methodologies 
while seeking to achieve a united goal. The different approaches that can be found within TWAIL 
scholarship include post-modernism, feminism, Lat-Crit Theory (Latina and Latina Critical 
Theory), post-colonialism, literary theory, modernism, Marxism, critical race theory, and so on. 
Thus, similar to other ideological schools, there is no single TWAIL. However, notwithstanding 
all the methodological variations, TWAIL scholars are united in their common commitment to an 
actual universal and egalitarian international legal system that would see greater involvement of 
Third World peoples and other marginalised peoples in international law. Some of the central 
themes of TWAIL are as summarised in the next paragraph. 
Through the centrality of historical, empirical and socio-legal methodologies in TWAIL 
scholarship, it seeks to deconstruct, unpack, and develop an understanding of the role of 
international law and its institutions in creating and perpetuating the subordination of the Third 
World to the powerful North through international legal norms.343 It also seeks to reform and 
remake international law by presenting alternative normative legal mechanisms that can coexist 
with other critiques of the prevailing neoliberal approach to international law.344 Also, it seeks to 
create opportunities for the consequential participation of the Third World in the international 
political and economic order through the mechanism of a reformed and an actual universal 
international legal order. Furthermore, through scholarship, politics and policies, TWAIL seeks to 
mainstream the issues of underdevelopment in the Third World and explore pragmatic ways in 
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which the issues can be meaningfully addressed.345 While TWAIL’s core concern is the resistance 
of imperialism in the global order, it would, however, be simplistic to say that the Third World 
countries are entirely innocent victims of the dark side of the international legal order. This is 
because the post-colonial era was accompanied with different kinds of politics of repression within 
the Third World itself. TWAIL, therefore, is also critical of the Third World elites whose agendas 
are not totally in alliance with the aspirations of ordinary Third World peoples. 
In amplifying some of the above themes, it is crucial to elucidate that history is one of the most 
essential elements of TWAIL scholarship due to its claim that the present international norms and 
institutional practices actually emerged and developed from a tainted past. Thus, before any 
significant reform could be made to any branch of the global order, TWAIL scholars believe that 
it is essential to re-evaluate the power relationship in the international legal system in order to 
eradicate the inherent oppression and hierarchy. TWAIL scholars have extensively demonstrated 
how repugnant concepts like colonial expansion and conversions of wealth were facilitated and 
justified by international law, under the guise of universalisation. Anghie extensively argued that 
colonialism was not just peripheral to international law; it was central to the formation of the 
system, and it still largely has enduring effect in today’s relationship between states.346 He, 
however, alleged that this reality has been largely obscured and misunderstood due to the fact that 
traditional international law scholarship has been constructed on Eurocentric narratives, which 
hardly take the parallel experiences of the larger Third World into account.347  
For instance, the fundamental concept of sovereignty which theoretically guarantees the equality 
of states and their absolute power over their territory emerged from the Treaty of Westphalia of 
1648. However, the doctrine at the time, which was inspired by the prevailing natural school, was 
that most non-European ‘states’ lacked this sovereignty. This understanding then served as legal 
justification for the various ‘civilising missions’ and economic ‘explorations’ of the European 
imperialists. Francisco de Vitoria, who is widely considered as one of the founding fathers of 
modern international law, extensively justified the ‘right’ of colonisers to travel to non-European 
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territories for economic purposes and to establish ‘proper governance’ over the natives in 
accordance with a ‘universal natural law’, as they are unfit to govern themselves – not even their 
family affairs. While he ‘progressively’348 considered the natives as humans bound by universal 
natural law, he, however, classified any form of resistance to their domination as an act of war. In 
describing the potential war situation, Vitoria said: 
And so when the war is at that pass that the indiscriminate spoliation of all 
enemy-subjects alike and the seizure of all their goods are justifiable, then it is 
also justifiable to carry all enemy-subjects off into captivity, whether they be 
guilty or guiltless. And inasmuch as war with pagans is of this type, seeing that 
it is perpetual and that they can never make amends for the wrongs and damages 
they have wrought, it is indubitably lawful to carry off both the children and the 
women of the Saracens into captivity and slavery.349 
The motive for delving into Vitoria’s work is to illustrate the relationship between colonialism and 
international law, particularly from a book that is considered as one of the earliest, if not first, 
modern works of the discipline. Vitoria’s work, in general, demonstrates the centrality of 
commerce to international law, which necessitated the development of doctrines to justify 
commercial exploitation and even ‘just’ war. It also gives a background to how international law 
plays a major role in presenting European subjectivity as universal objectivity, and how others are 
condemned as uncivilised and therefore incapable of being sovereigns. A similar structure of ideas 
continued in the 19th century when legal positivism became the dominant jurisprudence of 
international law.  
While the Vitorian jurisprudence of the law of nations still affirmed that both the Europeans and 
non-Europeans were bound by the same higher ‘universal’ natural law, the strict view of the 
positivists that dominated the legal jurisprudence in the 19th century was that the sovereign is the 
exclusive creator of the law and cannot be bound by any law unless it has consented to it.350 While 
this substantially guarantees a respectful relationship among European states, it expelled most non-
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European states from the realm of international law, as they were classified as uncivilised and 
therefore incapable of being sovereigns. This meant that those states lacked the legal personality 
to legally object to their dispossession and colonisation, and were therefore reduced to objects of 
exploitation and conquest. This was further legitimised using an old international law doctrine that 
supported the designation of lands occupied by ‘uncivilised’ non-sovereigns as terra nullius 
(meaning “nobody’s land”). Among the products of the principle is the Berlin conference of 1884–
85 where the European powers met to decide how Africa was to be divided among them. TWAIL 
scholars have argued that this categorisation of civilised/uncivilised people, based on European 
subjectivity, still exists in international law, even though subtly. The least of such example is the 
listing of general principles of law recognised by “civilised nations” as a major source of 
international law.351 Many authoritative international law sources understand the phrase “civilised 
nations” to originally mean Christian European states as opposed to states that are not thought to 
possess similar values – mostly referred to with terms such as enslaved nations, rude nations, 
uncivilised nations or semi-civilised nations, and their inhabitants are usually referred to as 
barbarians or savages.352 Although, some contemporary writers and interpreters are beginning to 
take a more inclusive path with regards to the understanding of the phrase.353 
The TWAIL methodology stresses historical facts like the above, so as to show how the modern 
realities are connected with the past. Even after the end of formal colonialism in most parts of the 
world, TWAIL scholars opine that the process of decolonisation only replaced the old structure 
with neo-colonialism; where the Third World has continued to play a subordinate role in the 
international legal system.354 This, according to many Western and non-Western scholars, has been 
facilitated by their economic dependence on the West which has been largely facilitated by the 
rules of the IEIs.355  
It is, therefore, helpful to summarise the main characteristics of TWAIL as follows: It is anti-
hierarchical, as it seeks to reform the complexes of superiority that has driven international law; it 
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is counter-hegemonic, as it opposes the hegemony of a few powerful states, which TWAIL 
believes is being legitimised by the UN and other international institutions; and it is suspicious of 
‘universal’ creeds and truths, as TWAIL is critical of the universalisation of European 
subjectivities such as market ideas and other values that may not fit in different contexts.356 
3.4.3. The Relevance of TWAIL to International Economic Law 
The TWAIL methodology has been adopted in critiquing virtually all aspects of international law, 
and IEL is not an exception. In fact, TWAIL assigns a primary significance to IEL because it views 
the field as the foundation upon which the edifice of international law was built.357 As earlier 
discussed, historical backgrounds are usually the default starting points of most TWAIL critiques. 
Therefore, a TWAIL critique of IEL is usually built upon the symbiotic relationship that exists 
between global capitalism, imperialism, and modern international law – and this relationship, 
according to TWAIL, substantially accounts for why the IEO has hugely been disadvantageous to 
the Third World countries.358 In analysing the background of the present global economic system, 
TWAIL, therefore, rejects the attempt by mainstream IEL scholars to present IEL as merely a post-
Second World War phenomenon, while conveniently ignoring how imperialism has largely shaped 
the system. To the Third World, the present IEO is simply a successor of the earlier exploitative 
colonial order. One of the numerous examples that is often given to support this point is the fact 
that corporations that were active in the imperial project and even slave trade continue to be 
relevant as dominant players in today’s global capitalism. For example, the Royal Niger Company 
(a mercantilist company chartered by the British government), which violently controlled the vast 
majority of distinct national territories that were subsequently amalgamated into one Nigerian 
state, still exists today as a major multinational company under the name Unilever. The company 
was instrumental in the formation of Colonial Nigeria, as it enabled the British Empire to establish 
control over the lower Niger against the German competition led by Bismarck during the 1890s.359 
Another famous example of such corporation is De Beers Group, which specialises in diamond 
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exploration among other diamond mining activities, and still operates today in about 35 countries. 
The company was established by Cecil Rhodes, a fierce colonial figure who vigorously advocated 
for settler colonialism under the supremacist belief that “the more of the world we [referring to the 
Anglo-Saxon race] inhabit the better it is for the human race”.360 The company has often been 
criticised for its role and that of its founder in the advancement of British imperialism, the 
exploitation of natural resources in countries under colonial control, and disregard for the rights of 
the natives, especially in southern Africa.361 The reality is that companies with histories and 
legacies like the above mentioned still operate as major players in the modern IEO, and it is alleged 
that their neo-colonial interests are still being fulfilled through the IEIs. 
Realities such as the above have, therefore, generated a series of Third World critiques and political 
resistance to the IEO. An example of such is the new international economic order (NIEO) critique. 
The NIEO is a set of ambitious proposals by some developing countries, known as the Group of 
77 in 1974, to restructure the IEO by establishing a balance in the relationship between the Western 
industrial economies and the predominantly raw material producing economies of the Third World. 
The NIEO also challenged the unfair rules imposed by international trading, investment and 
finance regimes, and advocated in favour of the right to development. Notwithstanding the 
majority status of the countries in support of the NIEO and its adoption as a declaration of the 
United Nations,362 the hierarchical power structure of the UN and the lack of political will from the 
industrial nations often render such initiatives unsuccessful. TWAIL scholars have also alleged 
that such Third World concerns have received very little attention from the mainstream IEL 
scholarship, and have in numerous cases been dismissed.363 In view of all the above, some of the 
main issues that are relevant to the critical Third World approach to IEL will be briefly mentioned 
below. 
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Firstly, one of the most consistent issues that arises in TWAIL critiques is the need to revisit the 
ideologies that have dominated the IEL thinking, such as the free trade and other liberalisation 
policies. Most of these policies have been imposed on most developing countries as preconditions 
to join the international organisations, receive different kinds of foreign assistance, and for other 
political and economic reasons. However, experts have consistently asserted that, while the 
policies might be beneficial in some ways, they mostly serve the interest of the big corporations, 
as opposed to the Third World peoples that are the main concern of TWAIL.364 While TWAIL is 
not opposed to the implementation of liberalisation policies, it seeks for an IEO that will genuinely 
consider the harmful implications of these policies on ordinary people and workers of developing 
countries.365 Leading economists like Stiglitz have argued that the development level of countries 
must be taken into consideration when pushing for trade liberalisation. According to him, the real 
issue is not whether to liberalise or not, but the appropriate time and to what extent.366 History also 
has it that most of the developed countries actually industrialised behind high tariff walls and a 
range of protectionist measures, which technically have not been absolutely eliminated even 
today.367 
Secondly, TWAIL scholars allege that IEL does not give sufficient attention to the 
operationalisation of social and economic rights, and this explains why these rights have not been 
developed to have practical content. Scholars have contended that where social and economic 
rights, such as the right to health, compete with other interests such as the international patent 
regime, that mostly stand to benefit the developed countries and their corporations, the actors 
promoting such property rights usually possess greater power and resources, which thereby affects 
any chance to find a meaningful balance between the contending rights. This problem is also 
compounded by the fact that development is not satisfactorily recognised as freedom. 
Notwithstanding the fact that 146 states voted in favour of the UNDRD, the opposition it has faced 
from the states dominating the global economic and political arena has rendered the right 
practically ineffectual. TWAIL, therefore, emphasises the need to identify and work on the main 
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obstacles affecting the realisation of the goal of development as freedom. For instance, Chimni 
contends that proper recognition and operationalisation of the RTD, which places significance on 
human development, is capable of restoring the crucial policy spaces for developing countries to 
implement necessary developmental programmes.368 
A third important issue at the heart of TWAIL’s critique is the continuous use of different types of 
coercion by powerful nations to get Third World nations to accept economic policies that could be 
unfavourable to them. These could include the blocking of loans from international financial 
institutions, unilateral economic sanctions, threat to deny development aid, and even direct push 
for regime change or support of dictatorial elites in the Third World.369 All these concerns are 
matters that should be within the concern of IEL because the goals of such forces are usually to 
realise commercial and economic gains. However, the mainstream IEL scholarship has been 
accused of ignoring such significant matters, as they choose not to be concerned with the processes 
through which economic phenomena are made the subject of international regulation. Some other 
major concerns that have occupied the critical TWAIL approach to IEL include the need to 
increase the transparency and accountability of the IEIs and transnational corporations; the need 
to make the interests of people and development policies the central subject of IEL as opposed to 
just the states; the need to make effective use of the language of human rights in international 
agreements to further the interests of the poor and marginalised groups; the need to ensure an 
equitable global sustainable development policy; the need to map out a global economic theory of 
justice that rejects “methodological nationalism” and so on. 
In summary, the critical TWAIL approach to IEL essentially rejects the prevailing formalist 
approach that only seeks to explain the rules of international economic phenomena and chooses to 
exclude the underlying issues that are fundamental to its structure. Thus, the central ambition for 
TWAIL is how it will unshackle international law and its various branches from its foundational 
inequities, with the aim of providing a global egalitarian system for the universal benefit of the 
global populace, particularly the marginalised Third World.370 
 
368 See B. S. Chimni, ‘International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making’ (2004) 15 European 
Journal of International Law 1. The author extensively explained how the internal policy standards imposed by 
international economic institutions hamper the development of developing countries. 
369 Chimni, ‘Critical Theory and International Economic Law’ (n 11) 258. 
370 Mutua and Anghie (n 336). 
124 
 
3.5. Conclusion on Theories – Five Conceptual Principles for the Realisation of Global 
Economic Justice 
Discussions on global economic justice have customarily been approached through singular 
theories or viewpoints, with proponents of various approaches mostly engaging in asserting the 
superiority of their views above others. While this could sometimes be a necessary practice, 
especially when contending against fundamentally opposing ideologies, it will also be of great 
benefit if researchers/theorists on the subject of global justice could adopt a pluralistic approach, 
wherein multiple methods, notwithstanding their possible dissimilarities on some matters, can be 
brought together in discussing the subject. This methodological “pluralism” was rightly advocated 
by Sen, who argued that insisting on just a single approach to justice, while disregarding other 
competing principles in total, “may be a mistake”.371 While there are apparent differences between 
competing approaches to justice, such differences are however not always sufficient for us to 
conclude that they individually cannot survive critical scrutiny and have legitimate claims to 
fairness. Moreover, alternative approaches may help remedy situations where one approach is 
insufficient in scope or wanting in how it addresses certain justice questions. According to Sen, 
“reasonable arguments in competing directions can emanate from people with diverse experiences 
and traditions, but they can also come from within a given society, or for that matter, even from 
the very same person”.372 Following Sen, a similar approach was also adopted in relation to IEL 
by Garcia in his Global Justice and International Economic Law: Three Takes, wherein he 
explored three different competing political theories of justice, albeit all within the liberal 
normative tradition, in addressing the question of fairness in IEL.373 For all the above reasons, this 
thesis also combines three complementary approaches (Distributive Justice, RTD, and TWAIL) in 
addressing the question of justice in the global economic arena. Adopting Garcia’s expression, this 
is essentially a matter of “seeking the best arguments with the broadest base towards a common 
goal”.374  
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Overall, the aim of this chapter, as mentioned in section 3.1, is to examine the three theoretical and 
normative approaches and thereafter extract relevant principles to serve as the key pillars on which 
to base the realisation of fairness in the IEO. The three approaches have been extensively discussed 
under sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. This last section of the chapter will, therefore, consider distilled 
principles that, in the opinion of this thesis, should underlie the realisation of global economic 
justice, building upon the common elements of the three theories. Without doubt, there are 
abundant concepts that could be extracted from the three theories; but for the purpose of this thesis, 
five conceptual principles have been carefully chosen due to their particular relevance to 
international economic and trade relations. These five principles will serve as the basis to analyse, 
critique and offer proposals to the trade matters that will be discussed in the case study section in 
chapter four. It is worth mentioning that TWAIL will not be directly referred to as consistently as 
the two other theories when analysing the extracted principles, because the critical approach does 
not restrict itself to any particular means to achieving global economic justice, provided that the 
end result is in harmony with its objectives and favourable to the wellbeing of the Third World 
people and the global populace in general. Moreover, the RTD, which will be referenced under the 
different principles, is arguably a major product of the Third World critical approach. The five 
distilled principles are, therefore, as follows: 
1. Development as the central objective of international trade policies  
2. Operationalisation of differential treatment in trade policies 
3. Mainstreaming human rights in international trade policies and agreements 
4. Equality of participation and transparency in international trade practice 
5. Expansion of global social responsibility 
All the above interrelated principles have been mentioned under various sections in this thesis 
either specifically or indirectly, and they are substantially dependent on each other in realising 
considerable equity in the global economic order. The principles have been selected based on their 
direct pertinence to fairness in the IEO, and in particular, their prospect of forming the basis of 
possible solutions to the practical issues in the case study sections. While this thesis identifies and 
analyses the extracted principles as offshoots of the three theoretical approaches, they have also 
independently gained momentum in discussions surrounding fairness in general and specifically 
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in relation to international economic policy. For instance, principles such as equity, participation, 
transparency and accountability have been mentioned (even though from diverse logical premises 
and perspectives) in different scholarly works, human rights instruments and even international 
resolutions as necessities for achieving global economic justice. However, a main novelty of this 
chapter is the fact that these principles will be discussed from the viewpoints of the three theoretical 
approaches. Further explanation on the significance and relevance of the five principles to the 
international trade regime will, therefore, be provided in the subsequent sections.  
3.5.1. Development as the Central Objective of International Trade Policies 
The inevitable connection between trade and development has been stressed in section 3.2.6. It is, 
however, worth emphasising that there is the critical need for the reconsideration of how we think 
about trade policies, especially with respect to concepts that are prioritised as the central objectives 
of international trade. The unrestricted devotion to concepts such as free trade and other similar 
liberalisation models need to be re-evaluated in light of their actual effect on the sustainable 
development of the global populace. This thesis, therefore, submits that such concepts should be 
treated as a means to achieve the development of people’s wellbeing, rather than being the central 
ends of trade policies. Instead, development should be taken as the primary objective of trade 
policies.  
Adopting the definition of the UNDRD, development here will be generally understood as “a 
comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant 
improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals”.375 This thesis views 
this definition of development as preferable because it focuses on the interests of all individuals, 
as opposed to the common state-based method of analysing and evaluating development, which 
mostly obscures the actual distribution of economic benefits within a given setting. Therefore, this 
thesis submits that international policymakers should be more committed to how the trade policies 
they enact affect the wellbeing of human beings, in terms of their food security, good health, 
quality of life, positive physical and mental health, prosperity, safety, and so on. 
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The idea of making development concerns central to the international trading policy is found in all 
three theoretical approaches earlier discussed in this thesis. Even though it appears to be more 
conspicuous under the RTD, development is nonetheless one of the main end goals of the discussed 
distributive justice principles, and predictably, the TWAIL methodology. However, it is worth 
mentioning that the means through which the various approaches seek to achieve a development-
centred international trading system differ, and this has generated debates among scholars. This 
dispute is mainly between those that advocate the implementation of developmental policies 
through human rights approaches such as the RTD, and the scholars that approach global economic 
justice through political/legal theories such as Garcia and Linarelli. For instance, while Garcia 
rightly emphasised, on the one hand, that “developing countries must re-focus WTO trade and 
development policy around the twin goals of development and fairness”,376 he, however, declares 
elsewhere that he disagrees with “other approaches that ground developing country trade concerns 
in the discourse of human rights, such as the right to development”.377 Like Garcia, Linarelli also 
termed the human rights approaches to global economic inequities as “nebulous” and “imprecise”, 
and that they sometimes conflict with the actual interest of fairness.378 He cited the example of how 
intellectual property rights were used to justify aspects of the TRIPS Agreement that conflicted 
with the human right to health.379 In essence, scholars like Garcia opine that the proper method of 
implementing fair and development-centred international trade policies is by acknowledging the 
existence of a moral obligation380 upon the wealthy states to ensure that the problems of inequality 
are well addressed, by virtue of their commitment to liberal tenets, through the introduction of 
favourable mechanisms.381  
While Garcia’s position provides a sound philosophical basis, the possibility of the practical 
materialisation of such a subjective ethical concept is very much in doubt, especially in an 
economic environment where value judgements are contemptuously regarded. Thus, 
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notwithstanding some of the legitimate criticisms against the human rights approach, this thesis 
will take a middle path by submitting that the human rights framework, despite its numerous 
limitations and imperfections, still offers a practicable constitutional basis for the implementation 
and enforcement of fair and development-centred policies. In fact, human rights principles such as 
the RTD do not exist in a vacuum; they mostly rest their principles on philosophical premises. For 
example, the UNDRD enshrined the principles of fair distribution and equality of opportunity, 
which Garcia also commits to, as elements of the RTD. This thesis, therefore, submits that the 
struggle for a just IEO cannot be exhausted in a single approach to justice. Both the human rights 
approach and political theories can complement one another with a view to improving the ideas 
and their implementation.  
In conclusion, the main contention of this section is that development concerns should be 
considered as the primary and inviolable objective of international trade relations, above other 
peripheral considerations. Some could argue that a number of international trade agreements 
usually stipulate development as part of their goals. However, a reasonable and objective analyses, 
as pointed out in various sections of this thesis, can reveal how most of such declarations hardly 
materialise in the real world. It is also important to note that it is one thing to claim development 
as a goal among other objectives; it is another thing to make it the central objective that cannot be 
subordinated to any other consideration. The latter represents the submission of this thesis. 
3.5.2. Operationalisation of Differential Treatment in Trade Policies 
Considering the unequal position of the participants in the global economic order and its 
asymmetric effect,382 the international trading system needs to be more committed to strengthening 
equitable values that would grant exceptional treatment to those in a less-favourable position, in 
order to aid development as an objective and for the system to be less unfair. This idea is justified 
by Rawls’ difference principle as an essential condition for distributive justice, and scholars have 
argued in favour of its global applicability, especially with respect to international trade.383 From 
a human rights perspective, differential treatment is also considered as one of the underlying 
principles of the RTD.384 Several provisions of the UNDRD emphasise the special status of 
 
382 For explanation on the asymmetric effect of the IEO, see section 2.3. 
383 See 3.3.5 and 3.3.6 for the global applicability of the difference principle. 
384 Isabella D Bunn, The Right to Development and International Economic Law: Legal and Moral Dimensions 
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countries with lesser development standards, despite the fact that all states are subjects of the right 
and duty-holders under it. For instance, the UNDRD notes that “sustained action is required to 
promote more rapid development of developing countries”, and that “effective international co-
operation is essential in providing these countries with appropriate means and facilities to foster 
their comprehensive development”.385 Such special treatment has also been considered by some 
authors to have emerged over decades of states practice, and that it is grounded in the duty to 
cooperate for development.386 The idea of differential treatment is also considerably similar to 
some existing human rights arguments such as affirmative action, equality of opportunity, and 
substantive equlity, which are all premised on the notion of equality of outcome and not just 
equality of opportunity.387 
The concept of differential treatment already exists, to a relative extent, in the WTO framework as 
the principle of SDT. It is described as the product of “the coordinated political efforts of 
developing countries to correct the perceived inequalities of the post-war international trading 
system by introducing preferential treatment in their favour across the spectrum of international 
economic relations”.388 Through different measures, SDT aims to take account of particular risks 
and vulnerabilities that developing countries face in international trade, especially in areas such as 
market access, market protection, and technical assistance. However, the effectiveness and 
enforceability of many of the SDT provisions in practice have been called into question. In fact, 
they are seldom interpreted favourably in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings.389 For the 
above reason, the Ministers at the 4th WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha mandated the 
Committee on Trade and Development to examine the SDT provisions in the WTO Agreements, 
with the stated view of improving the binding nature of the STD provisions. The Doha Ministerial 
declaration reads: 
 
(Bloomsbury Publishing PLC 2012) 217. 
385 UNDRD, Article 4. 
386 Roland Rich, ‘The Right to Development: A Right of Peoples’ (1985) 9 Bulletin of the Australian Society of Legal 
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387 Natalie Baird, ‘Disasters, Human Rights and Vulnerability: Reflections from the Experiences of Older Persons in 
Post-Quake Canterbury’ (2021) 2 Yearbook of International Disaster Law Online 314. 
388 Murray Gibbs, ‘Special and Differential Treatment in the Context of Globalization’, Note presented on behalf of 
UNCTAD to the G15 Symposium on Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO Agreements, New Delhi (1998). 
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We reaffirm that provisions for special and differential treatment are an integral part of 
the WTO Agreements. We note the concerns expressed regarding their operation in 
addressing specific constraints faced by developing countries, particularly least-
developed countries… We therefore agree that all special and differential treatment 
provisions shall be reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making them more 
precise, effective and operational.390 
After the Doha declaration failed to materialise into any significant benefit, a “monitoring 
mechanism” was established at the Bali Ministerial Conference in 2013 to review and analyse the 
implementation of the SDT provisions, with the possibility of making recommendations to relevant 
WTO bodies. However, these commitments are yet to yield any substantial progress in addressing 
the concerns regarding the effectiveness of the SDT provisions. Unfortunately, a more 
encompassing and effective SDT implementation is a germane element for the realisation of 
distributive justice and development as a goal of the multilateral trading system. As Garcia 
succinctly said, “Developing countries need a comprehensive agreement on S&D [SDT] clarifying 
that development, not trade liberalization, is the number one economic policy goal of developing 
countries, and that fairness, not charity, is the basis for development”.391 Alas, the attitude of the 
WTO policymakers and the dispute settlement body towards SDT seems to have placed 
liberalisation policies above development. This thesis takes the opposite approach. 
The problems with the operationalisation of the SDT are numerous; some of which have been 
discussed under different sections of this thesis, particularly in sections 2.2.4 and 3.3.6. One main 
problem is the fact that some of the SDT provisions, as earlier discussed, are required to be 
implemented through discretionary and nonbinding programmes. Apart from the fact that such 
provisions are usually not enforceable as of right, they also serve as an opportunity to the countries 
that choose to offer such preferences to impose a host of non-trade related conditions on the 
receiving countries, which is effectively a means of control.392 Another flaw of SDT provisions is 
that they are limited in scope. While it could be said that the majority of the developed economies 
and some major developing countries have granted duty-free quota-free (DFQF) market access to 
 
390 Paragraph 44, ‘Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration’ (2001) 
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LDCs in principle, sectors that are supposed to be of utmost importance, such as agriculture and 
textiles, are sometimes exempted from this preferential treatment.393 This, therefore, renders the 
DFQF meaningless because sectors where most of the LDCs have competitive advantage are not 
usually covered.394  
In summary, the primary purpose of this section is not to delve so much into the debates concerning 
the SDT provisions of the WTO Agreements. It is more interested in establishing that the idea of 
differential treatment is an essential element for achieving both distributive fairness and 
development in the international trading system – and for this to be meaningfully accomplished 
under the WTO, a reformed SDT is required in terms of scope, effectiveness, and implementation. 
3.5.3. Mainstreaming Human Rights in International Trade Policies and Agreements 
The theoretical underpinnings of the international trade regime and human rights law, as they 
currently stand, fundamentally differ.395 While the former is primarily committed to the ideals of 
unhindered movements of goods, services and capital, the latter is more concerned with the dignity, 
wellbeing and welfare of individual human beings, and, sometimes, peoples. This difference in 
ideals can easily be observed from the usage of similar terminologies in the different realms. For 
example, when words such as freedom, equality, rights and non-discrimination are used in the 
human rights context, they are usually used in connection with the protection of vulnerable humans 
of the society. However, when adopted in a trade law context, they are primarily used to confront 
any hindrance that may prevent investors or corporations from doing business, notwithstanding 
the effects of such business practices on human beings. Thus, even though we can find various 
WTO documents stressing the organisation’s commitments to human rights, the differences in the 
fundamental values that both realms advocate usually create situations where they clash.  
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The theoretical conflict between the international trade regime and human rights has materialised 
in practice in different instances, and this has consistently created conflicts between human rights 
activists/NGOs and trade policymakers. This is even more pronounced in relation to social, 
economic and cultural rights than civil and political liberties. Examples of recognised human rights 
principles that have been or are still being infringed in different ways by international trade policies 
include the right to an adequate standard of health through the TRIPS Agreement which limited 
the ability of developing countries to provide free and/or cheaper generic versions of patented 
drugs.396 Other examples of breaches are of the right to food through unfair competition which 
forces small-scale farmers to abandon their lands to sectors other than food production who will 
then be unable to feed themselves, and issues concerning transnational corporations (TNC) and 
international labour standards.397  
Interestingly, when issues are raised in relation to the effects of international trade in mainstream 
IEL, the arguments are usually centred on utilitarian calculations such as the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), efficiency, Gross National Product (GNP), or other material indicators that are 
mainly concerned with aggregate welfare. This approach differs from the ethical/moral criteria of 
human rights, which set minimum standards for the protection and wellbeing of every human 
being.398 Therefore, in a world where human rights are now widely acknowledged as a major 
standard of civilisation, this thesis, therefore, submits that any contention between the two regimes 
should always be settled in favour of human rights above purely economic considerations. 
This position is also justifiable from the perspective of all three theoretical approaches discussed 
in this thesis. As mentioned in section 3.3.4, Rawls’s first principle of distributive justice affirms 
the essentiality of basic rights and liberties, and he even confers on it a lexical priority over the 
 
396 Attempts have been made to remedy the issue of access to medicines through the inclusion of Article 31bis of the 
TRIPS Agreement (as well as the Annex and Appendix) in 2017. However, the system is still not without its 
shortcomings, especially with practical difficulties. See in general Ellen’t Hoen, ‘Access to Medicines Amendment 
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Access to Medicines?’ Southern Centre Policy Brief <https://www.southcentre.int/wp-
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1.pdf> accessed 30 April 2021. 
397 See generally, Abadir M Ibrahim, ‘International Trade and Human Rights: An Unfinished Debate Developments’ 
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second principle of his Justice as Fairness.399 The applicability of Rawls’s theory has been further 
developed into a global principle applicable to IEIs, as already discussed in section 3.3.5. Also, 
the UNDRD makes references to human rights under multiple articles, and the principle of respect 
for human rights is fundamental to the understanding and realisation of the RTD, which by itself 
is a human right. Particularly, Article 3.3 declares that “states should realise their rights and fulfil 
their duties in such a manner as to promote a new international economic order based on sovereign 
equality, interdependence, mutual interest and co-operation among all states, as well as to 
encourage the observance and realisation of human rights”.400 The Declaration also reiterates that 
resolute steps should be taken to “eliminate massive and flagrant violations of the human rights of 
peoples and the human beings affected” that may occur from all forms of situations.401 Among 
other similar provisions, Article 6.3 also affirms that steps should be taken to eliminate various 
impediments to development that may result from the failure to observe and recognise the civil 
and political rights, as well as economic social and cultural rights of the human person, which is 
the primary subject of the RTD.402  
In conclusion, all the above arguments are for the purpose of making a claim in favour of the 
primacy of respect for human rights as “inalienable” and a requirement for realising fairness and 
development as the main goal of international trade. The rights of humans individually and 
collectively should be the fundamental measure to evaluate trade policies and not the other way 
around. While it could be argued that the WTO has at various points considered human rights or 
even reformed some of its policies to conform to human rights principles, the crux of this section 
is that human rights should not be an afterthought or a secondary consideration that mostly 
becomes an issue only after so many agitations. It should rather operate as part of the first 
principles that trade policies and adjudication must always genuinely take into consideration. 
3.5.4. Equality of Participation and Transparency in International Trade Practice 
The processes of decision-making, negotiation and discussion in the WTO are usually 
characterised as not truly democratic, transparent, open and participatory. Yet, the WTO frequently 
 
399 See explanation in section 3.3.4. 
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describes itself as “a member-driven, consensus-based organisation” because “all major decisions 
are made by the membership as a whole”.403 While, in principle, the WTO’s decision-making 
process is either by the general consensus of all Members or through voting with each country 
having one vote in rare cases,404 the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the organisation 
has often been challenged due to the disproportionate power that the most powerful nations can 
wield in dictating the result of WTO negotiations.  
The most usual example given by authors and activists is the adoption of a controversial process 
of negotiation popularly described as the “Green Room phenomenon”. This is used to describe an 
informal meeting, convened by the Director-General, whereby key trade negotiations leading to 
WTO agreements will occur in the “Green Room”405 by small groups or caucuses, usually heavily 
influenced by the United States, the EU, and some other developed nations.406 The resolutions 
reached in the Green Room are thereafter presented to all Members for their consent. The Green 
Room phenomenon has been criticised by academics and NGOs as undemocratic because it is 
strictly by invitation and the vast majority of the WTO Members, especially the least-developed 
countries, are not usually extended the privilege to attend such critical meetings.407 NGOs like the 
Third World Network (TWN) have on this basis described the WTO as “probably the most non-
transparent of international organisations”.408 That said, one could argue that the practice is not 
entirely undemocratic because resolutions from Green Room meetings must be consented to by all 
parties before it can become binding. However, the reality, as alleged, is that pressures may be 
exerted on the smaller countries, through bilateral aid or IMF or World Bank loans, to get them to 
go along with the Green Room position.409 Moreover, the records or details of the deliberations 
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that occur in such caucuses are not usually available for public scrutiny, which presents a 
fundamental problem to the organisation’s transparency and democratic legitimacy.  
Another example of a situation where Members of the WTO are unable to participate equally has 
been explained in section 2.4.1 of this thesis, regarding the issue of the impracticality of smaller 
states, especially the LDCs, to enforce WTO rulings, because the enforcement procedures are 
designed in a way that requires the ability of Members to exert economic and political power. This 
has been advanced as a reason why no LDC has ever relied on the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism as a complainant, barring the most recent Plain Packaging cases.410 
The principles of equal participation and transparency are significant as they are necessary 
ingredients for the realisation of justice, fairness, and development. It is only through guaranteed 
equal and meaningful participation of Members that policies can adequately represent the interests 
of all and not just the influential few. This position is affirmed under different provisions of the 
UNDRD.411 In the 1995 World Summit for Social Development, held in Copenhagen, it was 
declared that “full participation by all” is fundamental to policies and actions that aim to promote 
the betterment of human condition, social progress, and justice.412 These two elements are also 
recognised as vital components for development and integral to the realisation of RTD in the 
United Nations’ Agenda for Development. It provides: 
Democracy, respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right 
to development, transparent and accountable governance and administration in all 
sectors of society, and effective participation by civil society are also an essential part 
of the necessary foundations for the realization of social and people centred sustainable 
development. 413 
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Drawing from the discussed theoretical approaches and the fact that the concepts of transparency 
and inclusive participation are major elements of human rights based and TWAIL approaches,414 
this thesis, therefore, submits that policies should be considered for the improvement of Members’ 
participation and transparency in the negotiating, adjudicating and decision-making processes of 
the international trading system for adequate realisation of fairness in practice.  
3.5.5. Expansion of Global Social Responsibility 
Global social responsibility is an ethical obligation on entities, be they states, corporations, 
organisations or individuals, to act in the best interest of their environment and the global society 
at large. Traditionally, most of the deliberations surrounding the realisation of an international 
trading system that will ensure fairness, human rights and development objectives have been 
focused on the responsibility of states and, to a lesser extent, international organisations as the 
major actors. However, considering the activities and mounting influence of other actors in the 
international trade arena, it may be of great benefit to the aforementioned agendas if the focus of 
social responsibility is expanded to include other actors such as transnational corporations (TNCs) 
and non-governmental organisations (NGO). This in the wider context can aid the advancement of 
human rights, environment protection, and other developmental goals.  
For example, the role of NGOs is becoming more prominent to the extent that they are recognised 
as vital players at the national, regional, and international levels. In a UN report, they were 
described as “catalytic elements in the realization of the right to development”.415 NGOs can, 
therefore, play the important role of serving as checks and balances for policies of the IEIs and the 
activities of Members. Thus, a proper integration of the NGOs of various interests in trade 
negotiations can help policymakers to be aware of vital considerations. Alas, while the WTO, upon 
its creation, offered the possibility of more engagement with NGOs than the previous GATT 
regime, NGOs still do not have any real place in the ‘inner temple’ of the WTO’s decision making, 
unlike some other international organisations.416 
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There is the need for the increased recognition of the role of NGOs or “civil societies” in both 
domestic and international policymaking, particularly in realising global economic fairness 
through development-centred policies and human rights. In relation to the realisation of the RTD, 
for instance, a General Assembly resolution makes a number of references to NGOs, such as: 
[The recognition] that the implementation of the Declaration on the Right to 
Development requires effective development policies and support at the international 
level through the effective contribution of … non-governmental organizations active in 
this field. 
To ensure widespread dissemination and promotion of the [RTD] in close cooperation 
with States and intergovernmental organizations, national institutions, academia and 
interested non-governmental organizations worldwide.417 
Beyond the responsibility of checks and balances that are required from NGOs as non-state actors 
in the international trading system, there are growing calls for effective regulation of the activities 
of TNCs in order to ensure that they are also socially responsible in the way they carry out their 
businesses and their associated impact on society. This can be achieved through a greater 
enforcement of “corporate social responsibility”. While positivist economists like Friedman 
oppose the idea of corporations having social conscience as an irrational concept,418 there is also 
the growing awareness in more recent times that businesses “are co-existent with society and can 
therefore not simply ignore the expectations society might have of them”.419 This is important in 
the international context, because as trade liberalisation increases, TNCs which are perhaps the 
greatest beneficiaries also have to evolve in terms of their responsibility to realise development 
goals. It is even of greater importance if one considers the numerous allegations that link the 
exploitative global economic order to various activities of international companies.420 
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A major effort aimed at ameliorating the excesses of TNCs can be found in the UN’s framework 
for business and human rights, which is also gaining attention in the academia. The framework is 
grounded on three foundational principles that are generally referred to as the Protect, Respect and 
Remedy framework (PRR).421 They represent the obligation of states to protect against human 
rights abuses by corporations through appropriate laws and policies; the responsibility of 
corporations to respect human rights principles by acting diligently to avoid infringing on people’s 
rights; and the facilitation of effective grievance mechanisms by states to ensure that those affected 
by human rights abuses have access to effective remedies.422 It is, however, important to keep in 
mind that PRR is not a governance or regulatory framework in itself, but a mere platform of 
guidelines or recommendations by which interested parties may define mechanisms using either 
obligatory regulatory mechanisms or indeed voluntary initiatives.423 Although, there are ongoing 
efforts by the UN Human Rights Council to provide an internationally binding instrument to 
regulate the activities of transnational corporations.424 
While this thesis acknowledges that there have been various international efforts, through 
international organisations like the UN, academics specialising in the emerging field of business 
and human rights, the media and other non-state actors, to ensure corporate organisations 
(especially TNCs) do not continue to operate in a way that hampers the development of people, it 
nonetheless reinforces the view that a more developed and coordinated effort is required for the 
adequate implementation and enforcement of policies that can ensure that corporations are socially 
responsible. 
3.6. Conclusion 
In conclusion to chapter three in general, the discussed five principles represent the conceptual 
contribution of this thesis to the normative challenges facing the international economic and 
trading system. This thesis argues that the proper assimilation of these principles into various 
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aspects of the international trading agreements and policies could lead to an equitable, fair, and 
development compliant trading system that could be more beneficial to the world. While some of 
the conceptual principles could have been expressed differently in some other contexts and based 
on different premises, their discussion in this thesis could be distinguished based on the fact that 
they are perceived and analysed through the combined lenses of the RTD, distributive justice and 
TWAIL. Therefore, while this chapter provides theoretical/normative proposals that could 
ameliorate the inherent unfairness in the international economic order, as established in chapter 
two, the following chapter serve as the practical case study in which the five conceptual principles 
are adopted to analyse, critique and proffer practical solutions to an international trade agreement 
(i.e. the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures). In essence, chapter four 





4.0. LEGAL AND NORMATIVE CRITIQUE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
SUBSIDIES REGIME 
4.1. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to make evident the practical relevance of the five conceptual 
principles for the realisation of global economic justice discussed in chapter three, by employing 
them to analyse and critique a practical case study in the international trade law. This chapter 
specifically adopts the conceptual principles to normatively critique pertinent issues relating to the 
international trade subsidies regime, and particularly the prohibited subsidies under the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The main justification for this critique stems from the 
abundant complaints against the subsidies regime for its violation of essential normative values 
such as development, equity, fairness, transparency and human rights.425  
Subsidies in the context of international trade is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, classic 
economic and development theories postulate that its usage can be an instrument to offset market 
failures in order to achieve greater economic efficiency as well as support the advancement of 
welfare and other development concerns.426 On the other hand, its usage can also lead to distortions 
in the global market, which has the capacity to generate negative effects that hamper fundamental 
development and human rights objectives, such as food security, the right to an adequate standard 
of living, and even environmental concerns.427 For instance, the heavily subsidised agricultural 
industries in some developed jurisdictions like the United States and the European Union have 
enormous distortive effects on global trade competition – this was a major contributory factor for 
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the collapse of the Doha Round.428 Such distortive subsidies invariably affect the livelihoods of 
people in poorer countries, especially where farming is the main occupation, as the competitive 
value of their produce diminishes in both their domestic markets and third-country markets. A 
popular illustration of this is the case study of Haiti, which was at a time self-sufficient in meeting 
its own agricultural needs but later became incapable of producing enough to feed its people, 
significantly due to the much cheaper, imported produce from heavily subsidised countries, 
particularly the United States.429 While it could be argued that the imported subsidised produce led 
to cheaper foods for local consumers, it however rendered an extensive number of the country’s 
populace unemployed and impoverished.430 Similarly, there is also the argument of the 
international subsidies regime overly restricting the policy space of less-developed countries to 
adopt certain subsidy measures as a tool to promote essential development objectives. 
The debates surrounding the use and regulation of trade subsidies is multistranded. While 
developing countries and LDCs consistently express their opposition to how subsidies are 
administered in most industrialised nations, there are also complaints from the same quarters 
alleging that the multilateral instruments regulating subsidies overly confine their own policy 
space to employ subsidies as a tool for development. Echoing this view, an UNCTAD Trade and 
Development Report concluded that the SCM Agreement431 “impinges directly on national 
rulemaking authority”.432 Perceiving this claim as an “accusation”, the former WTO Director-
General Lamy responded: 
The alternative, it seems, would be to have no subsidy disciplines, which raises an 
intriguing question. Do we want to argue that the best contribution the WTO can 
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make to development is to ensure that developing countries have no obligations in 
this area? Or that export subsidies should be allowed?433 
It can, therefore, be summarised that the debates surrounding the international subsidies regime 
are chiefly centred on balancing between the conflicting interests of adopting subsidies to advance 
domestic interests and preventing that such usage leads to unfair and damaging outcomes for other 
members of the international trading community. In view of all the above and with the intention 
of addressing Lamy’s intriguing query, the objective of this chapter is, therefore, to critically 
examine the international legal instruments regulating subsidies, particularly the SCM Agreement, 
and assess them in light of the equity and development-centred normative principles distilled from 
the RTD, TWAIL and distributive justice in chapter 3 of this thesis. In doing so, this chapter will 
provide an overview of the economic and legal understanding of the concept of subsidies and 
continue with a critical legal analysis of some of the most germane inequities perceived in the 
SCM Agreement. This will also entail an in-depth legal analysis of some of the SDT provisions 
contained in Article 27 of the SCM Agreement, with the ultimate view of normatively evaluating 
how development-centred they are. It is crucial to clarify that this thesis specifically chose to 
discuss the inequities in the SCM Agreement as its main case study, as opposed to any of the major 
complaints discussed in section 2.4, because there is limited legal and normative literature on the 
subsidies regime when compared to other potential trade issues (i.e., dispute settlement, sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures, and the Agreement on Agriculture). This thesis therefore intends to 
contribute to this gap in the literature. 
4.2. Economic Background on the Use of Subsidies 
Considering that the concept of subsidies is primarily, albeit not exclusively, a subject of 
economics, it is, as such, apposite to begin by providing an economic insight on the meaning, 
justifications, and some contending perspectives about their usage.  
On the definition of the term “subsidies”, there is no consensus among economists and 
policymakers on a specific definition. Attempts at defining the term usually exclude peculiar 
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characteristics that are deemed to be essential in the contexts of other policymakers or bodies. For 
instance, while the Oxford English Dictionary defines subsidy as “a sum of money granted by the 
state or a public body to help keep down the price of a commodity or service”,434 many others 
would argue that tax concessions are also an effective form of subsidisation.435 The variation in the 
conceptualisation of the term is even more obvious in policy literature, as different policymakers 
(states and international/regional organisations) have used the term to include varying degrees of 
scope, which usually depend on their policy objectives.436 This definitional variation is mentioned 
so as to recognise that subsidy definitions are usually context-specific and that the same country 
or organisation may adopt a variety of definitions in different contexts, which may be narrower or 
wider in terms of nature, recipient, objectives and effects of government support.  
Nonetheless, some of the attempts made by economists at defining the term subsidy are briefly 
mentioned below. A classic macroeconomics textbook defines subsidy as a “payment to buyers 
and sellers to supplement income or lower costs and which thus encourage consumption or 
provides an advantage to the recipient”.437 A possible objection to this definition may arise from 
the fact that not all types of subsidies take the form of payment to buyers and sellers. Some 
subsidies do not involve actual cash outlays, such as government-supported cash reduction for 
goods or services, tax exemptions, or a government’s assumption of contingent liabilities.438 
Furthermore, the definition’s limitation of the beneficiaries of subsidies to only buyers and sellers 
also effectively excludes other classes of potential recipients such as consumers, organised groups 
of people, and educational institutions. In another somewhat unfussy definition, Chappelow 
defines subsidy as “a benefit given to an individual, business, or institution, usually by the 
government [which usually takes] the form of a cash payment or a tax reduction”.439 The adoption 
of the word “benefit” in this definition, as opposed to “payment” like the former, may be a safer 
 
434 The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) is considered here because the WTO Panels and Appellate Body commonly 
rely on the OED to define the ordinary meaning of words used in Agreements.  
435 Alan O Sykes, ‘Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’ in Patrick FJ Macrory, Arthur E Appleton and Michael G 
Plummer (eds), The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis (Springer US 2005). 
436 For such example, see generally, Luca Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in 
Comparative Perspective (Oxford University Press 2009); See also Marco Slotboom, A Comparison of WTO and EC 
Law: Do Different Objects and Purposes Matter for Treaty Interpretation? (Cameron May 2006) 101. 
437 N Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Macroeconomics (7th end, Cengage Learning 2014). 
438 World Trade Report, ‘Exploring the Links between Subsidies, Trade and the WTO’ (2006) 51. 
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approach, as it accommodates other forms in which subsidy policies could be implemented. Save 
for the exclusion of individuals from its potential beneficiaries, Britannica, in a similar description 
as the above, also defines the concept as “a direct or indirect payment, economic concession, or 
privilege granted by a government to private firms, households, or other governmental units in 
order to promote a public objective”.440 The encyclopaedia, however, further acknowledges the 
complication with describing a subsidy due to the multiplicity of subsidy instruments and 
objectives, as well as the complexity of their effects.441 
The inability of economists to define the term precisely proves the often quoted statement by 
Houthakker who wrote: “My own starting point was also an attempt to define subsidies. But in the 
course of doing so, I came to the conclusion that the concept of subsidy is just too elusive”.442 Thus, 
in order to avoid most of the conceptual issues surrounding the definition of subsidy, a reasonable 
approach adopted by some economists is to analyse the concept through a range of characteristics, 
which could also be context-specific, rather than attempting to pin down a particular overarching 
definition. From the various attempts made to identify the common features of subsidies, there 
seems to be agreement on the general idea that “subsidisation involves the government and results 
in benefits for somebody”.443 This thesis is mostly concerned about the characteristics of subsidies 
in the context of international trade, which will be analysed in detail in the subsequent sections. 
Beyond the definitional issues, subsidies could be implemented through different fiscal techniques, 
such as direct payment in cash or kind, provision of goods and services to consumers at prices 
below the market price, the purchase of goods and services by governments at prices above the 
market price, tax concession, and other similar inducements. 
There are also different types of subsidies provided by governments. A common type is production 
subsidies which are predominantly used in most developed countries. This type of subsidy is used 
by governments to incentivise suppliers to increase the output of a particular product by 
 
440 ‘Subsidy’, Encyclopedia Britannica (2020) <https://www.britannica.com/topic/subsidy> accessed 30 April 2021. 
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substantially offsetting the production costs or losses. The usual goal of a production subsidy is to 
expand the production of those chosen products so that it would be promoted by the market without 
any price increment for the consumers. Production subsidies are usually discussed critically by 
economic analysts because, in spite of their economic and welfare benefits, they are sometimes 
capable of creating economic complications such as incentivising producers to overproduce. 
Overproduction, especially in agriculture, has numerous negative implications such as 
environmental deterioration,444 depressing world market prices, unfair trade competition, and 
poverty in other competing nations.  
Another type of subsidy is the consumer or consumption subsidy. This type of subsidy is directly 
targeted at consumers within a given political setting with the aim of subsidising their behaviours 
in relation to some prioritised needs. This is usually implemented by governments on the basis of 
their economic, social and welfare responsibilities to their people so they can meet the most basic 
living requirements. Examples include food, water, electricity, and education subsidies that are 
sometimes provided with the aim that everyone, no matter how economically disadvantaged, 
should have access to such basic amenities.445  
An export subsidy is another type of subsidy that has generated controversy, especially in 
international trade negotiations. It is generally described as “a reduction in the cost of exports 
brought about by a government grant”.446 It could be implemented through reduction of labour 
cost, export financing, or a more favourable tax treatment among other means.447 It is worth 
mentioning that most export subsidies are currently prohibited by WTO law.448 Other types of 
subsidies include import, tax, agricultural, employment, oil, healthcare and housing subsidies. 
Among all the aforementioned types of subsidies, only a few are directly relevant to discussions 
on international trade. 
4.2.1. Economic Rationale for Government’s Usage of Subsidies 
 
444 Eric Holt-Giménez, ‘We Produce Too Much Food - The Green New Deal Can Stop This’ (2019) 43 In These Times. 
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There are abundant debates among economists and policymakers on whether the use of subsidy as 
an economic or social policy is justifiable. Most of these debates (both in favour and against) are 
usually built on the premises of economic effects, political considerations, as well as socio-
economic development theory. The classic free-market economists are generally sceptical about 
the use of subsidies for various reasons. The foremost reason is that a free-market economy is 
theoretically understood to be such that the market is substantially free from any government 
intervention or control, and the prices of goods and services should be determined by the 
consumers and the open market. As such, decisions relating to the production, distribution and 
even investment should ideally be determined by forces of demand and supply. Therefore, it is 
technically understood that a free-market economy should be free from subsidies, and introducing 
one essentially changes the economic model from a free economy to a mixed economy.  
In economic theory, the starting point in analysing the rationale for the use of subsidies is usually 
through a benchmark economy known as the “perfectly competitive market” or simply the perfect 
market.449 The perfect market is an ideal economic situation that has to fulfil certain requirements. 
Satisfying those requirements will enable the market to reach an equilibrium where the quantity of 
supplied goods and services will equal the quantity demanded at the current price. Whish and 
Bailey summarised the requirements of a perfect market as follows: 
[O]n any particular market there is an infinite number of buyers and sellers, all 
producing identical (or ‘homogeneous’) products; consumers have perfect 
information about market conditions; resources can flow freely from one area of 
economic activity to another: there are no ‘barriers to entry’ which might prevent 
the emergence of new competition, and there are no ‘barriers to exit’ which might 
hinder firms wishing to leave the industry.450 
 
449 This benchmark is associated with general equilibrium theory in macroeconomics, which explains the dynamic 
interaction of demand and supply in an economy with multiple markets and how they eventually culminate in an 
equilibrium of prices. For general economic overview, see Manuel Cardenete, Ana-Isabel Guerra and Ferran Sancho, 
‘An Overview of General Equilibrium Theory’ in Cardenete, Guerra and Sancho (eds), Applied General Equilibrium: 
An Introduction (Springer 2017). 
450 Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (8th Edition, Oxford University Press 2015) 7–8. 
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The idea is that under the condition of a perfect market, no reasonable case can be made to justify 
the use of subsidies and introducing any form of government measure, such as subsidies, as such 
circumstance will be welfare diminishing and inefficient.451 However, some economists have 
expressed that the above conditions are very stringent and it is unlikely, if not impossible, that a 
market structure will satisfy all the conditions, especially in developing countries.452 As such, 
economists rely on the existence of “market failure”,453 arising from market imperfection, as 
sufficient economic justification for government interventions, through means such as subsidies, 
to improve domestic welfare. Therefore, some economists believe an efficient subsidisation is 
capable of correcting the market failure and of bringing social and private costs and benefits into 
alignment. For instance, Bhagwati and Ramaswami argue that production subsidy is the most 
efficient mode of government intervention in the presence of market failure or domestic 
distortions.454 For this purely economic reasoning, authors like Caido have construed subsidisation 
as “the rational action of benevolent governments seeking to improve the functioning of 
markets”.455 
Beyond the theory discussed above, another economic justification that is usually provided to 
support subsidisation is it could be used for the promotion of industrial development. As cited as 
an example above, Bhagwati and Ramaswami, and some other economists,456 have argued in 
favour of domestic subsidies, which is a form of industrial policy intervention, as a means of 
correcting market failure. This position has been further developed as an argument that 
international trade treaties should be made flexible enough for governments to have the space to 
implement domestic subsidies for welfare purposes.457 Policymakers in developing countries often 
argue that subsidy is a useful tool to develop their industries, especially agriculture and 
manufacturing. They also often rely on the ‘infant industry argument’, which essentially is that 
 
451 World Trade Report (n 438) 56–57. 
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less-developed countries will always find it difficult, if not impossible, to develop new industries 
or diversify their economy in a global arena that is competitive where developed countries also 
operate, without any form of state intervention. There are some counterarguments against the 
infant industry argument. Most such counterarguments are premised on the mainstream view that 
industries may become overly dependent on subsidies, and the receiving industries may as such 
never attain a competitive level. They also argue that governments providing such subsidy may 
then be faced with the predicament of either continuing to grant the subsidy ceaselessly, which 
could amount to an unnecessary burden on the public budget, or abandon the subsidised industry 
entirely, which could then create unemployment.458 This claim can be effortlessly refuted in light 
of several empirical and historical studies that have shown the successful implementation of infant 
industry polices both in the developed and developing worlds.459 Apart from the fact that infant 
industry policies and other protectionist measures were implemented by developed countries in 
their earlier stages of development, most of the countries that are now classified as “newly 
industrialised countries”, especially in East Asia, achieved rapid economic growth relying on such 
policies.460 
Even though critics have maintained that the laissez-faire approach, wherein states’ intervention 
will be kept to the minimum remains the best approach, the empirical success of state interventions 
in some of the East Asian countries is often used to support the subsidisation of infant industries 
by less developed countries.461 In Chang’s empirical and historical investigation, he argued that 
even the now developed countries all adopted infant-industry protection policies and other activist 
industrial policies in their early stages of development, as opposed to what is “currently 
recommend[ed] to, or even force[d] upon, the developing countries”.462 In his study, which 
examined the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, 
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Japan, and Switzerland, he mentioned that some of the policy tools that were adopted during their 
developing phases included export subsidies, conferring monopoly rights, direct credits, tariff 
rebates and inputs used for exports, as well as support for research and development.463 
A third rationale for the use of subsidies by governments is to foster the redistribution of economic 
benefits to achieve equity goals. This is usually to promote social cooperation among members of 
society by, for instance, favouring regions or groups of people that are economically disadvantaged 
with specific policies. Even though this kind of policy may not be directly justified in mainstream 
economic theory, as they might not contribute directly to economic efficiency, they are nonetheless 
justifiable through other theoretical tools like political, moral and development theories. 
Redistribution of economic benefits in favour of least-advantaged groups, like minority groups, 
may be justifiable from the viewpoint of Rawls’ difference principle, as discussed in sections 
3.3.4–3.3.6 of this thesis. In the context of industries and corporations, this rationale can also be 
used to justify government’s reallocation of resources from declining industries to emerging or 
expanding ones. This process is known as “adjustment”.464 
Apart from all the above rationales for the implementation of subsidies, another important factor 
is the political economy argument, even though this justification may be classified under non-
economic objectives. The basic assumption is that politicians are typically concerned about the 
impact of their actions on potential electorates, and might as such prioritise the welfare of certain 
domestic forces or organised societal groups in allocating economic benefits, such as subsidies. 
This concern is usually derived from the politician’s rational attempt to maximise his/her interest 
to gain popular support for certain ends or to be re-elected. Therefore, such political concerns will 
usually influence governments to implement some subsidy measures opportunistically for 
protectionist purposes and to boost the competitive advantage of domestic firms.465 It is usual for 
antagonists of subsidies to rely on the political theories of regulatory capture and rent-seeking as 
arguments against subsidies, as subsidies potentially create an unholy alliance between big 
corporations and the state. There are allegations that subsidies incentivise corporations to lobby 
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governments to shield them from competition, and they, in turn, reciprocate the favour to 
politicians by advancing their political interests through various means. 
Other rationales for the use of subsidies by governments include advancement of environmental 
conservation, regional development, support of innovations through research and development, 
national security, response to disasters and pandemics, cultural policies, and for specific industries 
that are deemed germane by the government (such as agriculture, food and energy sectors). 
4.2.2. International Consequences of Domestic Subsidies 
As mentioned in section 2.1 of this thesis, the effect of economic activities adopted by a state can 
no longer be said to be confined to just its domestic territory. In the era of modern globalisation, 
economic decisions made in one state have implications in others due to the world’s 
interconnectedness. As such, the implementation of domestic policies on the use of subsidies 
typically has direct or indirect consequences on other international trading partners, and on global 
welfare more generally. This is based on the predictable assumption that the market of the state is 
neither totally closed nor totally open to international trade.466 Economic analysis of the 
international impact of domestic subsidies is mixed, depending on the nature of the subsidy and 
the extent of its implementation. In simple terms, while some subsidies may have good economic 
consequences, some others have far-reaching harmful impacts. For instance, some subsidies are 
used to protect domestic industries or corporations from foreign competition. Although such 
protective subsidies may sometimes be justifiable on grounds such as welfare advancement and 
the development of infant industries by less-developed nations, in a different context (especially 
when used by bigger economies), they are also capable of leading to unfair competition against 
other imported goods or services, in the same way as if tariffs or quotas were imposed.467 
Among the different types of subsidies, export subsidies and production subsidies are of particular 
significance to the international trading system. As mentioned in section 4.2.1, while the former is 
contingent upon export performance, the latter is conferred notwithstanding the destination of the 
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output.468 As for the effect of production subsidies, even though they could lead to the expansion 
of domestic output, they could also negatively affect foreign producers, leading to loss of market 
share and profits as a result of the artificially reduced global market price. Similarly, export 
subsidies could be harmful to producers in importing countries, because the artificial decrease in 
price induces a reduction in their unsubsidised output, which then leads to a decrease in profit, 
payment, wellbeing, and even employment.  
It is, however, important to also note that subsidies could likewise be beneficial to countries with 
little corresponding production of the subsidised product or its close alternatives. This is usually 
the case for importing countries with low levels of self-sufficiency, as their consumers will benefit 
from the lower prices of the imported goods. In this case, the consumer gains should reasonably 
offset the possible producer losses. However, in countries where there is a substantial self-
sufficiency level of the imported subsidised product or its close substitute, the producers will lose 
and local investments in those sectors will be undermined. Many developing countries belong to 
this latter category, especially in relation to basic goods and foods.469  
In consideration of all the above, the fact that domestic subsidies can affect the global price of 
goods and services, distress global welfare, and make other countries worse off by displacing their 
production and exports is sufficient justification for global cooperation on the regulation and 
control of subsidies under the multilateral trade rules. While such regulation already exists under 
WTO law, this thesis opines that the existing rules do not adequately address certain values or 
principles which should be of utmost importance. Mainstream economic theories are also 
insufficient to address those concerns, as they are mostly less concerned about other “non-
economic” social implications that may arise from the use of subsidies, such as fairness and human 
rights. The next section, therefore, provides a general insight into the existing international legal 
regime on subsidies, before a critical and normative analysis follows in the later sections. 
4.3. Legal Background of Subsidies Regulation in International Trade 
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This section aims to provide an insight into the legal background of the SCM Agreement, being 
the central multilateral instrument regulating subsidies in international trade relations. For the 
purpose of contextual appreciation, the section looks into the development of the subsidies 
discipline in the WTO system. It further considers the legal definition of subsidies and other 
relevant foundational principles, in accordance with the SCM Agreement and the WTO’s 
jurisprudential interpretations. 
4.3.1. Development of the SCM Agreement 
From the inception of the first GATT in 1947, the original drafters paid rather trivial attention to 
trade issues associated with subsidies. The main subsidy provision was embodied in its Article 
XVI, which was neither well-developed nor imposed any noteworthy commitment on the GATT 
signatories. It only required that the Contracting Parties should notify “any subsidy, including any 
form of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any 
product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its territory”. Beyond the obligation of 
notification, no form of subsidisation was prohibited or even regulated. Also, if the effect of a 
subsidy implemented by a Contracting Party was determined to cause serious prejudice or threaten 
the interest of another contracting party, all that was required was for the subsidising state to 
discuss with the affected party, with the singular intention of limiting the subsidisation. 
Perceiving the above subsidy regulation as inadequate, some additional provisions were introduced 
in the 1955 Review Session of the GATT to Article XVI, entitled “Additional Provisions on Export 
Subsidies”. The preambular paragraph of the additional provisions, under Section B, 
acknowledged the increasing concerns about the trade-distortive effects of some types of subsidies, 
particularly the export subsidies. It provides:  
The contracting parties recognize that the granting by a contracting party of a subsidy on 
the export of any product may have harmful effects for other contracting parties, both 
importing and exporting, may cause undue disturbance to their normal commercial 
interests, and may hinder the achievement of the objectives of this Agreement.470 
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In introducing a new dimension to export subsidies, the additional commitments of 1955 further 
distinguished between “primary products” and non-primary products.471 The primary products 
were defined to include “any product of farm, forest or fishery, or any mineral, in its natural form 
or which has undergone such processing as is customarily required to prepare it for marketing in 
substantial volume in international trade”.472 On the other hand, non-primary products were 
essentially other types of trading products. With respect to primary products, the obligation was 
for Contracting Parties to “seek to avoid” the use of export subsidies. But whenever used, it should 
not be applied in such a way that would result in the subsidising nation obtaining “more than an 
equitable share of world export trade in that product”.473 In relation to export subsidies for other 
non-primary products, Article XVI:4 prohibited only such subsidies that resulted “in the sale of 
such product [non-primary goods] for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged 
for the like product to buyers in the domestic market”. While it could be said that something close 
to a prohibition was imposed on export subsidies in the case of non-primary goods, the same cannot 
be said in relation to primary goods. All the same, most GATT Contracting Parties failed to comply 
with these amendments.474 This non-compliance led to the establishment of a GATT Working Party 
on Article XVI:4. The Working Party, in 1960, produced a draft declaration giving effect to the 
provisions of Article XVI:4, with a non-exhaustive list of measures that fall under the prohibition. 
Unluckily, only 17 Contracting Parties accepted the declaration by the time it came into force in 
November 1962.475 
The next major stage in the evolution of subsidies law under GATT was an agreement that was 
negotiated during the Tokyo Round and entered into force on 1 January 1980. The Agreement is 
popularly known as the “Subsidies Code”. The Subsidies Code confirmed the earlier prohibition 
of export subsidies on non-primary goods, with a further introduction of an illustrative list of export 
subsidies. It represents the first express attempt to define subsidies under the GATT system. It also 
contained some SDT provisions for developing countries signatories. However, like the 
 
471 GATT, Article XVI: 3-4. 
472 GATT, Ad Article XVI. 
473 GATT, Article XVI (3) 
474 Dominic Coppens, WTO Disciplines on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Balancing Policy Space and 
Legal Constraints (Cambridge University Press 2014) 25–26. 
475 World Trade Report, ‘Exploring the Links between Subsidies, Trade and the WTO’ (2006) 190. 
154 
 
amendments to Article XVI, the code was accepted by a limited number of GATT Contracting 
Parties.  
It was not until the Uruguay Round before a detailed and elaborate agreement on subsidies was 
introduced into the multilateral trading system in form of the SCM Agreement. The SCM 
Agreement comprises substantial innovations and modifications to both the substantive and 
procedural aspects of subsidies regulation in international trade law. Specifically, its coverage 
includes the definition and scope of subsidies within its discipline; the introduction of the concept 
of “specific subsidies”; the categorisation of subsidies into prohibited and actionable subsidies; the 
establishment of institutional structure and notification/surveillance modalities for the 
implementation of the Agreement; and an elaboration on SDT provisions for developing countries. 
The Agreement also contains substantive and procedural provisions on the implementation of 
countervailing measures against subsidised imports, as well as provisions on dispute settlement. 
Unlike the previous GATT provisions, the SCM Agreement became binding on all WTO Members 
by virtue of the “single undertaking” principle, which essentially requires WTO Members to agree 
to virtually every item of the negotiation as a whole and indivisible package.  
4.3.2. Legal Definition of Subsidies in the SCM Agreement 
The legal understanding of subsidies according to the SCM Agreement involves a number of steps 
and considerations. The overall starting point is Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement which sets out 
the indicators for identifying a subsidy. The provision generally describes subsidies as “a financial 
contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member”476 and which 
consequently confers a benefit.477 This contribution could take the form of a direct transfer of funds, 
a potential transfer of funds or liability, forgone revenue such as tax credits, the provision of goods 
and services by a government except for general infrastructure, or the purchase of goods.478 
Furthermore, a subsidy will also be deemed to exist where a financial contribution is indirectly 
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implemented by a government through payments to a funding mechanism, or by entrusting a 
private body to carry out such functions that would ordinarily be vested in the government.479  
In essence, the major elements for determining the existence of a subsidy are: (a) the existence of 
a financial contribution, (b) by a government or any public body and, (c) evidence that a benefit is 
conferred as a result of the financial contribution. In addition to the aforementioned elements, 
Article 1.2 imposes a further requirement, legally termed as “specificity”, before a subsidy matter 
could become a concern of the SCM Agreement. It reads:  
A subsidy as defined in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provisions of Part II [on 
prohibited subsidies] or shall be subject to the provisions of Part III or V [on actionable 
subsidies and countervailing measures respectively] only if such a subsidy is specific in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 2.480 
As such, notwithstanding an actual existence or usage of subsidies within the definition provided 
under Article 1.1, subsidies can only become an issue under the WTO rules when they are 
“specific”. A brief insight will be provided below on each of the major elements, including the 
specificity requirement. 
4.3.2.1. A “Government” or any “Public Body” as the Granting Authority 
The SCM Agreement only seeks to address trade distortions resulting from governmental 
interventions. However, in order to avoid situations where governments would set up agencies or 
bodies to indirectly implement impermissible subsidy policies, the SCM Agreement envisages 
such situation by not just mentioning “a government”, but also capturing financial contributions 
by “any public body”. The meaning of a “government” here is not limited to the central 
government, it is also understood to include sub-national governments, such as provincial, state, 
local or regional governments, or any other hierarchy of government, depending on the structure 
provided by the constitution of a country. Hence, in both US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd 
 
479 ibid, Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv). 
480 ibid, Article 1.2. 
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Complaint)481 and US – Softwood Lumber III,482 the cases involved subsidy measures that were 
originally implemented by sub-national governments (provinces and states) in the US and Canada 
respectively, and this has not been a contested issue in WTO case law.483  
On the other hand, a rather controversial issue is what constitutes a “public body”. Initially, the 
phrase was interpreted by the Panel in US – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties 
(China) to mean “any entity controlled by a government”.484 The Panel, on the basis of this 
interpretation, held that China’s state-owned enterprises and commercial banks constituted “public 
bodies”. This position is also in consonance with the Panel decision in Korea – Commercial 
Vessels, where some government-owned financial institutions were held to be public bodies based 
on the government’s substantial control over them.485  
However, the Appellate Body subsequently took a more restrictive approach in US – Definitive, 
and instead of “government control”, the Appellate Body inclined towards the so-called 
“government authority” approach, holding that “a public body within the meaning of Article 
1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement must be an entity that possesses, exercises or is vested with 
governmental authority”.486 The higher threshold of this latter approach adopted by the Appellate 
Body has raised significant controversy, as there are claims that it could potentially affect the 
ability of other Members to successfully establish that state-owned enterprises, especially in 
relation China, are public bodies. Particularly, the possibility of foreign investigating authorities 
to obtain sufficient evidence to establish such authority still remains a subject of debate. 
4.3.2.2. Financial Contribution 
In the course of negotiating the SCM Agreement, Members were divided regarding the nature and 
extent of government interventions that should amount to a subsidy. Some Members contended 
 
481 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint), WT/DS353/AB/R (2012). 
482 Panel Report, US – Softwood Lumber III, WT/DS236/R (2002). 
483 Marc Bénitah, The WTO Law of Subsidies (Kluwer Law International 2019) 11. See also, Article 30 of the SCM 
Agreement in conjunction with Article 22.9 of the DSU. 
484 Panel Report, US – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/R (2010) para 8.94. 
485 Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R (2005). 
486 Appellate Body Report, United States — Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products 
from China, WT/DS379/AB/R (2011). 
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that, for a subsidy to exist, there has to be a charge on the public account. Other Members argued 
that the definition of subsidy should also include other forms of government interventions that may 
not involve an expense to the government, but are nonetheless capable of distorting trade 
competition. Eventually, the SCM Agreement adopted the former approach by specifying 
“financial contribution” as an essential element in determining the existence of a subsidy. Thus, 
once it can be ascertained that the granting entity providing a subsidy is either a government or a 
public body (or a “private body” that has been “directed or entrusted” by the government), what 
should therefore follow is a determination as to whether the act engaged in amounts to a “financial 
contribution” within the contemplation of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement.  
As briefly mentioned in section 4.3.2 above, Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) to (iv) of the SCM Agreement 
mentions situations in which a financial contribution can be said to exist. Such situations include 
if: 
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity 
infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); (ii) 
government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal 
incentives such as tax credits); (iii) a government provides goods or services other than 
general infrastructure, or purchases goods; (iv) a government makes payments to a 
funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the 
type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the 
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by 
governments.487 
Various aspects of the above provision have been subject to dispute before panels and the 
Appellate Body. For instance, regarding the interpretation of “direct transfer of funds” in 
subparagraph (i), the Appellate Body stated that the phrase entails “conduct on the part of the 
government by which money, financial resources, and/or financial claims are made available to a 
recipient”.488 This means that the meaning of “funds” is not limited to only money, but also includes 
 
487 SCM Agreement, Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) to (iv). 
488 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), para 614. 
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other types of financial resources.489 It is also important to note that a subsidy is not only deemed 
to occur when a direct transfer of funds has been actually effected, rather the mere existence of the 
commitment or possibility of making such transfer, even without the occurrence of the triggering 
event, satisfies the requirement.490 
Similarly, with respect to the interpretation of subparagraph (ii) above, the Appellate Body 
clarified that revenue “forgone” means that the “government has given up an entitlement to raise 
revenue that it could otherwise have raised”.491 The Appellate Body further established a normative 
benchmark to determine what should constitute a forgone tax revenue that is “otherwise due”. 
While acknowledging that this could be a difficult task, especially as it entirely relates to domestic 
fiscal regulations, the Appellate Body nonetheless gave a vague guide that “the term ‘otherwise 
due’ implies some kind of comparison between the revenues due under the contested measure and 
revenues that would be due in some other situations”.492 
4.3.2.3. The Conferment of Benefit 
Establishing that the government or public body has made a financial contribution as described 
above is not sufficient to conclude on the existence of a subsidy under the SCM Agreement. Article 
1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement provides that it is essential that “a benefit is thereby conferred” for 
a subsidy to exist. While the definition of “a benefit” is not mentioned in the SCM Agreement, the 
Appellate Body nonetheless generally described it as a situation where the financial contribution 
has made “the recipient ‘better off’ than it would otherwise have been, absent that contribution”.493 
The determination of this situation is not always clear-cut. Nonetheless, the Appellate Body ruled 
that in determining if a recipient is better off as a result of a financial contribution, the only logical 
comparative basis should be what the recipient could have received in the commercial market place 
 
489 ibid, 617. 
490 Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), WT/DS353/R (2011) para 7.164. 
491 Appellate Body Report, United States — Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, WT/DS108/AB/R 
(2000) para 90. This position was reaffirmed in Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint) 
(Article 21.5), WT/DS353/AB/RW (2019) para 5.153. 
492 Appellate Body Report, United States — Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations, para 89-91. 
493 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint), paras. 635, 636 & 662. 
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that is relevant to the nature of financial contribution at issue. In Canada–Aircraft, the Appellate 
Body states: 
We also believe that the word “benefit”, as used in Article 1.1(b), implies some kind of 
comparison. This must be so, for there can be no “benefit” to the recipient unless the 
“financial contribution” makes the recipient “better off” than it would otherwise have 
been, absent that contribution. In our view, the marketplace provides an appropriate basis 
for comparison in determining whether a “benefit” has been “conferred”, because the 
trade-distorting potential of a “financial contribution” can be identified by determining 
whether the recipient has received a “financial contribution” on terms more favourable 
than those available to the recipient in the market.494 
It is essential to clarify that the market benchmark here can only be determined in relation to “the 
prevailing market condition of the good or service in the country of provision or purchase”.495 
However, this will only be the case when the market price is “unconstrained”496 in the sense that 
the price arising from the market must not have been hugely influenced by any role predominantly 
played by the government. Thus, in a situation where there is no usable market-determined price 
in the country of provision due to the heavy distortion created by the government, alternative 
benchmarks could be considered in establishing the existence of benefit.497 
Notwithstanding the explanation above, there are uncommon situations where the marketplace 
benchmark will not be required to establish if a financial contribution has made its recipient better 
off. This can occur if the financial contribution is in the form of forgone government revenue 
otherwise due or a tax break. Hence, the Panel in Canada–Renewable Energy noted as follows: 
We note that to date, the “marketplace” has not been explicitly used as a benchmark to 
determine whether financial contributions taking the form of the measures described in 
 
494 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R (1999) para 
157. 
495 SCM Agreement, Article 14(d). 
496 Appellate Body Report, Japan - Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories from Korea, 
WT/DS336/AB/R (2007) para 172. 
497 Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with respect to certain Softwood 
Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R (2004) paras 100-106. 
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Article 1.1(a)(ii) of the SCM Agreement (i.e. where "government revenue that is 
otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits)") 
confer a benefit.498 
This is because forgone revenues are essentially a gift from the government,499 and establishing 
that a benefit exists in such situations only requires simple logical reasoning. 
4.3.3. The Specificity Principle 
The establishment of a financial contribution by the government or public body as well as the 
conferment of benefit might have satisfied the necessary elements for the definition of subsidies. 
However, the existence of a subsidy itself, even though within the description of Article 1.1, is not 
sufficient to become subject to the discipline of the SCM Agreement. For a subsidy policy to be 
subject to the SCM Agreement, such subsidy, in addition to meeting the aforementioned 
requirements, must also be “specific”.500  
The specificity requirement is laid out in Article 2, which provides the meaning of specificity 
through the identification of its various forms. The Article generally considers a subsidy as 
“specific” if its implementation or access is limited to “an enterprise or industry or group of 
enterprises or industries within the jurisdiction of the granting authority”.501 Thus, the specificity 
requirement mainly focuses on whether access to a subsidy policy is targeted at a particular class 
of recipients,502 such as companies or producers operating in a particular form or branch of 
productive labour or trade. 
Furthermore, Article 2.1(b) sets out that specificity “shall not exist” where the granting authority, 
through legislation or any other official document, establishes “objective criteria or conditions” to 
govern the eligibility for, and the amount of, the subsidy, provided that such eligibility is automatic 
 
498 Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector & Canada – 
Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS412/R & WT/DS426/R (2012) Footnote 509. 
499 Panel Report, US – Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), WT/DS353/R (2011) para 7.169. 
500 SCM Agreement, Article 1.2. 
501 SCM Agreement, Article 2.1(a). 
502 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, 
WT/DS437/AB/R (2014) para 4.169. 
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and that such criteria and conditions are strictly observed. Therefore, if a subsidy policy is 
implemented in an economy and neutrality can be guaranteed in relation to the conditions required 
to access it (i.e., by not favouring certain enterprises over others), such subsidy will not be deemed 
specific, and therefore cannot be brought within the discipline of the SCM Agreement.  
However, given that some governments might attempt to mask some subsidies to specific 
enterprises by fashioning the “objective criteria or condition” in a manner that only a few 
enterprises can qualify, Article 2.1(c) requires a review of the actual implementation and results 
of the measure. Therefore, a policy that appears objective on its face, but results in the conferment 
of benefits to a targeted enterprise or industry may be found to be specific. Factors that will be 
taken into consideration in determining such a situation are:  
[The] use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises, 
predominant use by certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large 
amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has 
been exercised by the granting authority in the decision to grant a subsidy.503 
Apart from the specific subsidies that relate to enterprises and industries, the SCM Agreement also 
addresses geographic specificity, and specificity arising from the prohibited nature of a subsidy.504 
The former occurs when a government targets particular producers or firms in designated regions 
within its jurisdiction for subsidisation.505 As for the latter, Article 2.3 states that any subsidy falling 
under the prohibited category, as provided for under Article 3 shall also be deemed specific.  
In summary, a subsidy may be considered as specific if it is targeted at enterprises, industries, 
geographical regions, or by being a prohibited subsidy. An explanation will be provided on the 
prohibited subsidies in section 4.3.4. 
4.3.4. Prohibited and Actionable Subsidies 
 
503 SCM Agreement, Article 2.1.(c). 
504 SCM Agreement, Article 2.2-3. 
505 ibid, Article 2.2. 
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The SCM Agreement provides for two categories of subsidies: those that are prohibited (and 
automatically specific) and those that are actionable (i.e., open for legal challenge depending on 
their impact on other countries). The explanation of these categories is important to this analysis 
because all specific subsidies fall into one of these categories, which are explained below. 
As the name indicates, “prohibited subsidies” are impermissible and should therefore be neither 
maintained nor granted by any Member.506 Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement states the types of 
prohibited subsidies as follows: 
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other 
conditions, upon export performance (b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as 
one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods. 
In essence, two types of subsidies are prohibited: subsidies that are directly tied to the exportation 
of goods (export subsidies)507 and subsidy policies that incentivise the usage or consumption of 
local products in preference to imported products (local content subsidies). If a Member is found 
implementing any of the mentioned types of prohibited subsidy, such Member shall be directed to 
withdraw the subsidy without delay.508 
As for “actionable subsidies”, most subsidies, such as production subsidies, fall into this category. 
While they are generally not prohibited, they are however subject to challenge, either through the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism or countervailing action, in the event that their usage causes 
“adverse effects” to the interest of other Members. Adverse effects can be caused in three main 
circumstances. The first is if the subsidisation causes injury to the domestic industry of another 
Member. An “injury” in this context is understood to mean “material injury to a domestic industry, 
threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of such 
an industry”.509 The establishment of injury must be based on positive evidence, which must take 
 
506 ibid, Article 3.2. 
507 While the Agreement on Agriculture is an exception to Article 3 of the SCM Agreement, it is worth mentioning 
that Members at the WTO’s 10th Ministerial Conference (2015) in Nairobi agreed to substantially eliminate 
Agricultural export subsidies. See Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015: WT/MIN(15)/45 — WT/L/980. 
508 SCM Agreement, Article 4.7. 
509 This definition is provided in footnote 45 in the context of Article 15 of the SCM Agreement; See also Panel 
Report, European Communities and Certain Member States — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 
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into consideration, the volume of the subsidised import, its effect on the prices of similar products 
in the domestic market, and its effect on the domestic producers of such product. Also, the 
causation requirement must be established, which essentially requires that the subsidised import 
must be the direct cause of the injury.510 
The second possible situation of adverse effect can occur if a subsidy implementation directly or 
indirectly leads to the “nullification or impairment” of benefits accruing to other contracting 
Members under GATT 1994. The Panel has interpreted “nullification and impairment” in the SCM 
context to have the same meaning as the terms in Article XXIII of the GATT and can be evaluated 
using the approach adopted in relation to the provisions of that Article.511  
The final way to demonstrate an adverse effect is by showing the existence of “serious prejudice” 
to the interests of another Member.512 Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement states four bases upon 
which serious prejudice can be established as follows: firstly, if the effect of the subsidy can 
displace or impede the imports of a similar product of another Member into the subsidiser’s 
domestic market; secondly, if the effect of the subsidy can displace or impede the exports of 
another Member’s similar product from a third country market; thirdly, if the effect of the subsidy 
leads to significant suppression, depression, undercutting, or lost of sale in any market. Lastly, if 
a subsidy leads to an increase in the subsidising Member’s world market share for a specific 
primary product or commodity. 
It is worth mentioning that the SCM Agreement also has a third category of subsidies known as 
the “non-actionable subsidies”.513 However, the provision of this category has already expired, as 
it was enacted only to operate for five years, and it was not extended when its operational time 
elapsed on 31 December 1999.514 
 
WT/DS316/R (2010) para 7.2068, wherein the Panel interpreted “injury to the domestic industry” in Article 5(a) 
harmoniously with the provisions of Article 15 governing countervailing duty investigations. 
510 SCM Agreement, Article 15.5. 
511 Panel Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217, 234 (2002). 
512 ibid, Article 5. 
513 SCM Agreement, Article 8. 
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4.4. Normative Critique of the SCM Agreement 
The preceding sections provide insights into the economic and legal context of the SCM 
Agreement. Keeping the central thrust of this chapter in mind, the succeeding sections will 
examine some of the major issues concerning the WTO subsidies regulation and practice from the 
normative lenses already discussed in chapter 3. The justification for a critique of this nature stems 
from the numerous complaints against the subsidies regime for its contravention of essential 
normative values such as development, equity, fairness, transparency and human rights.515 
Abundant development and economic analysis contend that these normative contraventions occur 
significantly because the SCM Agreement enormously confines the ability of states to adopt 
policies for industrial development and other non-commercial development purposes.516 As earlier 
discussed in 4.2.1, adequate policy space for industrial and other development programmes are 
even more important in the case of less-developed countries due to their peculiar need to offset 
market failures and realise crucial welfare objectives. Yet, the complexity of the subsidy discipline 
has to be recognised, because an unfettered space to use subsidies, especially by the more 
industrialised economies, is also capable of distorting the market and leading to unfair results for 
global development and equity. Thus, an ideal subsidies regulation should be one that is able to 
strike a balance between strong disciplines on trade-distortive subsidies, on the one hand, and the 
flexibility to use subsidies to achieve legitimate developmental objectives that are peculiar to each 
country, on the other hand. Alas, the prevailing system operates mainly to advance the primacy of 
commercialism as its core value, while other non-commercial values are typically treated as 
peripheral. 
The debates on subsidies have been one of the most consistently raised issues in multilateral trade 
negotiations. The WTO Ministers, at the Doha Development Round, agreed to the following 
mandate for negotiations: 
In the light of experience and of the increasing application of these instruments by 
members, we agree to negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines 
 
515 See for examples, Lee (n 425); Chang (n 425). 
516 See generally: Chang (n 425). 
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under the Agreements on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 and on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, while preserving the basic concepts, 
principles and effectiveness of these Agreements and their instruments and 
objectives, and taking into account the needs of developing and least-developed 
participants. In the initial phase of the negotiations, participants will indicate the 
provisions, including disciplines on trade distorting practices, that they seek to 
clarify and improve in the subsequent phase.517  
As a result of the above declaration, different proposals from various Members and negotiating 
blocs of varying interests were presented. The proposals included different issues such as export 
subsidies, SDT provisions, the definition of specific terminologies, specificity, export credit and 
guarantees and the allocation of benefits, among others. 
Considering all the above, the remainder of this chapter is divided into two main sections. The 
current section normatively critiques the SCM Agreement, particularly the prohibited export and 
local content subsidies through the lenses of the five conceptual principles established in this 
thesis. Thereafter, the final section explores possible proposals for the operationalisation of those 
vital “non-trade values” within the context of the SCM Agreement. This thesis clarifies that even 
though matters concerning agricultural subsidies are central to the complaints of most developing 
countries, the discussion in this chapter is limited to the industrial subsidies covered under the 
SCM Agreement. This is because while a significant number of authors have critiqued the 
Agreement on Agriculture from a developing country standpoint,518 it is crucial not to neglect 
subsidies that apply to other sectors, especially as many developing countries are aiming to 
diversify their economies. 
4.4.1. Export Subsidies and the Policy Space Concerns of Less-Industrialised Countries 
As a general rule and save for a few exceptions, export subsidies are considered prohibited as 
mentioned in section 4.3.4 of this thesis. However, it is also well known that export subsidisation 
can be an essential policy tool to overcome market failures, and could be helpful for the 
 
517 Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, para. 28. 
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development of infant industries, especially in less-developed countries which aim to break into 
the global market competition. Another often-repeated economic justification of export 
subsidisation for developing markets is the effect of learning-by-exportation, which is based on 
the assumption that productivity gains experienced by firms after they commence exporting, due 
to access to new knowledge and resources, spill over to other segments of the economy. In a World 
Bank study, the authors called for proactive policies to promote trade and export (diversification) 
in developing countries.519 The study argued that selective and functional government 
interventions, in the form of subsidies, are required to improve export diversification, which has 
been hampered by severe market shortcomings. The study also argued that the strategy to be 
adopted should depend on the peculiar characteristics of each country, as “one size does not fit 
all”.520 
Furthermore, developing countries have consistently emphasised that such market shortcomings 
are more prevalent in their domestic markets, and export subsidisation will only serve as a tool to 
level the playing field with exporters from the more industrialised countries. For example, India, 
in one of her responses to the United States on the subsidies debate, expressed the following: 
Industr[ies] in developing countries are characterised by low level of infrastructure 
development, high cost of capital, prevalence of under-developed regions where 
industries may be reluctant to invest etc. The various export incentive schemes in 
developing countries are less in the nature of conferring an advantage to the 
exporters in such countries and more for the purpose of creating a level playing field, 
in view of the fact that their competitors from the developed countries do not suffer 
from these disadvantages. It has therefore been recognised that governments have 
to assume a more active role in assisting the industry by creating a level playing 
field.521 
 
519 Richard Newfarmer, William Shaw and Peter Walkenhorst, Breaking into New Markets: Emerging Lessons for 
Export Diversification (The World Bank 2009). 
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Beyond the position of policymakers, several economic findings support the view that export 
promotion by way of subsidies can be beneficial to developing countries. In a joint economic study 
conducted by Xiangkang and Xiangshuo, the authors concluded that export subsidies for 
developing countries have a direct effect on the increment of employment, improvement of 
domestic productivity, updating technology, and enhancement of welfare under appropriate 
circumstances.522 However, because economics is not an exact science, it must also be 
acknowledged that there are studies that have attempted to establish the contrary about the benefit 
of export subsidies,523 especially when inappropriately administered. Nonetheless, overwhelming 
evidence from practice and empirical studies focused on both industrialised and less-industrialised 
countries point out that export subsidisation is essential for not just the growth of domestic 
industries alone, but also for welfare and development objectives. 
Despite the general policy space limitations to implement export subsidies in the SCM Agreement, 
the Agreement still carefully acknowledges this economic argument as it recognises that “subsidies 
may play an important role in the economic development of developing country Members”.524 It is 
for this stated purpose that Members agreed on the SDT provisions contained in Article 27 of the 
SCM Agreement with the aim of creating some policy flexibilities for developing countries. The 
fundamental question, however, is whether those SDT provisions are actually satisfactory for 
achieving the economic and developmental goals of their intended beneficiaries. More specifically, 
an important concern in this research is whether those provisions satisfy the standard of fairness 
in accordance with the five equity and development-centred normative principles elaborated in 
chapter 3. There are numerous issues of concern from development and equity perspectives on the 
SDT provisions in relation to export subsidies – many of which have been discussed by various 
authors – but a few peculiar ones are analysed in the subsequent sections, due the controversies 
that they have generated. 
 
522 Xiangkang Yin and Xiangshuo Yin, ‘Can Developing Countries Benefit from Export Promotion?’ (2005) 32 
Journal of Economic Studies 60; For a similar research, albeit centred on Peru, see also, Christian Volpe Martincus 
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523 Such debate was addressed in: Dani Rodrik, ‘Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization Debate’ [1997] Foreign 
Policy 19. 
524 SCM Agreement, Article 27.1. 
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4.4.1.1. The Beneficiaries of the Preferential Provisions on Export Subsidies (Article 27.2) 
As an SDT exception, Article 27.2 of the SCM Agreement provides that the prohibition on 
subsidies contingent upon export performance shall not be applicable to three categories of 
developing countries. However, only the first two categories of developing countries, which are 
contained in Article 27.2(a), can benefit from the SDT treatment on export subsidies at present. 
This is because countries falling under the last category (contained in Article 27.2(b)) were 
required to phase out their export subsidies programs within eight years from the date the SCM 
Agreement came into force. Article 27.2 specifically provides the categories of developing 
countries as follows: 
(a) developing country Members referred to in Annex VII. 
(b) other developing country Members for a period of eight years from the date of 
entry into force of the WTO Agreement, subject to compliance with the provisions 
in paragraph 4. 
With respect to paragraph (a) above, the developing countries referred to in Annex VII are of two 
groups, and they are the only two groups that can currently benefit from the SDT provisions on 
export subsidies according to the Panel’s interpretation in India–Export Related Measures.525 They 
are the Members that have been designated as least-developed countries by the United Nations, 
and countries in which their GNP per capita has not reached 1,000 USD per annum at the time the 
SCM Agreement entered into force.526 The countries in the latter group will, however, also be 
required to phase out their export subsidies once their GNP per capita has reached 1,000 USD 
per annum, just like other developing country Members in accordance with paragraph 2(b) of 
Article 27. Annex VII specifically provides as follows: 
 
525 This is the consequence of the Panel’s decision in India – Export Related Measures, WT/DS541/R, 31 October 
2019. 
526 SCM Agreement, Annex VII (a) and (b). 
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The developing country Members not subject to the provisions of paragraph 1(a) of 
Article 3 [on the prohibition of export subsidies] under the terms of paragraph 2(a) 
of Article 27 are: 
(a) Least-developed countries designated as such by the United Nations which are 
Members of the WTO. 
(b) Each of the following developing countries which are Members of the WTO 
shall be subject to the provisions which are applicable to other developing country 
Members according to paragraph 2(b) of Article 27 when GNP per capita has 
reached $1,000 per annum: Bolivia, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican 
Republic, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe. 
There was a contention before the Panel in India – Export Related Measures on whether an eight-
year period will be afforded to those developing country Members listed in Annex VII(b) when 
they graduate to the category of other developing countries in Article 27.2(b) (i.e. when their GNP 
per capita reaches 1,000 USD). India argued that the computation of the eight-year period for the 
transiting Members should commence from the date of graduation from Annex VII(b) and not the 
date the SCM Agreement came into force. However, the Panel held that “the text of Article 27.2(b) 
does not leave scope for ambiguity in respect to the end date of that transition period”, which 
essentially runs from January 1995 to January 2003 for all developing country Members.527 The 
Panel’s position was substantially based on its interpretation of the expression “shall be subject to 
the provisions which are applicable to other developing country Members” which is contained in 
Annex VII(b) above. The Panel held that the transiting developing countries essentially have to 
assume the subsisting applicability of Article 27.2(b) to other developing countries, which has 
basically expired since January 2003. This, according to the Panel, is because the text of Annex 
VII(b) does not support the modification of the starting date for the eight-year transition period for 
those developing country Members.528 
 
527 Panel Report, India – Export Related Measures, 7.3.3.2. 
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Although a notification of an appeal on this point of law has been filed by India,529 the current 
position of the Panel essentially renders the SDT provision of Article 27.2(b) inoperative. It also 
robs the group of those developing countries mentioned in Annex VII(b) of the opportunity to 
benefit from the rights granted to them by the SCM Agreement for the sole purpose of economic 
development. More essentially, the interpretation of the Panel seemed not to have adequately taken 
into consideration the centrality of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, 
which requires that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose”.530 The Vienna Convention has attained the status of customary law, and its provisions, 
particularly Articles 31 and 32, have been recognised in a plethora of WTO rulings as an 
indispensable instrument for interpreting all WTO Agreements, pursuant to Article 3.2 of the 
DSU.531 
In the context of the SCM Agreement, the “object and purpose” of the SDT provisions under 
Article 27 is the recognition of the crucial role subsidies can play in the economic development 
programmes of developing nations.532 Hence, if the eight-year transition period on export subsidies 
that was granted to the developing countries above the 1000 USD per annum GNP per capita is 
actually founded on any credible and beneficial economic basis, it, therefore, becomes 
irreconcilable with the object of the provision if the same differential treatment could not be 
granted to the transiting developing country Members from the date of their graduation from 
Annex VII(b). Besides, the interpretation of a treaty should not be so inflexible to the extent that 
its most basic purpose will be defeated – in the interest of equity. This view is in consonance with 
the Appellate Body’s position in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, where it was expressed 
that:  
 
529 India – Export Related Measures, Notification of an Appeal by India under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), and under Rule 20(1) of the 
Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/DS541/7, 22 November 2019. 
530 Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, Article 31 (emphasis added). 
531 See for examples: Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 April 1996, p. 16; Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, 
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, 4 October 1996. 
532 SCM Agreement, Article 27.1. 
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WTO rules are reliable, comprehensible and enforceable. WTO rules are not so rigid 
or so inflexible as not to leave room for reasoned judgements in confronting the 
endless and ever-changing ebb and flow of real facts in real cases in the real world. 
They will serve the multilateral trading system best if they are interpreted with that 
in mind. In that way, we will achieve the “security and predictability” sought for the 
multilateral trading system by the Members of the WTO through the establishment 
of the dispute settlement system.533 
In support of the above, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention also provides that supplementary 
means of interpretation may be adopted for the purpose of conforming with the purposive method 
of interpretation, especially where the interpretation leads to a meaning that is ambiguous, obscure, 
manifestly absurd, or unreasonable.534 In the view of this thesis, and taking the above 
pronouncement of the Appellate Body into consideration, the most equitable approach would be 
to interpret Article 27.2(b) mutatis mutandis in a manner that reflects the peculiar economic 
circumstance of the transiting Members (i.e. by commencing the computation of their eight-year 
period from the date they attain the 1,000 USD GNP per capita threshold). Any approach short of 
that would rather appear to have placed the interest of equity and fairness as inferior. 
Another crucial concern about the SDT provisions on export subsidies is that they do not apply to 
newly acceded developing countries, even if their income level is below the 1,000 USD GNP 
threshold. This will also be the case for LDCs that will probably graduate to the status of a 
developing country below the 1,000 USD GNP threshold. This clearly contradicts the stated basis 
upon which the SDT principles were founded, which is understood to be generally related to the 
level of income and development of Members. This specific concern had earlier been expressed 
by Coppens who also counter-argued that “[t]he assumption that original WTO developing 
countries would have ‘paid’ for their [SDT] treatment by making deeper concessions fails since 
newly acceded developing countries have generally made concessions that are far more 
 
533 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, p. 31 (emphasis added). 
534 Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, Article 32. 
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extensive”.535 As such, there could be no reasonable development justification for their exclusion 
from the SDT treatment. 
From a critical viewpoint of the five normative principles canvassed in chapter 3, the asymmetries 
in the original economic and development positions of the WTO Members further strengthens the 
argument in favour of global distributive justice and, in particular, the difference principle. The 
objective of the difference principle is clear, in the sense that it seeks to make the least advantaged 
in the economic and development distribution better off. While it could be argued that the SDT 
provisions on export subsidies have created a kind of different treatment for those that are least 
advantaged among the Members of the trading community, the SDT provisions do not seem to 
operate in a manner that actually seeks to achieve specific development ends beyond the 
ornamental value of, in most cases, time extensions. SDT provisions should be made to reflect the 
peculiar economic realities of its beneficiaries. They ought to operate in a way that their actual 
impact on development, rather than the expiration of time or date of accession to the WTO, 
becomes the main measure in determining its beneficiaries. The goal of SDT provisions in the 
context of subsidies ought to be more directed towards remedying the peculiar market failures in 
the domestic markets of their beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, if the primary objective underpinning the practice and policy of the WTO had been 
more inclined towards development as a fundamental right as argued in section 3.5.1 of this thesis, 
there would have been the prospect that the Panel in India – Export Related Measures would have 
adopted a development-favourable approach – as opposed to its unfettered commitment to a literal 
understanding of the text. Finally, the Panel’s decision also strengthens the normative argument 
made in section 3.5.2 on the need to operationalise the SDT provisions in order to live up to their 
development objectives.536 This is because Article 27.2(b), as it stands now, benefits no developing 
country Member of the WTO, nor does it have any prospect that it would benefit those that transit 
to the same economic position in future. 
 
535 Dominic Coppens, ‘How Special Is the Special and Differential Treatment under the SCM Agreement - A Legal 
and Normative Analysis of WTO Subsidy Disciplines on Developing Countries’ (2013) 12 World Trade Review 79, 
100. 
536 For similar argument on the operationalisation of SDT provisions in this thesis, see also sections 2.2.4 and 3.3.6. 
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4.4.1.2. Lack of Policy Space for Export Diversification 
For the developing countries referred to under Article 27.2(b), the policy space granted to them to 
use export subsidies for the period of eight years, as differential treatment, is not absolute. It is 
subject to the condition that “a developing country shall not increase the level of its export 
subsidies” beyond the existing level from the date the SCM Agreement came into force.537 This 
sets a ceiling level of export subsidies based on their export subsidies level in 1986, and bars the 
use of export subsidies as a policy instrument for those developing country Members who granted 
no export subsidies as at the date the SCM Agreement entered into force.538  
The implications of the above limitations are numerous from economic, development and 
historical perspectives. Firstly, the limitation imposed on the developing countries’ ability to 
expand the scope and level of their subsidies contradicts empirical economic findings that there is 
need for many of such countries to implement proactive policies to promote trade and export 
diversification for industrial and economic development.539 This is particularly more relevant in 
the case of the less-industrialised developing countries, many of which hardly have a single 
industry that has attained a competitive level in the global market due to their numerous market 
shortcomings. This is also related to the issue of development of infant industries, which has earlier 
been discussed as one of the major economic rationales for the implementation of subsidies. It, 
therefore, begs the question of whether such an SDT requirement, which has further diminished 
the policy space for developing countries, actually aims to achieve development as an end.  
Another criticism of this requirement is the fact that it sustains the global economic imbalance that 
had always existed between the developed and the developing worlds, especially those at the 
economic extremes. This is based on the historical fact that most developed countries had already 
attained a significant level of economic and development competence, with considerable reliance 
on tools such as quotas, tariffs, and exports subsidies, for several decades before the SCM 
Agreement came into force. This period was concurrent with the era in which a considerable 
 
537 SCM Agreement, Article 27.4. 
538 ibid. footnote 55. See also, Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/R, 14 
April 1999, para. 7.62. 
539 See analysis by Newfarmer, Shaw and Walkenhorst (n 519); Yin and Yin (n 522). 
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number of developing nations were either directly under colonial rule or still battling their way out 
of its dominance. Those countries hardly had the luxury of designing any sustainable economic 
path for themselves, as freedom was their immediate concern. Accordingly, a provision requiring 
many such countries to remedy their market failures within only eight years, in the face of 
numerous peculiar post-colonial challenges and without the ability to expand beyond their already 
insignificant level of export support, does not appear to have taken any development theory or 
even distributive justice into consideration. The lack of consideration of such legitimate historical 
concerns in international trade policies forms one of the major planks of TWAIL’s critical 
approach to international economic practice. 
It does not require much economic study to observe that the stipulation imposed on developing 
countries not to expand the scope of their limited export subsidies within the already inadequate 
eight-year period does not seem to serve the underlying purpose of the SDT provisions, which is 
economic development. Rather, it only sustains the existing global economic and power 
asymmetry that will make it difficult, if not impossible, for countries at the lower end of the global 
economic distribution to be at economic parity with their industrialised contemporaries. One could 
argue that contrary to the above claim, the reality may differ, as Members (both developed and 
developing) may sometimes escape these policy space constraints, due to their substantially 
inconsistent and inadequate compliance with the subsidies notification requirement as stipulated 
in Article 25 of the SCM Agreement.540 However, it must be clarified that in practice a Member’s 
action against the WTO-inconsistent subsidy of another Member will most likely emanate from 
complaints of domestic industries/businesses whose interests must have been directly affected by 
such inconsistent trade policy, rather than via the notification of Members. Thus, the possible 
existence of an unchallenged implementation of a WTO-inconsistent subsidy by a less-
industrialised Member will most likely be due to its inconsequential effect on the trade interests of 
other Members – especially the developed countries that have adequate resources to prosecute the 
claim. Moreover, the mechanisms that hinder the implementation of many development-centred 
subsidies in less-industrialised countries are far beyond the scope of just the WTO’s rules. As 
 
540 For analysis on the weak notification of subsidies by Members as expressed by the Subsidies Committee, in 
compliance with Article 25 of the SCM Agreement, see, Gregory Shaffer, Robert Wolfe and Vinhcent Le, ‘Can 
Informal Law Discipline Subsidies?’ (2015) 18 Journal of International Economic Law 711, 716–717. 
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mentioned in section 2.2.4, international financial organisations (like the World Bank and the IMF) 
and wealthier countries do impose and ensure the implementation of further commitments through 
mechanisms, such as the SAPs, as conditions for aids, loans, and other forms of assistance. 
Considering all the above, a possible remedy to this inequity is an argument advanced by Lee, 
wherein he proposed that the limitations placed on developing countries’ to use export subsidies 
should be discarded, and policy space should instead be granted to them individually to offer a 
certain amount of export subsidies in accordance with their various developmental levels and 
needs.541 While Lee’s proposal does not provide much specific detail on how this could be 
achieved, it nonetheless offers a conceptual guide that is founded on development, which also 
recognises the different development levels and characteristics of developing countries. He also 
acknowledged that his proposal still “needs to be further debated with respect to their effect on 
development”.542 
4.4.1.3. Export Processing Zones and the WTO Rules 
In an effort to transform their economies from an import-centric one to a global supply chain based 
on exports, many developing countries established export development policies that encourage 
both domestic and foreign direct investments. One of the major policy tools adopted in trying to 
achieve this objective is the establishment of Export Processing Zones (EPZ), which are a type of 
Special Economic Zone (SPZ). EPZs are usually established through domestic legislation that 
grants various kinds of special incentives to corporations of a specific nature, mostly within a 
defined geographic area within a country. The rules that apply in EPZs typically deviate from the 
general rules that apply to regular businesses. Such special rules include preferential tax or duty 
treatment, tax-free importation of production equipment, direct subsidies to enhance infrastructure, 
a waiver of administrative and property taxes, and a waiver from value-added taxes for transferred 
goods between designated EPZs.  
 
541 See, Yong-Shik Lee, ‘Facilitating Development in the World Trading System-A Proposal for Development 
Facilitation Tariff and Development Facilitating Subsidy’ (2004) 38 J. World Trade 935; See also, Yong-Shik Lee, 
‘Economic Development and the World Trade Organisation: Proposal for the Agreement on Development Facilitation 
and the Council for Trade and Development in WTO’ (2009) 325 Developing countries in WTO Legal System (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2009). 
542 Lee (n 541) 951. 
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There is no universally accepted definition for EPZs, because their peculiar characteristics 
sometimes differ depending on the provisions of their enabling legislation. Nonetheless, they all 
share the common attribute of providing special inducements for corporations to encourage export. 
A quite consistent definition in the economics literature is according to a World Bank report, which 
defines EPZs as follows:  
[A]n industrial estate, usually a fenced-in area of 10 to 300 hectares, that specializes 
in manufacturing for export. It offers firms free trade conditions and a liberal 
regulatory environment. Its objectives are to attract foreign investors, collaborators, 
and buyers who can facilitate entry into the world market for some of the economy’s 
industrial goods, thus generating employment and foreign exchange.543  
That said, it must be noted that the practice nowadays might not actually require firms to be 
physically present within a physically fenced area – they can merely be designated as an EPZ. 
There are numerous development benefits that are derived from EPZs. Such benefits include 
creation of jobs, increase of foreign direct investment, increase in foreign exchange through 
expanded exports, the introduction of technology, and creating backward linkages from the EPZ 
to the local economy. As a practical example, the EPZs in Nicaragua accounted for 50 per cent of 
the county’s total exports, and nearly 90 per cent of its manufacturing exports in 2010. The 
government also reported that, in the same year, jobs created through EPZs represented 25 per cent 
of the country’s total formal work, with firms directly employing an average of 7.5 per cent of the 
total labour force of the municipalities where the EPZs are located.544 Theoretically, these benefits 
should also lead to an increase in the welfare of the country’s population. However, while EPZs 
are generally considered as an adequate sustainable economic development strategy to attract FDIs 
and increase exportation, most of the incentives administered by EPZs, such as rebates offered to 
exporters and tax waivers, are understood not to be in conformity with the SCM Agreement. This 
 
543 The World Bank (ed), Export Processing Zones (1992) 20 Policy and Research Series, 7. 
544 Data obtained from the Comisión Nacional de Zonas Francas (CNZF) and Nicaragua’s Central Bank (BCN), Cited 
in Nathalie Picarelli, ‘Who Really Benefits from Export Processing Zones? Evidence from Nicaraguan Municipalities’ 
(2016) 41 Labour Economics 318, 319. 
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is because they are mostly subsidies contingent upon export performance, which are generally 
prohibited according to Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement.  
Nonetheless, many developing countries were able to use EPZs due to the SDT exceptions granted 
under Article 27.2 of the SCM Agreement. Even EPZs in developing countries that were neither 
LDCs nor had a GNP per capita of less than 1,000 USD were sometimes granted ad hoc extensions 
by the WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Committee) pursuant 
to Article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement. However, the SDT exception for such developmental 
policy space was constrained when the SCM Committee decided to phase out its practice of 
granting extensions to developing countries that are not listed in Annex VII. A final deadline of 
December 31, 2015, was set for making EPZ regulations in these countries WTO-compliant.545 
Making EPZs WTO-compliant essentially means that most of the export promotion policies, such 
as direct tax waivers, must be stopped – and these are the most fundamental basis of EPZs. 
Different proposals have been offered as ways for developing countries to amend their EPZ 
regulations to avoid a breach of the SCM Agreement, but many of these proposals are either 
inadequate to meet an equivalent development need or are even questionable in light of the strict 
reading of the SCM Agreement.546  
The decision of the Subsidies Committee seems to have extinguished the operationalisation of the 
SDT provision in Article 27.4, which permits the Committee to extend the period within which 
developing countries may subsidise their exports, based on their peculiar economic, financial and 
development needs. This SDT provision, according to its clear text, was originally not made to be 
time-bound, but instead subject to the economic and development conditions of Members. The 
decision of the Committee to impose a general final deadline does not appear to have taken such 
germane conditions as its primary consideration. A development-consistent approach would rather 
have been for the Committee to objectively assess the applications for extension of the usage of 
EPZs on the basis of peculiar conditions and needs of each country, rather than terminating an 
empirically proven tool to achieve economic development in those countries. As mentioned in 
section 4.4.1.1 above, it is even more concerning from a critical view of development and equity 
 
545 G/SCM/120, Decision of Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of 13 July 2007. 
546 See e.g. James Waters, ‘Achieving World Trade Organization Compliance for Export Processing Zones While 
Maintaining Economic Competitiveness for Developing Countries’ (2013) 63 Duke Law Journal 481. 
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that the newly acceded Members, many of which had GNPs below 1,000 USD in 1990 dollars, 
were generally required to eliminate all export subsidies as a condition of accession and could not 
benefit from any of the SDT treatments under Article 27. Such countries include Albania, Armenia, 
Tonga, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, and Vietnam. 
The central argument here is the lack of consistency in the WTO’s development policies with 
respect to export subsidies, as they do not appear to be administered in a way that actually seeks 
development as an end that must be achieved. Otherwise, a relevant question would be to ask what 
alternative development policies are in place for those countries that their position has not been 
better-off, but still have to eliminate their existing export promotion policies, only because their 
time is up. This shortcoming emphasises the need to reassess the philosophy of development in 
international trade relations by making development more central to its policymaking. As 
consistently argued in different sections of this thesis, if development were to be considered as a 
fundamental right as declared in the UNDRD, as opposed to a mere policy that could be taken into 
account or not, it would have been central to the decision reached by the Subsidies Committee – 
and probably taken into consideration in the case of the newly acceded developing countries. 
Furthermore, as for those limited developing countries that meet the requirement in Annex VII, 
and are, as such, still exempted from the prohibition on export subsidies, their differential treatment 
is still constrained by the fact that such subsidies (if granted) remain actionable and therefore 
countervailable (when they are above the de minimis thresholds set out in Article 27.10 of the 
SCM Agreement).547 The economic and development significance of export promotion policies to 
these countries (LDCs and countries with their GNP below 1,000 USD) should be a basis to call 
for the limitation of the scope in which actionable subsidies claims could be brought against these 
countries. Also, the threshold in which unilateral countervailing actions could be taken against 
them needs to be raised. This position is consistent with the proposals of a number of authors on 
trade and development, such as Lee, as mentioned in section 4.4.1.2 above. Lee proposed a class 
of subsidy known as “development facilitation subsidies”.548 This proposed class of subsidy would 
exempt developing country Members with justifiable development concerns from any potential 
 
547 See SCM Agreement, Articles 27.7 and 27.10. Recall also that export subsidies are generally deemed to be specific 
as per Article 2.3 SCM Agreement. 
548 Lee (n 541). 
179 
 
multilateral or unilateral actions, which could be in form of actionable or prohibited subsidy 
claims, or countervailing duties. This kind of policy space, coupled with other internal measures, 
is believed to be capable of helping many developing countries achieve the same development 
outcome as the “East Asian Miracle”, as canvassed by the World Bank Report.549 Otherwise, the 
current WTO rules and interpretation on subsidies, including the SDT provisions, glaringly lack 
the ability to tackle any development challenge of the developing country Members. As Rodrik 
rightly puts it, “the SCM Agreement must be judged to have made a significant dent in the ability 
of developing countries to employ intelligently-designed industrial policies”.550 
4.4.2. Local Content Measures and the Policy Space for Development Objectives 
Just as in the case of export subsidies, all subsidies that are contingent upon favouring the usage 
of domestic goods over imported ones (commonly referred to as “local content subsidies”) are 
generally prohibited.551 This prohibition is an offshoot of the neoliberal economic theory552 that 
emphasises that a more liberalised international trade, without any form of government 
intervention, will lead to improved efficiency – which is consequently expected to increase 
prosperity and development in the participating countries. However, this dominant position has 
been challenged multiple times by development economists and developing countries, who argue 
that local content policies are an essential development stimulant, especially in developing infant 
industries.553 They also often point out that local content policies, such as import substitution 
industrialisation, was one of the major development policy strategies that was initially 
implemented by the majority of the now industrialised and wealthy countries before they attained 
their current development levels.554 While advancing the infant industry economic theory in a 
UNCTAD discussion paper, Shafaeddin elucidates that “[w]ith the exception of Hong Kong, no 
 
549 World Bank (n 460). 
550 Dani Rodrik, ‘Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century’ (Harvard University, John F Kennedy School of 
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551 SCM Agreement, Article 3.1(b). 
552 It has been mentioned in various sections of this thesis that the neoliberal economic theory is the theoretical basis 
for the present international economic and trade regime. See Sections 2.2.4, 2.5, and 3.4.2. 
553 This argument is mostly built upon the Prebisch–Singer theory in Development Economics, which posits that 
developing countries would benefit more from fostering their infant industries behind protective economic walls, such 
as import substitution industrialisation. 
554 Sebastian Edwards, ‘Openness, Trade Liberalization, and Growth in Developing Countries’ (1993) 31 Journal of 
Economic Literature 1358. 
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country has developed its industrial base without resorting to infant industry protection. Both early 
industrialized and newly industrialized countries applied the same principle, although to varying 
degrees and in different ways”.555 It is also relevant to add that some developed countries, like the 
United States, still adopt some protectionist policies as part of their economic recovery 
strategies.556 
Such historical and empirical fact is more reason why less-industrialised countries express 
scepticism towards the constraints imposed on local content subsidies by the multilateral trading 
agreements. Considering the scepticisms and the divergent positions, this section aims to 
normatively critique the provisions of the SCM Agreement that relate to local content subsidies 
from the critical lenses of the RTD, TWAIL, and distributive justice, with particular emphasis on 
the five conceptual principles that were derived therefrom in the previous chapter.557 This critique 
also entails a critical assessment of the SDT provision that the SCM Agreement provides to aid 
the economic development of developing countries.  
In terms of the structure of this discussion, the next sub-section provides a general insight into the 
economic and development context of local content subsidies. Thereafter, the subsequent sub-
section analyses and critiques the relevant legal provisions from the aforementioned critical lenses. 
Furthermore, even though there are overlaps in both their legal regimes and practice, it is important 
to make clear that the primary focus of this critique (particularly the legal discussion) is on the 
local content policies in the context of the industrial subsidies covered by the SCM Agreement, 
and not so much about the local content requirements in investment legislation that is mainly 
covered by the TRIMs Agreement and other investment agreements. 
 
555 Mehdi Shafaeddin, ‘What Did Frederick List Actually Say? Some Clarifications on the Infant Industry Argument’ 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2000) 149 2. 
556556 A recent example is the Executive Order signed by the United States’ President aiming to encourage and enforce 
the purchase, procurement and hire of local products and services (also known as the “Buy American Policies”). See 
‘Executive Order on Ensuring the Future Is Made in All of America by All of America’s Workers’ (The White House, 
25 January 2021) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/25/executive-order-on-
ensuring-the-future-is-made-in-all-of-america-by-all-of-americas-workers/> accessed 30 April 2021. 
557 The five conceptual principles distilled from RTD, TWAIL and Distributive Justice are as follows: Development 
as the central objective of international trade policies; Operationalisation of differential treatment in trade policies; 
Mainstreaming human rights in international trade policies and agreements; Equality of participation and transparency 
in international trade practice; and the expansion of global social responsibility. See generally, Section 3.5. 
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4.4.2.1. Economic and Development Context of Local Content Policies 
Local content policies are a variety of measures imposed by governments (usually under specific 
law or regulations), which require foreign investors or businesses to procure certain goods and 
services (or up to a minimum threshold) from the domestic market of a country. Such policies may 
also involve the protection and incubation of newly established domestic industries until their 
production capacity develops to a level that they can compete with imported goods. The policies 
aim to more “actively embed foreign investment in, and catalyse spillovers into and linkages with, 
the domestic economy”.558 There are varieties of local content policies that are implemented by 
governments. Such policies include the implementation of import substitution policies and 
measures that encourage or mandate businesses to make use of a certain quantity of local resources 
in their manufacturing process, or even while rendering services. In the investment context, it may 
include other measures such as joint venture requirements, local management requirements, 
regulations requiring firms to have a certain share of domestic ownership, and technology transfer 
requirements.  
The primary objective of local content policies is to establish linkages between foreign investments 
and local economies in a manner that will promote domestic development.559 These policies also 
help in building local skills and capacity, creating employment, boosting research and 
development in the host country, and promoting technological transfer between foreign and 
domestic corporations.  
The usage of local content policies is quite controversial among economists and policymakers. 
Proponents of such policies (particularly the developing countries and development economists) 
usually invoke the “infant industry theory” in advancing their arguments. They opine that less-
industrialised nations should be able to implement the policies in order to be able to protect and 
strengthen their domestic industries until they are developed enough to compete in the global 
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market. They claim that, without such measures, the less-developed infant industries in their 
various jurisdictions will be unable to compete with foreign firms – and this could even lead to the 
collapse of those industries.560 
In contrast, opponents of the policy space to use local content policies often argue that such policies 
have the capacity to produce economic inefficiency, which may discourage foreign investors from 
investing in a country.561 According to them, measures that compel companies to use domestic 
inputs affect free trade and restrict access to global markets, and also translate to a higher burden 
on the national budget. They also argue that local content requirements that limit the ability of 
investors to use goods from any origin have the capacity to raise the production cost of companies, 
which could therefore lead to higher costs for local consumers.  
An obvious observation from the position of the opponents of local content policies is that their 
arguments are mostly hinged on the survival of foreign industries and the free trade idea, as 
opposed to other considerations, such as the development of local industries, employment 
opportunities, regional development, and other development agendas. On the claim that it could 
lead to a higher burden on the national purse, a counterargument is that there is nothing abominable 
in directing the national finance towards policies that will increase employment and welfare for its 
taxpayers. It, therefore, appears that the conflicting views mainly arise due to the fundamental 
differences in the values that are deemed as most crucial by the opposing sides. While the 
proponents are considerably concerned about the development implications of the policies in 
relation to human rights, welfare, employment, and the growth of local industries, the opponents, 
in a classic neoliberal fashion, are primarily basing their arguments on the hindrance that such 
policies can create for the flow of trade and other purely commercial goals.  
Overall, this thesis acknowledges that this debate is a complex one and that both sides raise 
important issues that need to be considered in shaping trade policy. Nonetheless, this thesis is more 
inclined towards adopting the argument of the proponents of local content policies, because their 
values and considerations significantly align with the normative principles that have been earlier 
 
560 See generally, section 4.2.1 on the infant industry argument as a rationale for subsidies implementation. 
561 Trebilcock, Howse and Eliason (n 458) 11–12. 
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proposed as key elements for an ideal international trade policy. Determining whether a local 
content policy is beneficial or not ought to be context-specific and countries should have the ability 
to make such decisions, depending on their development peculiarities. As Johnson explains: 
Whether local content requirements are good policy tools depends on the nature of 
the requirement, the fit between the requirement and its intended purpose, the 
circumstances in the host country, the needs and characteristics of the relevant firms, 
and the drivers behind those firms’ decisions to invest abroad. The issue is much too 
nuanced and context specific for there to be a simple rule on whether, when and how 
a government should employ many of these tools.562 
In advancing the argument in favour of local content policies and their relevance to development, 
especially for the less-industrialised countries, some authors have highlighted the intersection 
between such policies and some of the United Nations’ 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs).563 Of specific relevance to the development benefits of local content policies are SDGs 8, 
9, and 10. 
SDG 8 concentrates on promoting “sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and 
productive employment and decent work for all”.564 This SDG has twelve SDG targets, among 
which at least four are relevant to the development issues associated with local content policies. 
For example, target 8.3 of SDG 8 aims to “[p]romote development-oriented policies that support 
productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and 
encourage the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including 
through access to financial services”.565 Achieving this SDG and the target will require policies 
that would help domestic firms expand and integrate into global value chains. This entails policies 
that can address potential market shortcomings that could lead to disadvantageous outcomes for 
industries and suppliers as a result of foreign competition. Consequently, an identified economic 
tool in achieving this is implementing adequate local content policies that are capable of promoting 
 
562 Johnson (n 558) 8. 
563 See generally, Johnson (n 558). 
564 United Nations General Assembly Resolution, Transforming Our World, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, A/RES/70/1, (2015), 8. 
565 ibid, Target 8.3 (emphasis added). 
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economic diversity, as well as the diversity of suppliers and employees. Possible local content 
policies that may be adopted in this instance include incentivising the use of local goods, labour 
and services, providing direct financial support for micro-, small- and medium-sized businesses to 
support their development, and incentivising the training and employment of qualified domestic 
labour, among others. 
Similar to the above, SDG 9 also focuses on how to “build resilient infrastructure, promote 
inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation”. This goal is essentially a 
restatement of the chief purpose why less-industrialised jurisdictions advance the infant industry 
argument in relation to the policy space for local content measures and other economic 
development policies. Some of the most relevant targets of this SDG are as follows: 
9.1. Develop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including 
regional and transborder infrastructure, to support economic development and 
human well-being, with a focus on affordable and equitable access for all. 
9.2. Promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and, by 2030, significantly 
raise industry’s share of employment and gross domestic product, in line with 
national circumstances, and double its share in least developed countries. 
9.3. Increase the access of small-scale industrial and other enterprises, in particular 
in developing countries, to financial services, including affordable credit, and their 
integration into value chains and markets. 
All the above are essentially pointing out the need to implement industrial policies for infant 
industry development. In achieving the above SDG targets, various local content policies can be 
adopted. For example, concerning target 9.1, some authors have proposed policies requiring 
businesses (both foreign and domestic) to invest in developing infrastructures that are connected 
with their projects.566 Similarly, achieving target 9.2 requires government policies to increase the 
 
566 For examples, see, Perrine Toledano and Clara Roorda, Leveraging Mining Demand for Internet and 
Telecommunications Infrastructure for Broad Economic Development: Models, Opportunities and Challenges 
(Columbia Centre on Sustainable Investment 2014); Perrine Toledano and others, A Framework to Approach Shared 
Use of Mining-Related Infrastructure (Columbia Centre on Sustainable Investment 2014). 
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diversification of domestic production through obliging and incentivising the usage of local 
providers of goods, services, and labour.567 Target 9.3 is essentially encouraging direct financial 
and technical aid, particularly for small-scale and other similar businesses, to develop their 
capacity for integration into global value chains.  
Lastly, in relation to the intersection between the space to implement local content policies and the 
sustainable development goals, the relevance of SDG 10, which focuses on how to “reduce 
inequality within and among countries” cannot be overemphasised. Even though it could be argued 
that there has been a decline in global poverty in recent decades, mainly due to the economic 
developments in China, some analysis still points out that developing countries today are “more 
unequal than three decades ago”.568 Similarly, the inequality within wealthy countries increased 
everywhere over the 1970-2010 period.569 While there are many complex factors that are 
responsible for the increasing inequality, recent data on global value chains has triggered an 
increased analysis of how the extent of integration into global value chains contributes to the rising 
patterns of global inequality.570 In advancing the development objective of SDG 10 in this context, 
authors have proposed the need to implement policy measures that can address the inequality and 
development issues that are arising from global value chains, and can consequently assist less-
industrialised jurisdictions to properly integrate into, and reap the benefits of, the global value 
chains.571 Some of the identified policies in achieving this aim, especially in the context of 
developing countries, include adopting adequate local content policies that will promote or require 
the usage of domestic goods, services, and labour.572 
 
567 Johnson (n 558) 12. 
568 Facundo Alvaredo and Leonardo Gasparini, ‘Recent Trends in Inequality and Poverty in Developing Countries’ in 
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569 Salvatore Morelli, Timothy Smeeding and Jeffrey Thompson, ‘Post-1970 Trends in Within-Country Inequality and 
Poverty: Rich and Middle-Income Countries’ in Anthony B Atkinson and François Bourguignon (eds), Handbook of 
Income Distribution, vol 2 (Elsevier 2015) 1. 
570 Javier Lopez Gonzalez, Przemyslaw Kowalski and Pascal Achard, ‘Trade, Global Value Chains and Wage-Income 
Inequality’ (OECD Publishing 2015) 182. 
571 UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development’, United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2013) 177–191; This position is also relevant to the United Nations’ 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals, Targets 10.2, 10.3 and 10.4. 
572 Isabelle Ramdoo, ‘Resource-Based Industrialisation in Africa: Optimising Linkages and Value Chains in the 
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All the above might seem to be encouraging a form of protectionism, which contradicts the 
prevailing neoliberal economic theory of unhindered trade and investment flows. However, 
arguments from development economists and other similar experts, as mentioned earlier, point out 
that only such policies can be capable of uplifting industries in the less-industrialised jurisdictions 
from their current development status. Moreover, the use of the local content policies is not meant 
to be perpetual, as the objective is to grant those countries sufficient policy space until such time 
when their market failures will be remedied, and their industries (in specific sectors) are globally 
competitive. This is in line with empirical economic studies and will also serve development 
objectives. 
The objective of the above analysis is to establish the economic and development foundation for 
the use of local content policies, and for how such policies are capable of achieving global 
development objectives in a sustainable way. Notwithstanding the mentioned development 
benefits, particularly in the context of the less-industrialised jurisdictions, countries are still 
constrained from implementing a significant number of local content policies due to their 
commitments under the WTO agreements. The next section will, therefore, normatively critique 
the legal limitations imposed on the space to adopt development policies under the SCM 
Agreement. 
4.4.2.2. Critique of the SCM Agreement on Local Content Subsidies 
As a general rule, the SCM Agreement prohibits Members from implementing any form of subsidy 
that is “contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic 
over imported goods”.573 However, as a differential provision for developing countries, Article 
27.3 provides that “the prohibition of paragraph 1(b) of Article 3 [on local content subsidies] shall 
not apply to developing country Members for a period of five years, and shall not apply to least 
developed country Members for a period of eight years, from the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement”.574 If computed from the date the SCM Agreement entered into force, the 
 
573 SCM Agreement, Article 3.1(b). 
574 ibid. Article 27.3. 
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operationalisation of this SDT provision elapsed in the year 1999 for developing countries and 
2002 for the LDCs.  
From a critical development and human rights perspective, the relevant question to ask is whether 
the SDT provision has sufficiently realised the development objective that it supposedly sets out 
to achieve. This could entail querying whether the SDT provision has been able to significantly 
offset the market failures575 that arise as a result of trade liberalisation and specifically the global 
value chains. It is also relevant to enquire whether the implementation of the SDT provision has 
led to the development of the most crucial infant industries in the various applicable jurisdictions, 
and whether it has made domestic industries in those jurisdictions competitive in the global market. 
Furthermore, since the basis upon which the SDT is granted is supposedly due to the various 
countries’ development capabilities, one must query the extent to which the temporary SDT 
provision has been able to improve their development levels. For instance, LDCs are classified as 
such on the basis of their low national incomes, weak human assets and high economic 
vulnerability.576 Therefore, a realistic development focused SDT provision should be primarily 
concerned about when and how those identified vulnerabilities are remedied, as opposed to 
generalised temporary exemptions that are hardly founded on any objective development criteria. 
From a critical perspective, it seems that such SDTs mainly serve the purpose of expediting a 
headway with trade negotiations, rather than setting out to achieve definite development goals. 
The key argument of this thesis is that SDT provisions should be made and evaluated based on 
their ability to stimulate development according to the peculiar circumstances and needs of various 
countries at a specific time. Otherwise, the policy space constraints imposed by the WTO 
(including the limited SDT provisions) will continue to be incompatible with an objective 
understanding of the connection between trade policies, development strategies (for industrial and 
human developments), and the realisation of fundamental human rights. 
 
575 Market failure is relevant here because it is one of the major economic rationales for the use of subsidies. See 
section 4.2.1. 
576 ‘LDC Identification Criteria & Indicators | Department of Economic and Social Affairs’ (4 March 2010) 




As already demonstrated under various sections of this thesis,577 the general idea of incorporating 
SDTs into the WTO framework can be justified on the basis of human rights and political 
philosophy, as well as the five conceptual principles that form the basis of this critique. However, 
many SDT provisions suffer significant pragmatic and normative challenges, as they are either 
unenforceable or are incapable of impacting the development status of their beneficiaries. This 
normative and pragmatic problem underlines one of the main contentions of this thesis, and 
particularly the relevance of the five conceptual principles it proposes for the realisation of global 
economic justice.  
For instance, the existence of ineffectual SDT provisions, particularly in the context of local 
content subsidies, exposes the contradictions between the theoretical underpinnings of WTO law, 
on the one hand, and human rights and development concerns, on the other. It shows that 
development is not as central to the philosophy of international trade policies as much as the 
neoliberal free-trade capitalism. This is contrary to the first key conceptual principle, which 
emphasises making development the central objective of international trade. Otherwise, an 
essential economic tool that is vital for industrial and human development in certain jurisdictions 
would not have been forsaken for the sole purpose of an open market idea. Although, the Appellate 
Body in US – Tax Incentives made clear the extent of the policy space constraint on the 
implementation of local content subsidies as follows:  
Article 3.1(b) does not prohibit the subsidisation of domestic ‘production’ per se but 
rather the granting of subsidies contingent upon the ‘use’, by the subsidy recipient, 
of domestic over imported goods. Subsidies that relate to domestic production are 
therefore not, for that reason alone, prohibited under Article 3 of the SCM 
Agreement.578 
Some analysts could rely on this considerable permissibility of domestic subsidy (for all Members) 
to justify the prohibition on the policy space for local content subsidies. However, such an 
argument will not be of much help in the context of economic development for less-industrialised 
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nations for multiple reasons. Firstly, granting domestic subsidies alone is incapable of developing 
infant industries to the extent that can make them attain global competitiveness. Such subsidies 
will likely be a waste of resources if the infant industries will still have to compete against bigger, 
and perhaps subsidised, foreign or transnational corporations. It is also important to note that the 
extent of domestic subsidies that can be granted by many less-industrialised countries is minimal 
due to their limited economic and financial status. For instance, less-industrialised countries like 
Chad, Niger, Fiji or Haiti already have a limited economic capacity, and as such are incapable of 
granting any significant domestic subsidy in the first place. The most pragmatic industrial policy 
option for such countries still seems to be to implement policies to incentivise the use of target 
domestic products against well-established foreign products – as was the case in the developing 
phases of most of the industrialised countries.  
Secondly, pursuant to Article 2 of the SCM Agreement, domestic subsidies to industries are 
generally specific subsidies, and if granted, can still be subjected to unilateral countervailing 
actions, if any Member deems that the implementation of such subsidy causes an adverse effect on 
their interest.579 Therefore, the idea of domestic subsidies as an alternative to local content policies, 
such as import substitution industrialisation, is not satisfactory. Moreover, they do not serve the 
same purpose, because local content subsidies also serve the purpose of protecting vulnerable 
domestic industries from unfair competition (in addition to boosting industrial capacities). 
To solve this kind of problem, a significant reconsideration of the fundamental values upon which 
the multilateral trading regime rests upon is required. As discussed in chapter 3, development 
should be the central objective of international trade policies. The WTO’s trade policy is 
underpinned by what Dunoff describes as the “efficiency model” of Riccardo’s theory of 
comparative advantage.580 The model obdurately commits to the view that liberalised international 
trade leads to increased efficiency, which should therefore lead to increased development and 
fortune in the participating countries. On the other hand, development economists, such as Hettne, 
argued that the efficiency model had not been applied in the “pure” sense in the previous GATT 
 
579 As for developing countries, this could apply when they are above the de minimis thresholds set out in Article 
27.10 of the SCM Agreement. 
580 JL Dunoff, ‘The Death of the Trade Regime’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 733, 737. 
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of 1947,581 which also sought to enhance development and prosperity through a considerable 
reduction of trade barriers. He argued that the GATT 1947 was drafted in a Keynesian theoretical 
environment, which favoured a mixed economic model wherein governments had significant roles 
to play in guaranteeing economic stability and development. As such, development was 
understood by the drafters to be a national process in which countries are required to play a role in 
its planning and financing.582 This fundamentally differs from the prevailing neoliberal model 
which has shrunk the ability of states to implement developmental policies, and instead encourages 
total reliance on the corporation-driven global marketplace to influence development and 
prosperity. Stating the above is not an attempt to absolve the GATT of its inadequacies, but to 
point out the possibility of adopting a different economic model that would be more compatible 
with global developmental agendas. 
In terms of the theoretical lenses and the five conceptual principles discussed in chapter 3, it is 
clear that the current approach to local content subsidies is not consistent with the first suggested 
principle, i.e. that development should be the central objective of international trade. The principle 
particularly discussed the critical need to reconsider how international trade policies are thought 
about, especially with respect to the values and objectives it prioritises. In a hypothetical 
multilateral trading system that has imbibed development as its dominant objective, the policy 
dilemma of having to decide on which prevails between different competing values (such as trade 
liberalisation) and development objectives can hardly arise. In such a hypothetical system, SDT 
provisions would be designed primarily towards facilitating well-defined development and welfare 
objectives of all Members, rather than the present emphasis on their expiration date or their 
restricted operationalisation (such as Article 27.3 of the SCM Agreement). Beyond the integration 
of development as an objective of trade policy, development should also be adopted as a 
fundamental human right by the WTO, based on the UNDRD and as emphasised in the third 
conceptual principle of this thesis, which argues for the mainstreaming of human rights in 
international trade policies and agreements. Such recognition would mean that trade policies 
should not require Members to abide by policies that could exacerbate global economic inequality 
 
581 Björn Hettne, ‘Current Trends and Future Options in Development’ [2002] The Companion to Development 
Studies, Hodder Headline Group, London 8. 
582 Björn Hettne, Development Theory and the Three Worlds: Towards an International Political Economy of 
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or cause rights retrogression. The international trading system should rather aid states in 
stimulating their various development objectives, while respecting, protecting and promoting their 
social, cultural, economic, political and civil rights in advancing global social responsibility as 
discussed under the fifth conceptual principle of this thesis. 
4.5. Operationalising Development-Centred Approaches in the International Subsidies 
Regime 
The previous section demonstrates some of the inequities in the WTO subsidies regime by 
critiquing the two prohibited subsidies in the SCM Agreement (export and local content subsidies) 
through the lenses of the development-centred normative principles established in chapter 3. The 
section also entails various normative arguments on why the SCM Agreement does not adequately 
serve the interests of equity and development. In addition, it relied on economic theories, such as 
the infant industry theory, in justifying the need to reassess the existing limited space for 
developing countries to adopt policies for industrial development and other peculiar development 
priorities. With the relevance of the five normative principles to the international subsidy regime 
having been established, this section will therefore explore some pragmatic ways in which equity, 
fairness and development concerns could be better integrated or operationalised in relation to the 
regulation of subsidies in the multilateral trading system.  
Controversies as to whether the institutions overseeing the multilateral trading system, such as the 
WTO, should be concerning themselves with matters pertaining to development, human rights and 
other “non-commercial” concerns have already been well-debated.583 It may now be considered 
unfashionable to stick to the old argument that the main objective of the trading institutions is trade 
liberalisation as opposed to development. However, while the argument in favour of development 
as a major trade objective has gained considerable prominence at the conceptual level, these ideas 
are still yet to be properly translated into practice, as this thesis has demonstrated through the 
analysis of trade policies and agreements. In essence, the operationalisation of development 
concerns in WTO practice is still largely underdeveloped.  
 
583 See section 3.2.6 for a brief insight on this controversy. 
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This thesis reiterates that not only does it consider development and some other so-called “non-
economic/commercial” social issues, such as human rights, as essential concerns of the trading 
institutions, it also considers them as the primary value upon which the multilateral trading system 
and its institutions should operate. Otherwise, the IEIs will continue to face the persistent dilemma 
of having to settle endless contentions between development objectives and other values. This 
situation has also been consistently stated as the major factor hampering the attainment of most of 
the SDGs.584 In this interest, the next section will rely on legal and normative arguments to propose 
practical measures that could improve the equitable nature of the subsidy regime. This thesis 
specifically proposes the introduction of a special category of subsidy as a means to integrate 
development-centred principles in the SCM Agreement. This proposal will also require the 
amendment of the SCM Agreement. 
4.5.1. The Establishment of Non-Actionable Developmental Subsidies 
In the WTO discourse, issues pertaining to development are hardly conceived outside the scope of 
SDTs. This magnifies the perception that development concerns are mostly discussed as 
exceptions to the general trading rule as opposed to being treated as part of the mainstream policy. 
Operationalising the first of the five conceptual principles discussed in chapter 3 in relation to 
subsidies,585 therefore requires integrating development principles into the mainstream provisions 
of the agreements. This thesis, therefore, proposes that one practical way of advancing a 
development-consistent subsidies regime is by establishing a third category of subsidy, in addition 
to the existing prohibited and actionable subsidies, to be known as the non-actionable 
developmental subsidies (NADS). The NADS would share minor similarities with the elapsed 
non-actionable subsidies in Article 8 of the SCM Agreement. However, they will significantly 
differ in terms of their nature, scope, and underlying purpose.  
The proposed NADS are significantly inspired by the infant industry economic theory, which 
serves as a rationale to protect infant industries against external competitive pressures until they 
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mature and develop to such an extent that they can conveniently rival their foreign competitors.586 
The practicality and credibility of the theory have been pointed out in different sections of this 
chapter, particularly as adopted by both developed and some developing countries. The most recent 
successful example of the implementation of policies based on the infant industry theory is its 
radical application by some East Asian countries.587 Furthermore, the NADS is also inspired by the 
need to accomplish certain essential human rights and development objectives, especially as 
enshrined in various human rights instruments that acknowledge economic, social and cultural 
rights. This would also be in consonance with the UN SDG goals and the stated objectives of many 
international bodies to eradicate poverty and promote shared prosperity. While some of these 
considerations might be considered as irrelevant to some, such as the economic and legal 
positivists, because they are largely categorised as non-economic values, this thesis emphasises 
(as already argued in multiple sections) that such considerations should be the primary and most 
essential goals of the trading system. Another apparent motivation for the idea of NADS is because 
the current provisions that were formulated to tackle development concerns in the SCM Agreement 
(mainly contained in Article 27 as SDTs) have not satisfactorily served the purpose of their 
supposed development objectives. This is notwithstanding the fact that Article 27 also recognises 
that “subsidies may play an important role in economic development programmes of developing 
country Members”. 
4.5.1.2. The Idea of the Non-Actionable Developmental Subsidies 
Before exploring the details of how the NADS should operate, it is essential that its objectives are 
well defined. This is because this thesis opines that most of the current development provisions 
(mostly in form of SDTs) in the WTO Agreements are normatively and pragmatically deficient 
partially because of their lack of definite development purpose. This thesis argues that the specific 
development objectives of the provisions that are aimed at advancing development purposes 
should be made explicit in order for them to serve as an objective guide for the formulation, 
implementation and adjudication of the relevant provisions. This may be capable of reducing the 
usual inconsistencies that exist between the current SDT provisions and actual development goals. 
 
586 It is often cited that the infant industry theory was developed by two economists: Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich 
List. 
587 See section 4.4.1.3 for discussion on the “East Asian Miracle”. 
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For instance, if a definite development objective had guided the drafting of certain SDT provisions, 
there would hardly be any credible development basis to justify the general time limits usually 
imposed on all classes of developing countries without the consideration of their specific 
development needs. Also, it is most unlikely that the SCM Committee would decide to phase out 
the practice of granting extensions to certain developing countries for the use of EPZs, as discussed 
under section 4.4.1.3. Similarly, this could also have positive implications for the Panel and the 
Appellate Body when they are faced with the dilemma of declaring subsidies that are clearly aimed 
at promoting environmental sustainability, which is a legitimate development concern, as 
inconsistent with the WTO laws.588 Thus, stating the specific development goal of every 
development-focused provision unambiguously would also advance the transparency requirement 
which was discussed as the fourth conceptual principle for the realisation of global economic 
fairness in section 3.5.4. It would also consistently commit the minds of trade policymakers and 
negotiators to the fact that the trade policies are to be premised on certain ideas and objectives 
which are required to be accomplished as part of the customary legal obligation to co-operate in 
the realisation of development. Finally, a clearly defined development objective will also serve as 
a basis through which activists, academics, NGOs, and other pressure groups may evaluate the 
consistency of trade policies with their development agenda, in advancing the transparency of the 
process.  
In the context of the proposed NADS, its foremost objective should be how it can enable 
developing countries to develop their domestic industries to such an extent that they can compete 
against other competitors. As earlier stated, this objective is founded on the infant industry 
economic theory and its connection to industrial development. As such, provisions that aim to 
facilitate this objective must be practical enough to achieve this end, without hindrances such as 
time limitations, lack of enforceability, or other impediments that could render this objective 
unattainable. This would also mean that the development objective should be considered above 
other competing values, especially trade liberalisation. Trade liberalisation is specifically 
mentioned here because a closer observation of the SDT provisions in the SCM Agreement would 
easily reveal that trade liberalisation objectives are treated as the ultimate end, while the 
 
588 See for example, Appellate Body Reports, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation 
Sector / Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program, WT/DS412/AB/R / WT/DS426/AB/R (2013). 
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development-focused provisions are mere interim measures. It would only be appropriate and more 
development-consistent if the termination of development-centred provisions is determined by the 
accomplishment of their development objectives, rather than arbitrary time limitations that do not 
take into account if the problems they seek to remedy still subsist. 
Beyond the justification of NADS on the basis of the infant industry measures and industrial 
development, another central objective of the proposed NADS is to advance a subsidy regime that 
grants sufficient policy space for the implementation of strategies that can aid other essential socio-
economic development goals, such as poverty alleviation, education, food security, regional 
development, employment, research and development, environmental sustainability, and other 
similar major development concerns to both developed and developing nations. Some are regarded 
as human rights (in the economic and social rights context), and they also form the basis for the 
RTD. This objective is also in conformity with the third conceptual principle discussed in section 
3.5.4, which advocates the mainstreaming of human rights in international trade policies and 
agreements. Also, all these concerns form part of the UN’s 2030 SDGs, which have been officially 
described as “an urgent call for action by all countries - developed and developing - in a global 
partnership”.589 
4.5.1.3. Characteristics of the Non-Actionable Developmental Subsidies  
As the name suggests, the ambition of this proposed class of subsidy is to shield (or limit in some 
cases) the usage of certain kinds of subsidies from potential countervailing actions. This would 
mean that subsidies that fit into this classification would be deemed as non-specific within the 
meaning of Article 2 of the SCM Agreement. It would also mean that subsidies that qualify under 
this category would be exempted from the general prohibition and actionability of subsidies under 
Article 3 and Part III of the SCM Agreement respectively. The NADS would exist for the sole 
purpose of properly defined and justifiable development objectives, and it is aimed to guarantee 
sufficient policy space for Members that wish to implement such subsidies for the exclusive 
purpose of legitimate development goals. Furthermore, subsidies under the NADS category are 
not intended to be perpetually applicable to Members that qualify for its usage. Instead, they are 
 
589 ‘The 17 Goals | Sustainable Development’ <https://sdgs.un.org/goals> accessed 30 April 2021. 
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only intended to be implementable until such time when the market failure or the development 
concern they seek to remedy ceases to exist or becomes irrelevant. 
Unlike the expired non-actionable subsidy category that existed only for three specified kinds of 
subsidies (i.e., certain research-related subsidies, regional subsidies, and environment-related 
subsidies), NADS is proposed to encompass a combination of some specified kinds of subsidies 
and unspecified ones. The specified ones would be of two categories – those that would be 
generally applicable to all Members regardless of their development status for critical global 
development intervention (hereinafter referred to as ‘general NADS’ (G-NADS)), and the second 
category of specified NADS, which would only be applicable to Members of certain development 
status for peculiar needs (hereinafter referred to as ‘specific NADS’ (S-NADS)). Furthermore, the 
third category of NADS is the unspecified NADS (U-NADS), which would be determined 
according to the pressing development needs of specific Members. The purpose for having an 
unspecified category is to provide some flexibility which can accommodate the varying developing 
interests of different Members. Insights will be provided for each of these categories below. 
As for G-NADS, this class of NADS is aimed at tackling development-related issues that are of 
pressing concern to all Members, notwithstanding their development categorisation. This is in 
acknowledgement of the fact that some development matters are equally concerning to all 
Members, and there is need for global co-operation in resolving them. It is also in 
acknowledgement of the fact that developed jurisdictions could also be constrained from 
implementing adequate policies to tackle such development challenges, just as their developing 
counterparts. Such pressing matters of global concern would have to be determined from time to 
time based on credible studies establishing their importance.  
As an example, this thesis proposes that due to the fact that environmental sustainability is a 
universal and urgent development concern that leaves no section of the planet out, it is essential 
that the SCM Agreement classifies subsidies that are aimed at achieving environmental 
sustainability (otherwise known as “green subsidies”) as G-NADS, which would be applicable to 
all Members without exception. The universal importance attached to environmental subsidies is 
based on the numerous academic, scientific, and policy documents that emphasise the imminent 
problems affecting the planet, and the need for swift and pragmatic policies to reverse the status 
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quo.590 However, as the WTO jurisprudence currently stands, the policy space to implement 
environmental development strategies is significantly constrained through the prohibition or 
actionability of certain types of subsidies in the SCM Agreement. It is also controversial if the 
general exceptions of the GATT (which could create some exceptions to derogate from the strict 
interpretation of the SCM Agreement) could be relied upon to implement environmental 
development policies through subsidies. This is partly because the wording of the provision of 
GATT Article XX (on general exceptions) reads “nothing in this Agreement” which is held to have 
restricted its applicability to other WTO agreements. The Panel held in China – Renewable Energy 
that GATT Article XX (on general exceptions) cannot be invoked to justify WTO breaches in non-
GATT agreements except if the provision has been expressly integrated into the Agreement.591 
Alas, the SCM Agreement does not expressly provide for general exceptions. Although, some 
authors such as Rubini have expressed that the requirement to expressly stipulate the applicability 
of the general exceptions in every WTO agreement as imposed by the Panel is “unduly restrictive 
and, most importantly, clearly wrong under general principles of interpretation”.592 Likewise, some 
also argue that the decision of the Appellate Body in China—Audiovisual Entertainment 
Products,593 where it was held that Article XX of the GATT could apply to China’s Protocol of 
Accession, serves as an indication that Article XX could be applicable beyond the scope of just 
the GATT.594  
Notwithstanding the legal debates on this issue, this thesis opines that matters of extreme 
development urgency, such as environmental sustainability, should never be primarily discussed 
within the context of exceptions, or left to the uncertain outcome of quasi-judicial interpretations. 
 
590 See generally, Angelica Rutherford, ‘The Applicability of the Law of the WTO to Green Energy Security’ in 
Angelica Rutherford (ed), Energy Security and Green Energy: National Policies and the Law of the WTO (Springer 
International Publishing 2020). 
591 Panel Report, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/ DS394/R, 
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592 Luca Rubini, ‘Ain’t Wastin’ Time No More: Subsidies for Renewable Energy, The SCM Agreement, Policy Space, 
and Law Reform’ (2012) 15 Journal of International Economic Law 525, 565. 
593 Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain 
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594 See generally, Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Squaring Free Trade in Culture with Chinese Censorship: The WTO Appellate 
Body Report on China - Audiovisuals Case Note’ (2010) 11 Melbourne Journal of International Law 119; Paolo D 
Farah and Elena Cima, ‘Energy Trade and the WTO: Implications for Renewable Energy and the OPEC Cartel’ (2013) 
16 Journal of International Economic Law 707. 
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This controversy re-echoes this thesis’s first and third conceptual principles that advocate the 
centralisation and mainstreaming of development and human rights concerns into the main body 
of WTO rules and policies. It is incumbent, as a matter of development as a value, that the SCM 
Agreement does not continue to be a clog in the wheel of the implementation of subsidies that are 
aimed at promoting environmental sustainability. This also significantly forms the basis of the fifth 
conceptual principle which advocates for global social responsibility on such matters. 
It must be emphasised that the kinds of subsidies mentioned under the various categories of NADS 
are not intended to be exhaustive. This thesis favours a flexible subsidies/trade regime where 
development policies could be implemented without difficulty when most needed, provided that 
they are in conformity with reasonable and objective criteria to be determined by a committee of 
relevant development experts. For instance, another kind of subsidy that could be considered under 
G-NADS, other than green subsidies, are subsidies that are aimed at addressing global health 
emergencies, like the COVID-19 pandemic. It goes without saying that the protection of human 
lives and health are at the core of human rights and development concerns – and they should 
necessarily trump other competing economic values, according to the conceptual principles that 
form the basis of this critique. Possible subsidy issues that could be associated with global health 
concerns include the actionability of research and development subsidies for vaccines (or possible 
cure) and export support by governments. However, if such subsidies are protected under the G-
NADS category, the fact that research and development for industrial purposes could be actionable 
or that export subsidies are generally prohibited would be immaterial in the context of those 
specified subject matters.  
As for the S-NADS, the objective of this category is to ensure policy space for industrial strategies 
that have been proven to be essential for less-industrialised countries to attain export 
competitiveness, based on the infant industry theory. This category would entirely prevent (or limit 
in some cases) the use of countervailing actions against subsidies that are specified under this 
group for less-industrialised jurisdictions. For example, the importance of some types of export 
subsidies (such as EPZs) and local content subsidies to the industrial development of less-
industrialised jurisdictions have been discussed in sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. Various development 
economists, as earlier cited in different sections of this chapter, have also emphasised the 
impracticality of less-industrialised countries to attain an improved development and economic 
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status without the policy space to implement those kinds of subsidies.595 As such, it is proposed 
that S-NADS should comprise export subsidies, local content subsidies, and any other kind of 
subsidy that could be relevant in achieving the above stated objective, based on objective, 
transparent and credible economic and development findings.  
The extent to which the S-NADS categorisation should protect its beneficiaries from 
countervailing actions should vary depending on the development levels of countries. LDCs, for 
instance, should be entirely protected from countervailing measures, when they adopt any of the 
policies within the S-NADS category. This is premised on the assumption that LDCs are not 
economically strong enough to implement trade policies that could reasonably hurt the 
development interests of other Members in the global marketplace. As for other developing 
countries, the extent of their ability to implement S-NADS for development purposes and the 
limitation of their exposure to countervailing actions should vary based on their development 
levels. The current development classification of the WTO, which ranks various countries of 
extreme economic and development disparity as “developing countries”, would most likely be 
unhelpful for a pragmatic development policy. Thus, the threshold for individual developing 
countries could be set according to their Gross National Income per capita (GNI per capita)596 or 
even their Human Development Index (HDI).597 For instance, the World Bank’s categorisation of 
countries based on GNI per capita may be adopted (or modified) in deciding the various limits or 
extent to which countries may adopt the S-NADS.598  
As for the last category of NADS, which is the U-NADS, the kind of subsidies that would operate 
under this class would be determined according to the most pressing development needs and 
objectives of various less-industrialised jurisdictions. The purport of the U-NADS is to create 
sufficient flexibility for Members of various industrial and development interests to introduce 
 
595 Chang (n 425). 
596 The GNI per capita is preferred above the GDP by organisations like the World Bank and used by the EU to 
calculate the contribution of member nations, because it focuses on income rather that output, and therefore, 
considered as a better measure for economic well-being. 
597 The HDI is the most preferred to development economists and primarily guides the policies of the UNDP, because 
in addition to GNI per capita which gives a hint on the standard of living, it is also composed of other socio-economic 
development factors, such as life expectancy and education. 
598 The World Bank categorised countries based on GNI per capita into higher income (12,536 USD or more), upper 
middle income (4,046 USD - 12,535 USD), lower middle income (1,036 USD - 4,045 USD), and low income (1,035 
USD or less). 
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subsidies that are relevant to their development goals. Thus, unlike G-NADS and S-NADS that 
both have specified kinds of subsidies for specific objectives, U-NADS should be determined 
according to the national development priorities of relevant Members. This would be consistent 
with mainstream development views that countries’ development needs and policies are best 
understood and implemented by domestic policymakers as opposed to opinions of foreign experts. 
This would also be consistent with the fourth conceptual principle that argues for equality of 
participation and transparency in the policy making process. Furthermore, the burden of 
establishing the development need(s) that would require the implementation of a subsidy policy 
that is intended to be protected under the U-NADS would be upon the Member seeking to adopt 
such subsidy measure. This would mean that the permissibility of certain kinds of subsidies for 
one developing jurisdiction would not necessarily entitle others to implement such subsidy 
measures. Otherwise, it would be almost impossible to conceive an equitable subsidies regime 
where the rules would realistically accommodate the development objectives of large developing 
countries like Brazil, China, India, landlocked countries like Chad and Nepal, and small islands 
such as Samoa and St Lucia. 
This thesis’s proposal on limiting countervailing actions for developing countries shares some 
similarity with what Lee termed “development facilitation subsidies” (DFS).599 However, while 
NADS shares a similar objective with DFS in terms of their commitment to development in the 
subsidy regime, the two proposals significantly vary in terms of scope, beneficiaries, and 
categorisation. Among the differences between DFS and NADS is the fact that Lee’s conception 
of development agenda is limited to only developing countries, which gives no room for matters 
of universal development concern that are covered under G-NADS.600 Similarly, DFS seems to 
focus mainly on the prohibition on export subsidies and import substitution subsidies under Article 
3 of the SCM Agreement.  
In conclusion, the goal of this chapter is to demonstrate how an equitable and development centred 
policy can be incorporated and operationalised in the SCM Agreement. NADS represents a 
conceptual sketch of how such policies could be integrated into the subsidies regime. However, it 
 
599 Lee (n 541) 948–953. 
600 This thesis differs with Lee on his view that development policies like the DFS are only relevant to developing 
countries. See ibid 951. 
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must be emphasised that much of the detail in terms of the kind of subsidies that should be under 
the various categories and the threshold for countries of different levels of development would be 
open for deliberations, and particularly, to the competence of development experts, economists, 




5.0. FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND GENERAL CONCLUSION 
In chapter two, this thesis relied on the combination of historical, economic, and legal analyses to 
establish the inherent unfairness of the international economic order. Thereafter, it proposed five 
equity and development-centred conceptual principles that were distilled from the theoretical 
lenses of the RTD, global distributive justice, and TWAIL, as normative remedies that can 
facilitate the realisation of fairness in the global economic order in chapter three. Furthermore, this 
thesis normatively critiqued aspects of the international subsidies regime, being the case study, 
through the five conceptual principles, with substantive proposals to improve the SCM Agreement. 
This chapter will therefore conclude the thesis by providing two broad-based recommendations on 
how the development-centred concerns, particularly the conceptual principles, can be 
operationalised in WTO agreements and adjudicatory processes in general. Specifically, section 
5.1 explores the concept of grundnorm in relation to international trade law, with the aim of 
proposing how the development-centred principles may be adopted as superior legal norms against 
which the validity of trade agreements, policies, and other competing legal norms can be assessed. 
Furthermore, due to this thesis’s multiples criticisms of the SDT provisions contained in various 
WTO agreements, Section 5.2 provides some final thoughts on how the SDT provisions can be 
improved and operationalised to serve actual development objectives. Finally, section 5.3 provides 
the general conclusion of the thesis. 
5.1. The Adjudication of Development Concerns in the WTO Context – Exploring the 
Concept of Grundnorm 
It is one thing to have clearly articulated provisions, such as NADS, for the advancement of 
development concerns in the SCM Agreement. It is, however, another hurdle for the development 
objective(s) of the provision to be acknowledged, or even taken into proper consideration while 
adjudicating such relevant provisions. This has been a consistent issue with the WTO dispute 
settlement bodies, especially in relation to the interpretation of SDT provisions. As already pointed 
out in multiple sections of this thesis, case law has rendered many SDT provisions (which serve 
as the main approach to development in WTO Agreements) non-operational on different grounds. 
Such grounds include the use of hortatory expressions by the drafters of the agreements or the 
mere fact that the implementation of such SDT provision is impractical in the view of the WTO 
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adjudicatory bodies.601 Many other SDTs have simply elapsed, because they were only applicable 
for a limited period, even where the development problems they were enacted to solve are still 
present. This thesis strongly opines that these development-unfavourable stances occur largely 
because of the normative value that underlies how the adjudicators conceive trade relations. 
Without a doubt, the prevailing approach of the policies and adjudications emanating from the 
neo-liberal inspired international trading regime favours trade liberalisation above other normative 
values. Therefore, as exemplified in multiple cases and policies analysed in this thesis, conflicts 
that arise between the liberalisation of trade and other values like development and human rights 
are mostly settled in favour of the former.602 This prevailing approach is the basis of this thesis’s 
divergence with the IEO. Therefore, this thesis proposes that the equity and development centred 
normative approaches, as expressed through the five conceptual principles for the realisation of 
economic justice in section 3.5, can be operationalised through their recognition as the grundnorm 
of the international economic and trade law, and particularly the WTO adjudicatory bodies.603 To 
restate, the five conceptual principles are the adoption of development (both in its theoretical and 
human rights forms) as the central objective of international trade; the reimagination and 
operationalisation of the idea of differential treatment in trade policies; mainstreaming human 
rights in international trade policies and agreements; entrenching the ideals of equality of 
participation and transparency in international trade negotiations; and the expansion of global 
social responsibility which should promote mechanisms to ensure that participants in the 
international economic/business relations imbibe ethical values that would eliminate practices that 
hurt vulnerable humans and the environment. 
The concept of a grundnorm – basic norm –604 is generally understood as the underlying legal 
principle or normative value against which all other legal norms can be assessed (akin to the 
concept of first principles in philosophy). It is the fundamental principle in which every legal 
 
601 For discussions on the limitations of the SDT provisions, see sections 2.4.2 and 3.5.2. 
602 For instance, the policy of the Subsidies Committee to phase out its practice of granting extensions to developing 
countries for the use of EPZs, or multiple decisions where the Panel or Appellate Body have refused to uphold SDT 
provisions in reliance on different technical justifications. 
603 This idea has been suggested in section 3.2.6 and 3.5.3 of this thesis. 
604 Translated from German. 
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enactment, regulation, or policy mirror to test their validity.605 In essence, the concept of 
grundnorm establishes a hierarchical legal order in which certain legal notions, derived from and 
justified by normative concepts, are considered superior to all other legal norms and provisions. 
Therefore, any legal provision or policy that conflicts with the grundnorm, even if duly enacted 
by a competent authority, would still be declared null and void to the extent of its inconsistency. 
Examples of basic norms that sometimes operate as the grundnorm in today’s context, particularly 
in national legal systems, include the rule of law, the idea of justice, and human rights. While the 
concept of grundnorm is usually associated with the Austrian legal philosopher, Hans Kelsen, the 
formulation of the idea (in the European legal philosophy) can be ascribed to Immanuel Kant (even 
though he did not specifically use the term) in his work titled The Metaphysics of Morals (which 
commenced with a treatise on the philosophy of law).606 Unlike Kelsen’s idea which is grounded 
in legal positivism, and therefore perceives the grundnorm as an epistemological premise, Kant’s 
idea of the basic norm differs in the sense that he postulates that all positive laws ought to be 
grounded in “natural” norms of general acceptance and reasonableness (Vernunft) in order to 
prevent arbitrariness (Willkür). Thus, only norms that can be assumed to reflect a reasonably 
defined common interest can be defined as the basic norm, according to Kant’s perspective. In 
relating this to the argument of development and human rights as the grundnorm of the 
international economic and trade law from the Kantian premise, one could rest on the assumption 
that the global cooperation for development and the obligation to commit to respecting and 
protecting the survival of humanity and even the planet through trade policies is a dictate of reason 
(Gebot der Vernunft) and general acceptance (allgemeine Gültigkeit). Since the Kantian 
perspective seems to emphasise the prevalence of common interest based on reasonableness and 
general acceptance, it is unlikely that a reasonable person would deny the significance of 
development and human right concerns above pure commercial interests. 
An example could also be drawn from domestic legal systems, in which a number of values have 
been suggested as their grundnorm – most of which have been incorporated into the body of 
positive laws like national constitutions. Prominent examples in most liberal constitutional 
 
605 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (University of California Press 1967); See also Uta Bindreiter, Why 
Grundnorm?: A Treatise on the Implications of Kelsen’s Doctrine, vol 58 (Springer Science & Business Media 2002). 
606 Bindreiter (n 605) 15. 
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democracies include provisions on certain fundamental human rights. Fundamental human rights 
provisions in many jurisdictions have been incorporated into constitutions, and as such rank higher 
above any other parliamentary legislation or government policies. Therefore, any contradiction of 
such constitutionally guaranteed human rights by any other law of parliament or government 
policy is considered a constitutional violation, subject only to the justified and proportional 
limitations usually specified by the constitutions themselves. This is a well-established practice in 
countries like Germany, India, Nigeria, or the United States, where laws or executive policies can 
be challenged in courts and declared null and void on the basis of their violation of the 
constitutional provisions.607 
In the international law context, some of such norms have also been a subject of academic 
discourse, such as human rights, rule of law, justice, and even environmental sustainability. 
Different authors have written to advance the grundnorm theory in different contexts of 
international law. For instance, Mendes and Voigt have written on the idea of human rights608 and 
the rule of law609 respectively as the grundnorm of international law. Similarly, Kim and 
Bosselmann have also argued for the adoption of ecological integrity as the grundnorm of 
international law, in advancing their position on the operationalisation of sustainable 
development.610 In following a similar pattern, this thesis also argues that development and human 
rights, as opposed to trade liberalisation, should be recognised and upheld as the grundnorm of 
international economic and trade law. As a default law, development and human rights as the 
grundnorm of the WTO would guide and underpin the interpretation of existing WTO Agreements 
and the creation of subsequent policies. As a fundamental adjudicatory norm, it would help build 
a systemic relationship between trade agreements and policies by envisaging them as part of the 
shared purpose. Also, the express proclamation of specific norms as the grundnorm of the 
international trading system would also limit the scholarly contentions on whether the international 
 
607 See, Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, Article 93(1); Constitution of India, Section 13; Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Section 1(3); Constitution of the United States of America, Article VI, Clause 2. 
608 Errol P Mendes, Global Governance, Human Rights and International Law: Combating the Tragic Flaw 
(Routledge 2014). 
609 Christina Voigt, Rule of Law for Nature: New Dimensions and Ideas in Environmental Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2013) 75. 
610 Rakhyun E Kim and Klaus Bosselmann, ‘Operationalizing Sustainable Development: Ecological Integrity as a 




economic and trade law is entirely autonomous from other international legal rules. Those who 
opine that international trade law is not entirely autonomous of the general international legal rules 
mostly do so in order to integrate important international legal instruments, such as human rights 
and environmental protection treaties, into the trading rule. But the express adoption of those 
intended principles as grundnorm would limit the relevance of such debate, especially between the 
American and European international economic law scholars. 
Development and human rights can be integrated as the grundnorm of international trade relations 
through various means. One possible means is by expressly integrating a clause in WTO 
agreements, akin to the supremacy clauses in some domestic constitutions,611 which will establish 
these norms as the most fundamental values in which no agreement or policy should contravene. 
Such a clause could be referred to as the ‘Development Supremacy Clause’ (DSC). By implication, 
the DSC would empower the adjudicatory body to prioritise development concerns while 
interpreting WTO agreements, especially when faced with a competing norm. A draft example of 
a potential DSC could read as follows:  
Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted to contravene fundamental 
development concerns as understood by the United Nations Declaration on the Right 
to Development and as amplified by the United Nations Agenda on Sustainable 
Development and other extant human rights instruments, particularly the 
international bill of rights. Any conflict arising between the express provisions of 
this Agreement and such development concerns, especially which has the proven 
capacity to negatively impact the Human Development Index (HDI) of any Member 
directly or indirectly, shall be settled in favour of the latter, and such inconsistent 
provision shall be null and void to the extent of its inconsistency. 
The understanding of development according to the UNDRD is adopted here because it remains 
the major international instrument that recognises development as both a process and human right 
and expressly acknowledges and incorporates other major human rights instruments such as the 
 
611 A supremacy clause is generally understood as a provision, usually in written constitutions, which establishes the 
priority of constitutional provisions or other enactments over other legislation.  
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Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.612 Also, this thesis 
adopts the HDI as the measure to determine the impact of policies on development because it has 
been adjudged, notwithstanding its limitations, as one of the most accurate measures of 
determining economic and welfare development. This is also the measure adopted by most 
development economists and the UNDP, as opposed to other measures like the GDP. It is described 
as a summary measure of the average achievement in crucial aspects of human development, which 
include long and healthy life, access to knowledge, and a decent standard of living.613 The UNDP 
states that this measure was created in order to “emphasise that people and their capabilities should 
be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth alone”.614 
This measure also appears to be in more conformity with the ambition of global justice and the 
human right to development which places humans as its central object. Furthermore, this kind of 
measure is especially important considering the abundant empirical studies that have established 
the link between trade policies and development outcomes such as global poverty, employment, 
technology, education, life expectancy, and other fundamental concerns.615 
A provision like the DSC can either be enshrined in all WTO agreements or expressed in a special 
agreement that would be made binding on other specific agreements. However, the potential 
problem with the latter is that a situation could arise where the applicability of such agreement to 
another could be challenged. This is similar to the current controversy on the applicability of the 
GATT provisions on the “general exceptions” to the SCM Agreement, mainly because the SCM 
Agreement did not expressly adopt the general exceptions. Alternatively, the DSU could also be 
amended to include the DSC in a manner that would be accordingly adapted for a general purpose, 
just as Article 3.2 of the DSU empowers adjudicatory bodies to interpret the WTO agreements in 
accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public international law. 
 
612 UNDRD, Preambular paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
613 ‘Human Development Index (HDI) | Human Development Reports’ <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-
development-index-hdi> accessed 30 April 2021. 
614 ibid. 
615 For example, see, Antony Davies and Gary Quinlivan, ‘A Panel Data Analysis of the Impact of Trade on Human 
Development’ (2006) 35 The Journal of Socio-Economics 868. 
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Overall, the crux of this thesis’s recommendation to recognise and integrate the five conceptual 
principles as the grundnorm of international trade law is to ensure that the current problems 
associated with development provisions, which have been rendered non-operational, are reduced, 
if not totally eliminated. At the moment, the pathways that could be relied upon in arguing 
development and human rights concerns, especially in the context of the SCM Agreement, are 
inadequate and not satisfactorily authoritative. For instance, while the DSU empowers to adopt the 
customary rules of interpretation, which by extension includes the adoption of a purposive 
approach for the interpretation of treaties as provided for under Article 31 of Vienna Convention 
on the Laws of Treaties, the lack of adequate affirmations of development as the basic norm of the 
WTO leads to development-unfavourable interpretations of many development-focused provisions 
in WTO Agreements.616 Thus, an unequivocal affirmation and adoption of development and human 
rights as the grundnorm of WTO law will not only improve the adjudicatory process in favour of 
development concerns but would also further advance the systemic integration of Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in the WTO jurisprudence. Similarly, controversies 
such as over the applicability of the general exceptions to green subsidies, in light of the Panel’s 
interpretation in Canada – Renewable Energy should no longer be an issue in a regime that has 
adopted development as its grundnorm. In the wider UN context, this would also reduce the 
tensions between WTO trade policies and some of the SDGs. 
5.2. Concluding Thoughts on Special and Differential Treatment Provisions 
Notwithstanding their normative and pragmatic inadequacies, SDT provisions remain the main 
method through which development concerns for developing countries are expressed and 
implemented in WTO law. The general idea of differential treatment for countries that are less 
well-off in the global distribution of economic benefits is justifiable under the global difference 
theory, the RTD and the TWAIL approach, which underscore the conceptual principles upon 
which this chapter is critiqued. Particularly, the second conceptual principle for the realisation of 
global economic justice, as suggested in section 3.5.2 of this thesis, emphasises the need to 
operationalise the SDT provisions in order to guarantee a fair and equitable international trading 
 
616 For example, see Section 4.4.1.1 for this thesis’s argument that the development purpose of Article 27.2(b) of the 
SCM Agreement was not adequately considered by the Panel in India – Export Related Measures. 
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system. However, while the general idea of SDT appears to be a suitable tool towards the 
realisation of development objectives, its implementation in the WTO has been unable to address 
fundamental issues, such as inequity in the trading system, unbalanced rules where the cost of 
implementing the trade rules have been higher than the benefits for many developing countries, 
the incapacity of many developing nations to adequately participate in the trading system, among 
other issues. Also, multiple SDT provisions and their interpretation have been criticised in different 
sections of this thesis for their inability to realise their expected development functions. Moreover, 
one of the major constraints that impeded the progress of the Doha Round was how to address the 
demands of developing countries for more effective SDT provisions. This is despite the fact that 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration affirmed the importance of SDT provisions by stating that SDT 
provisions are an integral part of the WTO agreements, and it even called for a review of the SDT 
provisions with the objective of “strengthening them and making them more precise and 
operational”.617 There are already abundant economic, political, legal and philosophical proposals 
on why and how to improve the SDT provisions – many of which have been discussed under 
various sections of this thesis. But this section will briefly emphasise some germane points for the 
improvement of SDT provisions.  
Firstly, there is the need to ensure that SDT provisions are enacted to work towards achieving 
defined development objectives, through which the success of the policies can be evaluated. A 
significant number of SDT policies are not justifiable when evaluated through any credible and 
objective development lens. They seem to have been reluctantly included in the agreements in 
order to persuade Members with the most pressing development interests to adopt the agreements 
without hindrance. Drafting SDT provisions with defined development objectives in mind would 
not only guide the policymakers towards enacting more reasonable and practical development 
policies but would also show their genuine commitment towards development concerns – which 
could improve the legitimacy and transparency of the multilateral trading system, at least in the 
view of most developing countries. For instance, SDT provisions in the context of the SCM 
Agreement should specifically aim to facilitate the development of its beneficiaries’ infant 
industries and remove the clogs that could hinder the attainment of their global competitiveness. 
 
617 Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration, para 44. 
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As such, temporary SDT policies that do not take into consideration whether any development 
progress has been achieved as a result of the policy upon their expiration are arguably not drafted 
with the aim of attaining specific development goals. Otherwise, the status quo will only continue 
to affirm the central argument of the proponents of the dependency economic theory that the poorer 
countries’ integration into the global economic order and the policies imposed upon them would 
only continue to keep them in a position where their only comparative advantage in the global 
value chain would perpetually be raw materials and cheap labour.618 
Secondly, the improvement of SDT provisions and other development concerns should not only 
be considered when it becomes a subject of protest at the level of trade negotiations, there is the 
need for the trading system to establish and strengthen both internal and external mechanisms for 
the advancement as well as evaluation of the success or failure of development policies. This would 
serve as appropriate checks and balances to ensure the proper observation of development concerns 
against other competing interests. While the WTO already has the Committee on Trade and 
Development with five main mandates that seek to ensure beneficial participation of developing 
countries and LDCs,619 this thesis proposes that the committee’s mandate should be enlarged in 
order for them to be actively involved in the negotiation and policymaking processes. Thus, their 
mandate should not only be limited to a “periodical review” of development-unfavourable policies 
after they have been implemented and would then require bureaucratic processes to revoke. 
Beyond the internal mechanisms like the Trade and Development Committee, external bodies, 
such as NGOs that are dedicated to various aspects of international development works, need to 
be involved in the WTO negotiations and policymaking processes. This would also help the WTO 
to improve on its transparency and public accountability, which has already been alleged as 
“probably the most non-transparent of international organisations”.620 Participation of NGOs is 
particularly important for the advancement of development concerns as the UN described them as 
“catalytic elements in the realization of the right to development”.621 This would also be an 
appropriate path towards fulfilling the objectives of the 4th and 5th conceptual principles of this 
 
618 See section 2.3 of this thesis for discussion on the dependency theory. 
619 See WTO Committee on Trade and Development – Decision by the General Council on 31 January 1995, WT/L/46. 
620 ‘Transparency, Participation, and Legitimacy of the WTO’ <https://twn.my/title/legit-cn.htm> accessed 30 April 
2021. 
621 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/21 (1994), para 38 (c). 
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thesis, which emphasise the need for transparency and the improvement of the social responsibility 
of private actors in the multilateral trading system. 
Thirdly, there is the critical need to reconsider the development categorisation of countries in 
which the WTO currently operates. The generalised categorisation of countries of significantly 
diverse economic capabilities as “developing countries” also hinders the successful negotiation of 
appropriate development needs for countries with specific pressing development needs. The 
development policies, including SDT provisions, should be designed in a way that is consistent 
with the peculiar circumstances and development priorities of Members. One does not require 
much grounding in economics to realise the significant distinction between China and Angola, and 
the fact that their development priorities and required approaches would significantly differ. The 
current generalised classification of developing countries, which includes countries that are 
substantially industrialised and globally competitive in some industries, also contribute to 
negotiation deadlocks that are usually detrimental to the development of the less-industrialised 
developing countries.  
Notwithstanding all the above, this thesis opines that discussions about development in the WTO 
should not only be restricted to the effectiveness of SDT provisions. While SDT could be a 
valuable tool to achieve development goals, it is only one of the various ways through which 
development concerns can be integrated into the trading system. Also, limiting the discussion on 
development to the improvement of SDTs alone relegates the importance of development to the 
status of a mere exception to the general rule or a postscript. As Ismail describes, “development is 
thus regarded as an afterthought, as a nice to do, or at worst an optional extra”.622 Instead, 
development concerns, such as poverty, starvation, and unemployment, should be mainstreamed 
into the main body of rules and policies of the WTO agreements.  
5.3. General Conclusion 
This research converges both theoretical/normative analysis, on the one hand, and the critique of 
international trade law, on the other hand, in establishing the unfairness of the international 
 




economic order, and offering proposals to remedy the unjust status quo. The contributions of this 
thesis to the intersection between global justice, development and international trade law can be 
divided into two broad parts.  
The first part, mainly in chapter three, contributes to the theoretical understanding of fairness in 
international economic law through the distillation of five overarching, interconnected, and 
complementary conceptual principles that are rooted in the philosophies, ethics and values of 
global distributive justice, the right to development and the TWAIL. To reiterate, the five 
conceptual principles are the adoption and integration of development (both in its theoretical and 
human rights forms) as the central objective of international economic and trade policies; the 
operationalisation, reimagination, and restructuring of the idea of differential treatment in trade 
policies; mainstreaming human rights (including economic, social, civil and political rights) in 
international trade policies and agreements; entrenching the ideals of equality of participation and 
transparency in international trade negotiations and other economic practices; and the expansion 
of global social responsibility which should promote mechanisms to ensure that participants in the 
international economic/business relations imbibe ethical values that would eliminate practices that 
hurt vulnerable humans and the environment. 
Beyond the novelty of the five conceptual principles that are particularly justified from the 
viewpoints of the three theoretical/normative approaches, this thesis, in chapter three, also 
individually explored some crucial discussions surrounding the three approaches that may be of 
concern to academics, policymakers and activists for, perhaps, future deliberation and 
development. An example of such is the discussion concerning the recognition and legal status of 
the right to development (which is not limited to the UNDRD) in section 3.2.5, which may be 
argued to have attained the level of a peremptory or authoritative international law, and from which 
states cannot deviate (i.e., jus cogens). The significance of deliberating on this subject matter is in 
order to determine the extent of its applicability in the international political, economic and legal 
processes, which will therefore serve as a basis for future works/strategies for the improvement of 
its recognition and operationalisation.  
Similarly, section 3.3.5 also explored the continuing philosophical debate on the global 
applicability of the difference theory of Rawls’s distributive justice principles – even though Rawls 
himself disagreed with its global applicability. This thesis reaffirmed the positions of scholars such 
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as Garcia, Pogge, and Buchanan in asserting that the inherent nature of modern globalisation and 
global governance is sufficient justification for the obligation of the distributive justice principles 
in international trade relations. Relying on the mentioned authors, this thesis concluded that not 
only does the structure of the international economic governance satisfy Rawls’s “basic structure”, 
which is Rawls’s ideal nature of society where his theory can apply, it also contradicts moral 
universalism, to which Rawls also subscribes, to maintain an economic order that arbitrarily 
discriminates in favour of the well-off societies against the global underprivileged.  
Furthermore, by also bringing the Third World critical approach into the discourse of global 
fairness in IEO, it would help in mainstreaming the ignored historical realities, such as slavery and 
colonialism, that have largely shaped the present underdevelopment and dependency status of 
many developing countries. It also established that those historical barbarities are firmly rooted in 
and facilitated by international law, and which are still sustained in today’s principles and 
hierarchical structures of international governance. As such, TWAIL helps in bringing to the fore 
of international legal scholarship those defining realities of the global system that are barely 
acknowledged in the footnotes of mainstream international legal writings, by deconstructing the 
erroneous pedagogy that misrepresents the present system as fair, humane, equitable, transparent, 
and as a product of equal participation. The realisation and acknowledgement that the IEO was 
built upon injustices would contribute to the consideration of appropriate policies, assuming the 
existence of the political will, to remedy the status quo.  
Ultimately, the theoretical section of this thesis demonstrates how multiple approaches, 
notwithstanding their possible contestations, may be brought together in providing conceptual 
contributions that may remedy the unfair state of the global economic order, which has 
significantly contributed and continues to sustain the underdevelopment of the poorer nations. It 
must be emphasised that the theoretical/normative approach adopted to discuss the existing 
unfairness in the IEO is due to the fact that the traditional black-letter approach of analysing legal 
problems within an existing legal structure/idea is inadequate to remedy the fundamental 
normative anomaly of the IEO. 
The second part of this thesis’s major contribution to knowledge is the case study in chapter four, 
which normatively critiqued the SCM Agreement. The chapter provides both economic and legal 
backgrounds for the usage of subsidies in international trade law, and thereafter normatively 
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critiques the two prohibited subsidies under the Agreement (i.e., export subsidies and local content 
subsidies) through the lenses of the conceptual principles established in chapter three. 
Furthermore, this thesis argued, relying on the infant industry economic theory, that the SCM 
Agreement overly confines the policy space for developing and less-industrialised countries to 
implement strategies that could help in developing their domestic industrial capacities for their 
attainment of global economic competitiveness. The infant industry argument is relevant 
particularly after considering the historical fact that almost all countries that are now classified as 
developed had at their earlier stages of development adopted export subsidies, import-substitution, 
and various protectionist measures that are now prohibited for all, to develop their domestic 
industries. This subsidy rule, according to Chang, is literally an act of “kicking away the ladder” 
by the affluent countries that mainly influence the international trading rules.623 Also, as cited in 
multiple sections of this thesis, the evidence of the successful implementation of various infant 
industry policies that include the now prohibited subsidies by some East Asian countries (referred 
to as the “East Asian Miracle” by a World Bank report)624 is a justifiable economic rationale to 
guarantee a similar policy space for less-industrialised countries. 
The restrictive provisions of the SCM Agreement that unfairly confronts the implementation of 
pressing development objectives by less-industrialised countries, therefore, gives relevance to the 
operationalisation of the five conceptual principles in the context of subsidies in international trade 
law. In providing a pragmatic proposal to reform the SCM Agreement, this thesis proposed the 
introduction of a special category of subsidy, named the “Non-Actionable Developmental 
Subsidies” (NADS). As mentioned in section 4.5.1.3, the general ambition of NADS is to shield 
(or limit in some cases) the usage of certain development-motivated subsidies that satisfy defined 
criteria from potential countervailing actions. While NADS represents a conceptual sketch of how 
equity and development-centred policies could be integrated into the subsidies regime, it is 
nonetheless acknowledged that aspects of the idea would still need to be deliberated upon and 
developed by relevant experts.  
As concluding thoughts, the final chapter (in sections 5.1 and 5.2) offers two general 
recommendations on how development-centred concerns, particularly the conceptual principles, 
 
623 Chang (n 425). 
624 World Bank (n 460). 
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can be operationalised in the WTO agreements and adjudicatory process. The first proposal is 
concerning how fundamental development objectives could be adopted as the grundnorm of the 
international trade policy process and adjudication. Inspired by Kant’s idea of the basic norm, this 
thesis proposed the establishment of a hierarchical legal order in international trade law, in which 
certain legal notions, derived from and justified by the equity and development-centred conceptual 
principles, would be considered superior to all other legal norms and provisions. This is aimed at 
resolving the constant frictions that exist in the WTO policymaking and adjudicatory process 
between development and human rights norms, on the one hand, and trade liberalisation, on the 
other hand. This thesis strongly opines that the other should always prevail above the latter. 
Furthermore, while this research acknowledges that there could be multiple ways of achieving its 
grundnorm ambition, it suggested the introduction of a “development supremacy clause” in WTO 
agreements that would relegate all other competing values and considerations below the status of 
fundamental development and human rights concerns. Lastly, after several criticisms about the 
SDT provisions for their normative and pragmatic inadequacies, this thesis concluded the final 
substantive chapter with some thoughts on how the differential treatments could be improved and 
operationalised. The first is on the need to define the specific economic and development 
objectives of each SDT provisions, in order to serve as an instrument to evaluate their success as 
well as guarantee transparency. The second is the need to facilitate internal and external 
mechanisms to serve as checks and balances for the strengthening of WTO development policies. 
Thirdly, this thesis argued for the reconsideration of the current development categorisation of 
countries, particularly developing countries, as the status quo which categorises countries of 
diverse development levels into a one-size-fits-all policy grouping is not adequate for fair 
development policymaking. Finally, this thesis emphasised the need to innovate other tools to 
achieve and mainstream development objectives in the WTO law beyond SDT provisions, which 
reduces development concerns to mere exceptions to the general trading rules or an afterthought.  
Finally, notwithstanding the contributions of this thesis to the debates on global economic justice 
as well as the improvement of the international subsidies regime, it, however, acknowledges its 
limitations in terms of scope. This is because the subject of global economic justice and the 
multiple dimensions involved in it is not such that can be exhausted in a doctoral thesis. For 
instance, while this thesis focussed broadly on the imbalance between the Global South and the 
Global North in its theoretical and case study analyses, other economic distributive concerns, such 
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as gender and racial inequities in the contexts of women or indigenous people were not covered in 
this thesis. Similarly, there could be other relevant theoretical and critical approaches, beyond 
Rawls’ Justice as Fairness, RTD, or even TWAIL that could also be explored in relation to the 
international economic order. Furthermore, while this thesis has only applied its five conceptual 
principles to critique an aspect of the SCM Agreement (prohibited subsidies) as its case study, 
further research could explore how other aspects of international trade and economic relations 
could also be subjected to critical scrutiny of the conceptual principles. A relevant example could 
be how the conceptual principles could be adopted to proffer normative solutions to the global 
inequities and human rights challenges arising from the TRIPS Agreement, especially if one 
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